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This thesis investigates the negative affect of ‘spectatorial embarrassment’, a 
feeling of exposure and discomfort sometimes experienced when looking at art.  
Two particular characteristics of embarrassment figure in the methodology and the 
outcome of this enquiry; firstly that embarrassment is marginal, of little orthodox 
value, and secondly, it is a personal experience of aversive self-consciousness.  
The experiential nature of embarrassment has been adopted throughout as a 
methodology and the embarrassments analysed are, for the most part, my own and 
based on ‘true’ experience.  Precedent for this is drawn from ‘anecdotal theory’, 
which uses event and occasion in the origination of a counter-theory that values 
minor narratives of personal experience in place of the generalising and abstract 
tendencies of theory-proper. 
 
The context is a series of encounters with artworks by Gilbert & George, Jemima 
Stehli, Franko B, Adrian Howells, and Sarah Lucas.  They are connected by their 
contemporaneity, their ‘British-ness’, and that they allow the spectator no 
comfortable position to look from.  This enquiry engages with theories of ‘the gaze’ 
(as both aesthetic disinterest and a dubious sign of cultural competence) and the 
challenge to aesthetic disinterest made by ‘transgressive art’ which may provoke a 
more engaged, even embodied response.   
 
Each encounter sparks consideration of differing causes and outcomes of 
embarrassment that resonate beyond art to broader sociocultural territories 
particularly in terms of gender and class.  The approach taken is inherently 
interdisciplinary, situated within the affective turn, and engaging with feminist and 
queer discourses.  Moments of embarrassment as ‘thinking-feeling’ are finally 
configured as a critical epistemology, or a ‘body of knowledge’ offering the 
opportunity to value the singular  truth of embarrassment as an embodied criticality 
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An  Introduction to Embarrassment 
 
 
This project was sparked by a chance encounter with a curious quotation; 
  We wanted to do art to be embarrassed.  Art that embarrasses ourselves. 
I think we still do that.  We are very embarrassed sometimes at what we are 
doing, and that’s a good feeling.  When it hurts then its true for us.1   
 
The sentiment expressed by Gilbert & George made me pause, for I too sometimes 
feel embarrassed by art.  As a spectator, I am sometimes embarrassed by an 
encounter with an image which can hurt, like a punctum, and I find I am drawn to 
images that have this capacity; images that unsettle, unnerve, that undo my sense of 
self.  I am not speaking of a strong emotional response; of the impact of the sublime, 
of shock, or disgust, but a more minor affect; an awkwardness, a sense of the 
inappropriate, accompanied perhaps by a double-take, a look-and-look-away.  
These small but dysphoric feelings are at odds with accepted notions of aesthetic 
appreciation, or indeed any kind of appreciation.  In what way is this ‘a good 
feeling’?  Gilbert and George’s claim that embarrassment is a productive artistic 
strategy that they link to creativity (and to love) has prompted me to reconsider 
embarrassment, both as a spectatorial experience and as a critical device.2  The 
questions I want to consider are; within the context of spectatorship, how does 
                                                 
1
 The comment on embarrassment was originally made to Anthony d’Offay and recalled by 
Gilbert in ‘London’s Living Sculpture: Interview with Robert Becker 1982’ Gilbert&George, 
The Words of Gilbert & George (London: Thames & Hudson, 1997). p136.   
2
 Mark Lawson interviewed G&G in 2011 and asked them to comment on the 
embarrassment quote, they replied that it is still very relevant to their creative processes: 
George: ‘The only thing we can compare it with is when one’s deeply attracted to a new 
person, then everything else is different not just that person, but the house and the garden, 
and the air, the atmosphere, everything is exalted because of that feeling.’   
Gilbert:  ‘It is embarrassing, it is difficult . . . you would like to run away from it.’  
George:  Its exciting. 
Gilbert:  And it’s exciting because it is that edge, it must be like being on the front no?  It is 
all exciting and nervous making, and at the same time that’s the best thing that you can do. 
Louise Bourner, "Mark Lawson Talks to Gilbert and George,"  (BBC, 2011).   
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embarrassment figure as part of the experience of art?  And, does this minor and 
negative feeling tender a possible outcome that is in any way worthwhile?  
 
 
OUTLINING  A CONTEXT  
Despite the current increased interest in emotions of ‘the affective turn’, a growing 
cultural and critical attention to emotion; what it is, and what it does, embarrassment 
is underrepresented.  It has received some attention from psychological 
perspectives, notably in the works of Robert J. Edelman (1987), W. Ray Crozier 
(1990), Michael Lewis (1995), and Rowland S. Miller (1996), but this is much less 
consideration than other emotions such as grief, shame or anger have received.3  
Embarrassment is a minority subject of self-help books that present it as a wholly 
negative experience that can, with courage, be avoided or overcome.4  For the 
sociological view of embarrassment, the seminal text is (still) Erving Goffman’s mid 
twentieth-century essay ‘Embarrassment and Social Organization’ which interprets 
embarrassment as a temporary failure of self which acts to moderate behaviour, 
enforcing and reinforcing social norms.5   
 
Two notable texts consider embarrassment within a cultural context; firstly Keats 
and Embarrassment by Christopher Ricks, who argues that Keats’ poetry and 
private correspondence show evidence of a remarkable sensitivity to 
embarrassment, and that this is indicative of emotional and indeed moral 
                                                 
3
 A search on Amazon for books on single emotions within the category of ‘Society, Politics 
and Philosophy’ generated the following numbers of published titles: Happiness; 2109,  
Grief; 2066, Fear; 1550, Anxiety; 912, Pride; 630, Anger; 592, Shame; 386, Envy; 140, 
Jealousy; 121, Disgust; 48, Embarrassment; 39. 
4
 Such as; Allyn, D. I Can’t Believe I Just Did That: How Embarrassment Can Wreak Havoc 
in Your Life – and What You Can Do to Conquer It (2004), and, Markaway, B. G. Carmin, 
C.N., Pollard, C.A., and Flynn, T. Dying of Embarrassment: Help for Social Anxiety & Phobia 
(1992) 
5
 ‘Embarrassment and Social Organization’ in Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on 
Face-to-Face Behaviour (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967). 
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intelligence.6  And in Stage Fright, Animals and Other Theatrical Problems, Nicholas 
Ridout theorises embarrassment as the ‘predicament of the audience’; a situation in 
which the audience is ‘caught looking’ and this is figured as a form of exposure, 
almost an indecent exposure, that in its difficulty  is a cause of both pleasure and 
pain.  But beyond these texts, embarrassment is without a critical discourse.  It 
figures in fiction, but academically has been largely ignored.  Ridout notes that 
embarrassment ‘does not make theoretical claims, but subsists in the empirical.’7  
Can there be a theory of embarrassment, or are the two terms quite irreconcilable?  
Embarrassment as an academic subject is small and self-effacing, it is anxious to 
be overlooked and complicit in its own marginalisation.  In fact, the problem seems 
to be one of tautology; embarrassment is embarrassing.   
 
The lack of interest in embarrassment cannot be fully explained by its negativity; 
other dysphoric emotions have their discourses.  This seems to be particularly the 
case in queer theory, where there is a rich vein of enquiry into the dynamic between 
negative affect and critical thinking.  In Queer Optimism Michael Snediker discusses 
this, noting queer theory’s ‘habitation of this pessimistic field’ and proposing that this 
reflects a concern with ‘ontological instabilities’.8  Queer work of this stripe might 
include the following writers and texts:  Judith Butler cites melancholy as constitutive 
of gender strategies, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick  inhabits shame, writing from within on 
its queer and critical potential and she is followed by others writing on shame as the 
queer emotion.  In No Future, Lee Edelman mines the death drive to think almost 
unthinkable opposites to futurity.  Leo Bersani advocates the potential of self-
shattering as a disintegration of self through sexuality, and replicated in art and  
                                                 
6
 Christopher Ricks, Keats and Embarrassment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).  p1. 
7
 Nicholas Ridout, Stage Fright, Animals and Other Theatrical Problems (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). p84. 
8
 Michael D. Snediker, Queer Optimism: Lyric Personhood and Other Felicitous Persuasions 
(Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2009). p4. 
8 
 
criticism.  Judith Halberstam writes about The Queer Art of Failure which runs 
counter to what she terms ‘the toxic positivity of contemporary life’ asking instead, 
what reward does failure offer?  Lauren Berlant writes about the disappointment of 
Cruel Optimism as an endlessly self-defeating desire.  Jane Gallop has edited an 
edition of Women’s Studies Quarterly on Envy, another disprised and disavowed 
feeling.  Sianne Ngai has produced a ‘bestiary’ of Ugly Feelings, which includes 
irritation and anxiety, arguing for the critical potential of ‘the aesthetics of negative 
emotions’.   
 
A sizeable number of writers and theorists then have attended to the critical ‘value’ 
of other disagreeable feelings, and largely, they are not works of rehabilitation or re-
valorisation.  There is a (sometimes) tacit understanding that the project of these 
various texts is not to promote the qualities of negative feelings as neatly reversed 
to constitute positivity, but to explore a negative value on its own terms.  Edelman 
makes this point explicitly, describing his work as; ‘. . . the impossible project of 
queer opositionality that would oppose itself to the structural determinants of politics 
as such, which is also to say, that would oppose itself to the logic of opposition.’9  
 
In ‘opposing the logic of opposition’ Edelman, and other theorists working in the field 
of negative affect have opened up a critical space in which it is possible to sidestep 
the usual prescriptive binaries, attending instead to areas of ambivalence and 
ambiguity, and so to ascribe some value to the worthless, and to look at the 
overlooked without converting it.  This thesis, conceived within that space, and 
without an agenda of revalorisation, proposes embarrassment as a significant 
addition to the existent and emergent negative bestiary.  What I believe 
embarrassment has to offer is a singular mode of embodied thinking, and this thesis 
                                                 
9
 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2004). p4. 
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aims to investigate that and to develop a critical epistemology of embarrassment that 
can offer some understanding of the apparent perversity of describing 
embarrassment as ‘a good feeling’. 
 
Mostly, as I shall argue, embarrassment longs for the sameness of ‘normal’ of 
composure, harmony, evenness, equanimity, or as Lauren Berlant in The Female 
Complaint, says, ‘okayness’.10  But instead, embarrassment is experienced as 
unsettled, disquieted, out of kilter, standing out and disadvantageously differenced.  
One shade of ‘okayness’ that is particularly relevant to the context of art 
spectatorship explored here, is a ‘cultural competence’, a feeling of legitimacy that 
intersects with the lived experience of class.  Alongside this, the difference that I 
have focussed on in this thesis is that of gender, rich in connotations of trouble, 
inescapably vexed and sexed.  Certainly, other differences are grounds for 
embarrassment; age, and race for instance have their own particular 
embarrassments both within and without the context of art.  And there are of course 
many other non-art embarrassments that might occur from time to time; the social 
faux pas, or the failure to suppress a fart: but they are not considered here.  Within 
the scope of this enquiry it is impossible to do justice to all potential 
embarrassments, and so I am committed to a narrow, perhaps even parochial scope 
delineated by a small number of encounters with art.  The embarrassments they 
have thrown up revolve around my own experience of being female, feminist, 
curious, single, and sentimental.  Rather than gloss over the broad extent of all 




                                                 
10
 Lauren Berlant, The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in 




The Oxford English Dictionary gives a potential origin of ‘embarrass’ as the 
Portuguese embaraçar from baraço a halter, and I imagine myself wearing one 
when I have made an ass of myself. 
 
My working definition of embarrassment for this thesis builds on studies of emotion 
written from the perspectives of sociology and psychology which at its most succinct, 
would be that embarrassment is ‘an aversive self-consciousness’.  That definition is 
however further inflected and informed by supplementary interpretations from 
etymology, linguistics, queer theory, gender studies, literature, and philosophy.  I am 
particularly concerned with embarrassment as a ‘loss of face’, or ‘the discrediting of 
one’s own image’, as a discredit that works to endorse social norms of being and 
belonging.  And as I am writing about embarrassment, I feel bound to pay attention 
to words as both cause and effect.  I take embarrassment to be an awkwardness, 
perhaps even an awkwardness of language.   
 
Dictionary definitions of embarrassment give a number of different strands of 
meaning not strictly pertaining to emotion but suggestive of feeling.  Embarrassment 
is a blockage that impedes progress derived from ‘embaras’, an accumulation of 
driftwood blocking a waterway.  The concept of a blockage is explored in thesis both 
thematically and in the methodology as a moment of pause . . . when thought is 
interrupted by emotion.  As I shall discuss, a framework for thinking through the 
blockage of embarrassment and harnessing the pause it creates as a moment of 
cathectic intensity is offered by the somewhat outdated resources of anecdotal 
theory and reader-response criticism.  The concept of a blockage also resonates 
11 
 
with Erving Goffman’s account of embarrassment in the social context as a moment 
when the self is present but ‘not “in play”’.11 
 
Embarrassment is also defined as a difficulty, and as a difficulty, embarrassment is 
often financial, and can be a difficulty of either too much or too little.  Difficulty as 
lack is a ‘financial embarrassment’ or ‘pecuniary difficulties’, and as Ridout observes, 
the wordiness of ‘being unable to meet one’s obligations’ seems to euphemistically 
avoid speaking plainly of debt, and only makes matters worse.  In contradiction to 
the inferred lack stands the description of excess as ‘an embarrassment of riches’ 
which is more than one knows what to do with.  Whilst an explicitly financial 
embarrassment is considered in Chapter Three, more broadly, instances of both lack 
and excess are explored throughout as elemental to embarrassment. 
 
Furthermore, embarrassment is defined as a state of doubt; it is a complication, 
perhaps the self-inflicted convolution of a predicament of our own making.  The 
doubtfulness of embarrassment is manifested in this thesis as an instability of 
knowledge and of claims to knowledge, in fact, on the important critical position of 
confusion or doubtfulness that embarrassment can produce.  When so much of the 
meaning and indeed value of contemporary art is predicated on spectatorial 
response, the spectator may feel burdened by a duty of care towards the artwork, to 
have the right response, the right sort of response, to know what we are expected 
know and feel what we are expected to feel.   At times however, spectatorial 
response may be quite insubstantial or awkward to articulate. 
 
From the viewpoint of the social and psychological sciences, embarrassment is 
generally defined as an ‘unpleasant self-consciousness’.  And that turn towards the 
self is used here first and foremost to focus attention, within the parameters of the 
                                                 
11
 Goffman, Interaction Ritual p101. 
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spectator-text relationship, on the spectatorial self rather than on the text.  It also 
authorises a personal approach to myself as subject and to subjectivity per se.   
 
Embarrassment, is a complex, self-conscious emotion, and shares some 
characteristics with shame, guilt and pride in that it requires awareness of self/other 
and of social expectations.  It is defined in both somatic and cognitive terms; as a 
physiological condition, of blushing, or clamminess, of increased blood pressure, 
averted gaze, nervous and ineffectual gestures; and also as having a strong 
intellectual element of self-reflexiveness as an estimation of impaired worth or value.  
There has been little agreement on the question of whether or not embarrassment is 
sufficiently innate to qualify as a ‘basic emotion’, and this remains in dispute.12  One 
proposal is that embarrassment is a ‘derived emotional state’ that builds on a basic 
emotion that we have no word for in English but involves ‘unwelcome attention from 
others’ which causes an aversive self-consciousness.13  A detailed sociological 
account of embarrassment, its signs, causes and development is given by Miller in 
Embarrassment: Poise and Peril in Everyday Life.  He provides both theoretical and 
methodological comparison of differing concepts of embarrassment, and of the 
various empirical studies that have been carried out.  His own view is that 
embarrassment is a basic emotion but has ‘fuzzy boundaries’ with other emotional 
states such as anxiety and shame.  The differences and similarities that exist 
between embarrassment and its near neighbours, anxiety and shame will be 
discussed later in this introduction.   
                                                 
12
  A ‘basic emotion’ is generally agreed to be both psychologically and biologically innate, 
and not to contain any other emotions as sub-divisional parts.  The basic emotions are 
thought to be irreducible; their occurrence is automatic and non-cognitive.  They are 
experienced in common throughout diverse cultures and produce distinctive physiological 
responses that differentiate them from the more complex and compound emotions and 
emotional states.  Prinz lists ‘the big six’ as happiness, sadness, fear, surprise, anger, and 
disgust.  Some theorists have proposed the inclusion of other emotions, including 
embarrassment (Miller 1996 and Ekman 1999) but there is no widespread agreement on this 
and it is not unusual for theorists to revise previous lists of basic emotions. 
13
 Jesse J. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotions (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004).  ‘Wierzbicka (1999) provides linguistic evidence for the claim that 
embarrassment builds on a basic emotion with no exact name in English’. p156. 
13 
 
There are two further aspects of embarrassment that emerge from social and 
scientific studies of emotion which prove to be significant; firstly, that embarrassment 
always assumes the presence, either real or imagined, of an ‘other’, and secondly, 
that there are two strands to embarrassment in which the ‘other’ is elemental.  The 
two parts of embarrassment involve exposure and evaluation and it is ‘the other’ to 
whom we are exposed, and by whom we are evaluated.  The other sees and judges, 
and, presumably, finds (me) wanting.  The existence of two separate (but almost 
inseparable) strands is theorised by Michael Lewis who establishes that the capacity 
to experience the two parts of embarrassment develops sequentially during 
childhood.14  First comes the self-conscious ‘exposure embarrassment’ dependant 
on cognitive skills and self-referential capacities requiring the maturity to know the 
difference between self and other.  The child is seen by one that he knows is not he, 
and he also knows that the ‘he’ that is seen is his self.   
 
The second stage adds that ‘self’ and ‘other’ are not only different, but that 
differences are value laden, and so the relation between the seer and the seen is 
hierarchical.  In this second stage, the development of the capacity for ‘evaluation 
embarrassment’ requires additional knowledge of social norms, and an aspiration to 
conform, to excel, or to please.  This time, embarrassment causes the child to 
realise that he has failed to do, or be, what was expected of him and that his failure 
has been seen by the other.  Lewis defines evaluation embarrassment as ‘the 
discrediting of one’s own image’, and the discredit, like the other may be either real 
or imagined.  Embarrassment then, lies in the perceived attention of the other, and 
the failure of the self, in this very moment, to be, and to be seen to be, as good as it 
should be, or could be.   
 
                                                 
14
 Michael Lewis, "Embarrassment: The Emotion of Self-Exposure and Evaluation," in Self 
Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride, ed. June 
Price Tangney and Kurt W. Fischer(New York: The Guildford Press, 1995). 
14 
 
Turning towards the humanities, I want to add two further accounts of 
embarrassment that have contributed to my understanding, and have shaped both 
the context and methodology of my research.  Jean-Paul Sartre’s account in both 
theory and fiction of embarrassment as an agonising, obsessive self-consciousness 
has highlighted the limitations of ‘theory’, but also encouraged me to be ruthless in 
my introspection, and Roland Barthes, who frequently mentions embarrassment 
lightly, in passing, as a minor but noteworthy experience provides a paradigm for 
paying attention to the embodied and situated self as a way of thinking.  From 
Sartre, I take embarrassment as an intense exposure that is a threat to my 
subjectivity, a slavery that denies my mastery.  But it is from Barthes that I take 
embarrassment as a discomfort to be lived. 
  
Sartre’s existentialist philosophy, particularly Being and Nothingness, is often 
invoked in relation to shame, and this will be considered later in this thesis, but in 
Sartre’s works of fiction it is embarrassment rather than shame that figures 
frequently and vividly as an acute self-consciousness over the sometimes trivial 
matters of existence.  Those of his characters, who exist for the reader from the 
inside out, suffer the exposure and evaluation of embarrassment; they feel 
disappointment in their appearance, their behaviour, their thoughts and motivations.  
They are pitilessly analytical of their own smallest feelings.  In The Age of Reason, 
for example, there is the following encounter in a bookshop between Daniel Sereno 
and Boris Serguine.  They are discussing philosophy. 
‘I suppose you like it,’ said Sereno. 
‘Yes’ said Boris who felt himself blushing for the second time.  He hated 
talking about what he liked: it was indecent.  He had the impression that 
Sereno guessed as much, and was being deliberately tactless.  Sereno eyed 
him with an air of penetrating intentness.15  
 
                                                 
15
 Jean Paul Sartre, The Age of Reason, trans., Eric Sutton (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1979 (first published 1945)). p145. 
15 
 
For Sartre the exposure of ‘being seen’ is always an adverse condition, giving ‘the 
other’ an advantage, even in the abstract; from The Reprieve; ‘A look.  A vast look, 
an empty sky: she struggled in that look, like an insect in a shaft of light.’16  What 
Sartre captures is the idea of embarrassment.  The self he imagines caught like an 
insect, is the conscious, thinking self; its corporeal body is an inconvenience, carried 
around like an embarrassing parcel.   
 
Barthes, on the other hand thinks with his body; hunger, itching, apathy are 
experienced, and described, from the point of view of an embodied intellect.  
Barthes’ view of embarrassment may be gleaned from this account of a shortage of 
money.  
 This art subsisted, incorruptible, amid every financial crisis; not misery as a 
 family experience, but embarrassment; . . . This endurable privation (as 
 embarrassment always is) may account for a little philosophy of free 
 compensation, of the overdetermination of pleasures, of ease (which is 
 the exact antonym of embarrassment).17 
 
Barthes attends to the embodiment of the idea.  For him, embarrassment is a 
personal discomfort of both mind and body.   Barthes, particularly in his later works 
is a significant resource, running like a thread throughout this thesis.  This is clearly 
visible in the use of specifically Barthesian concepts such as the punctum, an 
almost unspeakable spectatorial disruption, and the biographeme, a momentary 
flicker of ‘self’ that interrupts the narrative structure of biography.  This thread also 
underwrites themes of marginalism, individualism, corporealism, and the flawed 
nature of the writing self.  Furthermore, Barthesian thinking is embedded in the work 
of other writers whose work I engage with, particularly Nancy Miller and Jane Gallop 
                                                 
16
 Jean Paul Sartre, The Reprieve, trans., Gerard Hopkins (London: Penguin Books, 2001 
(first published 1949)). p321. 
17
 Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes, trans., Richard Howard (USA: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1989). p45.   
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who developed the discursive potential of the gendered, embodied, situated, and 
contingent self as a catalyst for critical thought. 
 
The last piece in my composite definition is descriptive; an attempt to capture the 
unruly, feeling-ness of experience in language.  Embarrassment, as an ‘aversive 
self-consciousness’ is, for the narcissistic self, a two-edged sword.  To be looked at, 
to look bad, to imagine that I am looking foolish, is seductively appalling.  
Embarrassment acts as a catalyst for Alice in Wonderland sensations; of being 
oversized and clumsy, the most vast and visible thing on the horizon.  Everybody is 
staring.  I am a large object of ridicule.  This makes me want to shrink, to disappear; 
I would drink from the little poison bottle with the ‘drink me’ label, in the hope of 
shrinking to some vanishing point.  I wish I could fall through a crack in the floor; I 
want the earth to swallow me up.  And yet, just as embarrassment enlarges, it also 
belittles.  I am so small, so despicably insignificant, the smallest and most 
overlooked beetle on the planet.  I crave the ‘eat me’ cake, to regain stature and 
restore equilibrium.  Sometimes, but not always, the feeling of embarrassment is 
manifested in a blush, at the very moment I most desire composure, the confusion 
advertises itself on my face, a bright glowing, drawing attention to itself in a stupid 
act of self-sabotage.  When I most wish to go unnoticed, my face becomes more 
noticeable.  The contradiction of large and small, of visibility and invisibility is 
described by Nicholas Ridout as ‘the action of a body that knows itself to be both 
everything and nothing’.18  This contradiction is, for me, a source of continuing 




                                                 
18
 Ridout, p91.    
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EMBARRASSMENT AND ITS NEIGHBOURS: 
Embarrassment may be imagined as situated within a continuum of feeling and 
according to Miller cited above, shares ‘fuzzy boundaries’ with its near neighbours.  
On one side are the milder feelings of modesty and self-consciousness, followed by 
anxiety and then embarrassment, and on the other, the weightier and darker feelings 
of shame and guilt.   In defining embarrassment it might be helpful to consider two of 
the feelings that it is sometimes likened to, but different from. 
 
(i) ANXIETY- EMBARRASSMENT 
Whilst there are some similarities between anxiety and embarrassment they are 
relatively superficial and result largely from proximity and overlap.  A person in an 
unfamiliar or stressful situation might be anxious about the possibility of 
embarrassment, or alternatively, might be embarrassed about displaying anxiety 
when they would have preferred to appear confident.  Furthermore, an anxious 
person might be prone to a high degree of embarrassability or an easily 
embarrassed person may be frequently anxious about being ambushed by 
embarrassment.  Whilst some somatic similarities are evident, the significant 
difference between the two feelings is one of timing; anxiety is forward looking and 
anticipatory whilst embarrassment is reactive and contingent on event, incident, or 
scenario and so is a feeling of a present moment.  Even when embarrassment is 
remembered, and of a past moment, it tends to make us re-live the moment, the 
feeling, and so becomes again insistently present tense.    
 
(ii) EMBARRASSMENT -  SHAME 
The difference between these two is often characterised as nothing more than 
intensity, but that is an over-simplification.  Additionally, the moral valence of 
embarrassment is much weaker than that of shame; although embarrassment 
18 
 
diminishes the kudos of the self, its causes are usually inadvertent and innocent, but 
shame, in contrast, generally indicates wrong-doing and dishonour.  Miller argues 
that besides intensity and moral valence, a third difference between embarrassment 
and shame is levity; embarrassment is often ridiculous whilst shame is no laughing 
matter.  For an entertaining account of the difference between embarrassment and 
shame it is hard to better Ridout.  He characterises shame as deep and significant, 
worthy of the attention of philosophers, whilst embarrassment is an insignificant 
interloper.  Of embarrassment he writes; 
In its mildness, in its minority, lies its impropriety.  It is improper shame, 
shame in the wrong place, shame that ought to be ashamed of itself for 
manifesting itself at all and laying claim to the name of shame.19  
 
The impropriety that Ridout claims for embarrassment, I think lies partly in its 
effrontery in being too self-interested.  The self is a proper (and popular) subject of 
study providing it remains abstract, but when it is real and personal, it is immoderate 
and immodest.  Also, embarrassment can be a concern for appearance, rather than 
reality.  It bothers itself over how things seem.  It is a silly concern for the self, a 
vanity over self-image.  But what could be more important than how things seem? 
 
The fact that embarrassment is frequently suggested to be a minor shame, or shame 
about something of only minor importance may account for its relegation within the 
spectrum of emotions, to a very humble status, and often mentioned in studies of 
emotion only in a footnote.  Contrastingly, shame is extensively analysed and 
theorised and there are a number of writers, whose work on ‘shame’ is relevant to 
embarrassment, and I feel obliged to provide some justification for (shamelessly) 
using them.   
 
                                                 
19
 Ridout, p84. 
19 
 
In Affect, Imagery, Consciousness, and Exploring Affect Tomkins extensively uses 
the term ‘shame’ to describe feelings that are certainly, to my English sensibility, 
more properly understood as embarrassment.  Tomkins (an American) uses ‘shame’ 
to name the whole axis of feelings that range from shyness and mild exposure 
embarrassment to the self-contempt of deep and lasting proper shame.  This is 
Tomkins’ account of the arousal of ‘shame’.  
. . . because one is suddenly looked at by one who is strange, or because 
one wishes to look at or commune with another person but suddenly cannot 
because he is strange, or one expected him to be familiar but he suddenly 
appears unfamiliar, or one started to smile but found one was smiling at a 
stranger.20  
 
This, for me, describes not shame but embarrassment with a remarkable degree of 
precision.  It accurately accounts for the foolishness, the inadvertency, and the 
mildness; it is relational and conflates image and imaginary in visual terms of 
strangeness. 
 
Elspeth Probyn’s work on shame, makes some similar claims to those I will make for 
embarrassment, for example, that shame can be self-evaluative.  Following 
Tomkins, she argues that shame is connected to interest.  Shame happens when 
interest is almost, but not completely eradicated.  For Probyn, the potential of shame 
is crystallized in the following quote from Tomkins; ‘ . . . the pulsations of cathexis 
around shame, of all things, are what either enable or disenable so basic a function 
as the ability to be interested in the world.’21  This serves to highlight the difference 
between her work on shame and mine on embarrassment.  Probyn moves outward 
from shame to consider collective shame in ‘national and cultural narratives’ as an 
interest ‘in the world’ whereas for me, embarrassment persists in returning to the 
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very much smaller sphere of the self, so that when she writes of a politics of shame, 
it is a national and cultural politics, but my politics of embarrassment is tethered to a 
more inward looking identity politics.  As Ridout comments; ‘Where shame can 
define a culture, embarrassment wouldn’t presume’.22   
 
Jean-Paul Sartre writes of shame and embarrassment with embarrassment 
pertaining specifically to the embodied self and shame used more widely and more 
abstractly as an affect experienced in contexts of ‘being-in-itself’.  The interesting 
differentiation between the two in Sartre’s work is that shame occurs most frequently 
in his theoretical philosophy, and embarrassment is more prevalent in his fiction.  
This bears out Ridout’s observation quoted earlier that embarrassment makes no 
theoretical claims but ‘subsists in the empirical.’  Shame is effective as a 
philosophical proposition; embarrassment is no more than a feeling.  For Sartre, the 
experience of shame carries a moral weight that seems not to be predicated on any 
actual wrongdoing, but merely on being objectified and that this is in itself ‘shameful’.  
Sartre contends that there is such a thing as ‘original shame’, which like ‘original sin’ 
is an inescapable problem of being.   
Modesty and in particular the fear of being surprised in a state of nakedness 
are only a symbolic specification of original shame; the body symbolises here 
our defenceless state as objects.  To put on clothes is to hide one’s object 
state; it is to claim the right of seeing without being seen; that is to be pure 
subject.23   
 
Whilst I doubt the state of nakedness could or should be claimed as intrinsically 
shameful, I do believe it can, in some situations, be embarrassing, and furthermore, I 
would suggest that nakedness can stand symbolically for the exposure of 
embarrassment; for the self as object.  In the artworks considered here, nakedness 
is a recurring theme, each time raising issues of exposure and object-ness.  
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On trying to reconcile Sartre’s shame with my embarrassment there might be some 
cultural differences worth considering.24  Christopher Ricks notes;  
Much as God may move men to shame but not, apparently to 
embarrassment, so the French tradition, or certainly the existentialist one, 
always seeks to assimilate all embarrassment to shame, guilt, and 
unworthiness, and not at all to shyness, modesty, and innocence.25 
 
Ricks suggests that there is perhaps something about the English sensibility that 
might enjoy or suffer a high degree of embarrassability.  This seems to belong to the 
shallow end of embarrassment, close to modesty and shyness, and is also marked 
by a tendency towards being overly concerned with appearances, respectability, and 
with the opinions of others.  Ricks discusses the difference between English and 
‘foreign’, particularly French sensibilities in the literature of Dickens and Laclos.  He 
argues that whilst the English show a great degree of embarrassability, the French 
are characterised by unembarrassability.  Ridout, perhaps betraying a preference for 
Les Liaisons Dangereuses over Our Mutual Friend, paraphrases Ricks’ distinction;  
‘embarrassment is an English thing, a sort of shifty Protestant, wet climate pseudo 
effect, a pasty substitute for the red-blooded, continental, fleshy, silk-knickered, 
sensation that is shame.’26  The marginality of embarrassment that is quite important 
to this project is manifested in a polite self-effacement rooted in the idea of Ridout’s 
‘English thing’, and also as an apologetic, second-best-ness of a feeble feeling.  
Embarrassment is not the stuff of passion; it would rather not make a scene.  
However, Ricks’ tongue-in-cheek characterisation of the French as brazen and 
unembarrassable belongs to the context of his work on Keats and so to a 
nineteenth-century sensibility.  Whilst embarrassment as shyness and excessive 
modesty, might be an exclusively ‘English thing’, the pitiless dissection of the 
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embarrassment of being not good-enough, and experienced as aversive self-




SPECTATORIAL  EMBARRASSMENT  
When I look at art, sometimes, it looks back.  It sees me, and it judges me and I feel 
very uncomfortable about that, and that situation and that discomfort, broadly 
outlines the scope of my research.  Occasionally, in the context of art spectatorship 
a moment of confrontation between the artwork and its spectator might be 
experienced as ‘spectatorial embarrassment’.  In this singular experience the 
spectator who is defined by the act of looking is self-reflexively aware of looking.  It 
is her embarrassment and her moment.  The spectator sees herself seeing and 
imagines how she appears to ‘the other’ (the artwork) and so in effect sees from a 
perspective of otherness.  As this confrontation is figured as an incidence of both 
seeing and being seen, subject and object positions are open to interpretation, even 
confusion, and so the self, momentarily, may be objectified, may feel diminished.  
The subjectivity of the self is compromised and she suspects she may look foolish 
or be inadequate and feels embarrassed.  The feeling is not of inferiority to the 
artwork, which might also be inadequate, but of being foolish, inferior or inadequate 
before it. 
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So often, when looking at art, the spectator aspires to possess, or affects to possess 
some degree of critical distance; the critic, the historian, the connoisseur particularly 
so.  But even the civilian, the consumer, the ordinary person frequently assumes a 
position of having/claiming to have, if not knowledge, then at least taste; they claim 
to know what they like.  What if, instead of trying to maintain a ‘critical distance’ we 
got right up close; we exposed ourselves to art?  The exposure that I am proposing 
is neither a grand gesture nor a furtive indecency, but an openness or permeability 
that would expose differences, desires, ignorance, ambivalence, identifications and 
identities.  What if, ignoring the protocols of critique or taste, we admitted how this 
felt?  The embarrassment that we might risk in an exposure to art is about difference 
from normative standards of competence and composure that we understand to be 





Embarrassment is situated within a continuum of feeling that begins in modesty, 
shyness, and self-consciousness, and finally plunges through self-contempt into the 
abyss of shame.  At the level of intensity that we might situate embarrassment, 
Silvan Tomkins states that; ‘it refers more to feeling of inferiority than feelings of  
guilt, and therefore more to responses of proving oneself ‘good’ (in the sense of 
being superior) than to ‘good’ in the moral sense.’28 But in our anxieties about 
difference, we will often settle for less.  We are anxious not to be ‘good’, but to be 
‘good-enough’.29  Our modest aspiration is very often to be ‘normal’.  According to 
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Michael Warner, ‘nearly everyone, it seems, wants to be normal.’  He writes; ‘Of 
course people want individuality as well, but they want their individuality to be the 
normal kind, and given the choice between the two they will take normal.’30   
Embarrassment is a discomfort that punishes us for not being normal, for standing 
out when we should have been fitting in.  It is a sign that we have somehow failed, 
and we know we are not good-enough, without any need to debate what ‘good’ 
looks like; it looks normal. 
 
Goffman’s work on embarrassment within the social context posits embarrassment 
as symptomatic of non-conformance with the standards we are expected to meet 
and he states; ‘In the popular view it is only natural to be at ease during interaction, 
embarrassment being a regrettable deviation from the normal state.’31  Because 
embarrassment is experienced as a negative, slightly unpleasant sensation, and 
also, because it is socially disprised it is normal to avoid it where at all possible.  
Even though embarrassment can be valued as a sign of proper modesty, it is still, in 
most instances, experienced as an ‘ugly feeling’.  Ngai’s work on dysphoric emotions 
defines them as ‘semantically and syntactically negative’, that is; ‘saturated with 
socially stigmatised meanings’, and ‘organised by trajectories of repulsion’.32  
Goffman describes the stigma of embarrassment; ‘ . . . to appear flustered, in our 
society at least, is considered evidence of weakness, inferiority, low status, moral 
guilt, defeat, and other unenviable attributes’33  So when I am embarrassed, my 
attention is centred on a self that is socially discredited, weak, inferior, low, or 
perhaps overly sensitive, or prudish, or narrow minded, or perhaps ill-informed, or 
unfashionable, or foolish.  At the very least, I am not ‘good’.   
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The standard expected of us in any given situation, as Goffman succinctly puts it, of 
being ‘at ease’, stems from competence and is experienced as a mastery of the 
situation, and a feeling of legitimacy.  In the specific situation examined here, that of 
looking at art, the desirable state of competence or legitimacy, may be effectively 
explained by borrowing from Bourdieu, the phrase ‘cultural capital’.34  This is a 
resource that will tend towards protecting the spectator from making a fool of 
herself, from feeling foolish and from the foolish-feeling that is embarrassment. 
Bourdieu’s defines how ‘cultural capital’ and our access to it are central to the 
experience of class structure.  Access to capital, he argues, is a matter of habitus, 
of facticity, and education.  These things determine our levels of competence and 
confidence to be in social and cultural spaces.  Cultural capital is what gives us a 
feeling of legitimacy in the midst of a capacity crowd watching a football match, in a 
gallery in front of a masterpiece or in front of a perplexing contemporary artwork, or 
in a betting shop, at the opera, polo match, PTA meeting, dog fight.  To doubt our 
legitimacy in any given situation, to feel like a fish out of water, is certainly a 
possible precondition for embarrassability. 
 
How ‘cultural capital’ (and its acquisition), as markers of ‘class’ may be determining 
factors in situations of spectatorial embarrassment is considered in this thesis, but to 
only a limited extent.  To survey and analyse the full extent of the class dynamics of 
embarrassment would undoubtedly be an interesting project, but is beyond the 
scope of this enquiry.  Instead, what is incorporated here is a very partial account 
that is rooted in the experience of middle-class-ness.  
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Being middle-class, though materially comfortable is not always ideologically a 
matter of pride.  Those who belong to this social division are notoriously apologetic 
or defensive about their belonging, to the extent that it might be possible that they 
are socially predisposed towards embarrassment.  To be told; ‘you are so middle-
class’ is to be subjected to an intended-insult.  It is to be accused (perhaps quite 
unfairly) of being small-minded, materialistic, conventional, complacent, provincial, 
middle-brow in taste, and not just average, but mediocre.   Where our grandparents 
and parents worked hard, striving for social mobility, working to become middle-
class, later generations now sometimes, belittle their achievements, indulging in 
sentimental and quite spurious claims to be salt-of-the-earth working-class.  There 
is self-evidently no one such thing as ‘middle-class’, but rather a plurality of middle-
classes.  In my own family, one set of grandparents aspired to material comfort, 
social status and respectability, the other set valued advancement through 
education, culture and entrepreneurship.  To a large extent I am a product of their 
values and aspirations and I have learned to appreciate the legacy.   
 
Middle-class-ness in all its plurality is a state of flux.  It is about change, dynamics, 
aspirations, and perhaps above all, taste as Bourdieu underlined with the subtitle of 
his paradigmatic text; A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste.  As we become 
less defined by occupation and money, so we become more divided into tribes by 
the choices we make.  How does a person develop taste, and how does she come 
to judge a cultural artefact or experience as ‘good’ – or not?  And most significantly 
what drives the concern that she should be able to demonstrate such judgement.  
Perhaps it is that very concern that defines middle-class-ness.  It is also that 
concern that figures in spectatorial embarrassment.  If the artwork and our response 
to it did not matter, did not matter at all, then there would be no embarrassment.  
But if we are somehow invested in the situation and in our capacity for competence, 
that is competence to judge, and by extension we care about the competence of 
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others to judge us, to judge our competence, then we are subject to 
embarrassability. 
 
Because embarrassment is unpleasant and discredited, we don’t (normally) want to 
feel it, and so embarrassment acts as a moderating influence and is in fact a 
conservative mechanism reinforcing dominant ideologies, reinforcing prevailing 
standards of ‘normal’.  Whilst Goffman holds that embarrassment is a discredit to the 
individual, yet also he defends its value to society.  He argues that embarrassment 
regulates conduct and is very much a part of orderly social behaviour, so the 
outcome of embarrassment is that; ‘Social structure gains elasticity; the individual 
merely loses composure.’35  But what if, perversely, we were to value 
embarrassment as ‘a good feeling’, as Gilbert and George do?  What if we were able 
to redefine embarrassment as radical and individuating rather than conservative, 





SOME AREAS OF DIFFICULTY 
In undertaking this research project, I have encountered a number of difficulties that 
are intrinsic to the subject matter and the methodology.  Firstly, this thesis has 
developed within the purview of numerous on-going and overlapping discourses 
including visual culture, feminist theory, and queer theory, each making its own 
contribution, either explicitly or implicitly to what has become known as ‘the affective 
turn’.  And the difficulty arising from this is that because the affective turn is 
inherently pandisciplinary there is a risk of appearing superficial, a dilettante, a 
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dabbler in discourse, with no real mastery, or intellectual depth.  Sedgwick makes 
the comment;  ‘ . . . one of the cumulative stories told by Touching Feeling may be 
of a writer’s decreasing sense of having a strong centre of gravity in a particular 
intellectual field.’36  Whilst she writes of a problem with gravity, I am concerned that 
in my case the problem may be perceived as a lack of gravitas, and I am exposed to 
a perhaps appropriate risk of being intellectually embarrassed.  
 
The difficulty that stems from being between discourses is supplemented by two 
further aspects of my work on embarrassment; that the subject matter is slight, 
amounting to little more than a piece of marginalia, and also that this research is 
personally predicated.  Embarrassment is a minor feeling; its causes and effects can 
be next-to-nothing.  Privately we might agonise over embarrassment, but publicly we 
dismiss the unwanted feeling, and we trivialise and diminish it; we brush it aside, or 
under the carpet.  The insubstantiality of embarrassment as a minor, negative affect 
also applies to the marginality of embarrassment as my subject matter, as a matter 
that hardly matters, and by further extension to myself, as the subject whose 
embarrassment is so subjective.  The personal is conventionally construed as 
resistant to the orthodoxy of theory; and because it lacks intellectual weight, it is 
vulnerable to indictments of self-indulgence.  The two difficulties, of the personal and 
the marginal each bear upon the other; marginalising the personal, restricting the 
scope of minor affect to personal experience.    
 
These difficulties; the lack of disciplinary foundation, lack of academic gravitas 
ascribed to the personal, and the awkwardness of sustained attention to this 
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slightest of fleeting foolish-feelings all have a tendency to surface in the writing of 
this thesis as a performative dismantling of critical authority.  It is a difficult thing to 
insist on the doubtful and marginal status of a subject without compromising its 
legitimacy as the subject.  The self-effacing qualities of embarrassment are 
undoubtedly at odds with some conventional aspects of an academic text, 
embarrassment is not for instance confident or authoritative.  However, the 
diffidence of embarrassment does not here correlate with a lack of sustained critical 
focus or scantiness of research.  What is most important in the overarching scope of 
this thesis on embarrassment is the significance of the trivial detail and the tentative 
argument; one in which the outcome is undecided.  This is an attitude of 
awkwardness or difficulty, an uncertainty, a position of doubtfulness that ascribes to 
the question, that is, to the asking of the question a greater ‘value’ than to the 
answer, or indeed answerability of any question.  At the very moment, perhaps a 
fleeting moment of embarrassment, confidence and certainty are undermined; other 
possibilities are manifest.  This doubtful position is explored throughout this thesis as 
a critical resource that is counter to the more usual ‘critical authority’.  The following 
two sections of this introduction; on marginalia, and on the personal, stake out my 
argument for persevering with a subject and methodology that might, according to 





In approaching the subject of embarrassment, I am anxious about the potential 
difficulty of bringing academic weight to bear on something so slight, of submitting 
such a woolly subject to the incisive strongholds of theory.  Silvan Tomkins, whose 
work predates ‘the affective turn’ by several decades, provides a solution as if in 
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anticipation of this.  Tomkins investigated the role of emotion in human experience 
and social interaction, producing an overarching psychological theory of affect.  His 
work has more recently been reprised and critiqued by Sedgwick and Frank in 
Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader, bringing his work to a new 
audience.  Tomkins reconciled the inequality of the ‘touchy-feely-ness’ of emotion 
and the abstract power of ideology by envisaging the relation not as a contest, but 
as a romance between the looseness of affect and the organisation of ideological 
theory.   
Ideoaffective resonance to ideology is a love affair of a loosely organized set 
of feelings and ideas about feelings with a highly organized and articulate 
set of ideas about anything.  As in the case of a love affair the fit need not at 
the outset be perfect.37 
 
 
This thesis is comprised of a series of studies on the affective experience of 
embarrassment figured as brief but amorous encounters with theories and 
discourses that are perhaps out of embarrassment’s league, but leave a residue of 
wishful thinking (a critical ‘if only . . . ’).  Each exposure to art is the ground for 
critical enquiry and cumulatively builds what Tomkins would describe as a ‘weak 
theory’, that is, a theory that gives an account of, or description of event and makes 
only tentative claims for connexion between events.  Whilst a weak theory might be 
successful, insightful and valuable, it is ‘weak’ in terms of ‘the size and topology of 
its domain’.  Tomkins’ weak theory is described by Sedgwick; ‘A weak theory’s 
domain can be thought of as pockets of terrains each in analogic relation to the 
others and expandable only by textured analogy’.38  A theory of embarrassment is 
perhaps necessarily weak due to its marginality; unwanted, unspoken, dismissed 
and ousted to the margins even of the affective turn.    
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The underlying truth of the affective turn is of course, that it champions an underdog. 
Culturally we still endorse a dualism that privileges thinking over feeling, the rational 
over the emotional.  Emotion takes its value position from its alignment with nature 
(nearer to beasts), and as female (further from God).  When someone says ‘you’re 
just being emotional’ this is criticism of letting emotion cloud judgement, not using 
your head.  Reason is acquired, we work at it and this gives it a value, and we link it 
to discipline and purpose.  Emotions on the other hand are fallaciously supposed to 
just ‘happen’ and so serve to remind us of our humanity in the sense of a weakness, 
a flaw that we should strive to keep in check.  Excessive or inappropriate emotion 
gets bad press.  Too much sadness is depression and needs therapy, anger 
requires management, too much pride is a deadly sin.39    
 
Emotion is undervalued through its links to the feminine, not because women 
experience emotion more frequently or more deeply, but in the sense that there is a 
cultural imperative to control emotion and men are popularly regarded as better than 
women at exercising this control, whilst women, being supposedly weaker, let their  
emotions get the better of them.40  Unsurprisingly, the emotional currency promoted  
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by the affective turn has tended to emerge from, and is most visible in spheres of 
feminine influence; families, relationships, caring professions.  Witness such 
phenomena as the now acknowledged value of affective labour, and the popularity 
of eponymous television shows, ‘Jerry Springer’, ‘Trisha’, ‘Oprah’, that facilitate the 
vicarious consumption of emotion.  As a form of entertainment these shows 
originated on daytime television; the province of housewives, mothers, the sick, and 
the economically ineffective.  Now they are ubiquitous.  The newly found economic 
value of these programmes has increased the potential for emotion to be ‘taken 





TAKING IT PERSONALLY & WRITING IT PERSONALLY 
One of the risks taken in this thesis stems from the conviction that embarrassment 
is personal; and so to speak in a neutral way of ‘one’s embarrassment’ would defeat  
the object.  Consequently, it follows that to uncover the truth that embarrassment 
may tell demands a personal investment, and so, in search of what is ‘true’, in the 
sense that Gilbert & George equate embarrassment and truth, I must account for 
my embarrassment, and also write personally.41  In fact, there is a circularity about 
embarrassment and the personal noted by Nancy Miller.  She asks; ‘Is it personal 
only if it’s embarrassing?’ suggesting that if a ‘personal account’ doesn’t embarrass 
either the writer or the reader perhaps it wasn’t personal at all.  Without the little 
feeling of excoriation that comes with exposing the truly personal, as the writer, or 
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witnessing someone else’s exposure, as the reader, Miller suggests that ‘writing 
personally’ is no more than a rhetorical ploy.42 
 
One of the most embarrassing things about embarrassment then, is that it is 
personal, sometimes excruciatingly personal.  It is a narcissistic emotion, always 
returning attention to the self in a public manifestation of privacy.  And 
embarrassment is particular and subjective, so that what embarrasses one person 
may not embarrass another, and vice versa.  Faced with the prospect of disclosing 
what is embarrassing to me, I am afraid that I will be judged by you.  That you will 
think me a prude, a pedant, a snob, a sophist, a narcissist, a nincompoop, a fusspot, 
a milksop, and you will think that I should get out more, get over myself, get a grip.  I 
am afraid you will dismiss my embarrassments as trivial.  And they are.   
 
A further problematic of my methodology is that in giving a personal account I must 
negotiate a culturally systemic privileging of ‘objectivity’ as being synonymous with 
‘truth’ and the unsaid correlation that ‘subjectivity’, of personal experience, of our 
feelings, has, at best, only a weak claim on being ‘true’.  The neutrality of the object 
as impartial, detached, and most significantly as dispassionate is privileged over the 
subject as partisan, one-sided, and particular.  In this privileging of objectivity, 
reason again trumps feeling and the personal is marginalised.  It is my contention 
that in the context of a study of emotion there is a need for a moratorium on the 
absolute equation of objectivity and truth.  For my purposes in this thesis ‘objective’ 
is deployed to mean ‘like an object’, that is, as Sartre’s ‘being-in-itself’, and also as a 
reasonable version of ‘true’ that might be general and transferable.  ‘Objective’ is 
additionally used to denote the viewpoint of the self imagining itself seen by the  
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other (as an object), and whilst that is a version that claims the truth of ‘objectivity’, in 
truth, it might be less than ‘true’.  ‘Subjective’ relates to the qualities of a ‘being-for-
itself’, and is used here to express how it feels for me, from the inside; in fact an 
embodied truth.  Subjectivity does not denote a lesser truth, but a particularly 
personal truth which although it may not be widely applicable, is in its particular 
context, particularly ‘true’.  Like a weak theory that applies only to limited domains, 
the truth of embarrassment might also be thought to be ‘weak’, but in context, it is 
nonetheless ‘true’.  Subjective truth of this kind is evident in this enquiry in the 
veracity of anecdotal accounts, confession, admission and disclosure. 
 
Using personal experience as the basis of a PhD thesis might be considered a 
somewhat risky strategy, but I believe that in this particular context it is appropriate.  
A wider survey of other people’s embarrassment would not I think serve my project 
of reconsidering embarrassment as a source of criticality that offers a way of 
thinking through feeling.  This thesis centres on a series of studies of 
embarrassment sparked by brief encounters with art.  And rather than speculating 
on someone else’s feelings, the embarrassments I write about are mostly my 
embarrassments and so I know them intimately.  In using my own embarrassments 
as the starting point for investigation I am able to describe the warmth of feelings, 
analyse them in detail, dissect them in cold blood.  This level of individualism is, as I 
shall argue, integral to the embodied criticality that embarrassment promises to 
bring to the spectator-text relationship. 
 
An alternative approach was taken by James Elkins in the research for Pictures and 
Tears.  There is an obvious parallel with this thesis; Elkins wrote of his project; 
Almost no one wanted to talk about it; it was not well defined or well 
documented; I may not be qualified to write it; it is unprofessional, 
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embarrassing, ‘feminine’, unreliable, incoherent, private, and largely 
inexplicable; and it is philosophically dubious and historically outdated.43  
 
Although Elkins has cared deeply about certain paintings, none have moved him to 
tears but he knew, and knew of, others who had cried.  To expand this knowledge 
base, he wrote to art historians asking if they ever cried in front of art, and placed 
advertisements asking total strangers about art that has made them cry, and why.  
Some of the academics and art historians ignored him; so few admitted crying that it 
lead him to surmise that ‘tearlessness is a criterion of good scholarship.'44  Some 
replied but declined to contribute.  One wrote; ‘I would rather not participate, even at 
the risk of confessing to a stony, unfeeling nature.’45  Whilst some of the 
respondents generously shared their feelings, Elkins admits that others were 
marked by an ‘emotional distance’.  Ultimately, Elkins fictionalises some encounters 
between the weeper and the painting and frequently falls back on his own 
experience and feelings, writing in the first person, and concludes that some tears 
‘just don’t make sense’ and also, that some things felt in front of paintings are ‘not fit 
to share with other people’. 
 
A conventionally ‘objective’ study of the cause of other people’s tears proved 
difficult.  Whilst the replies Elkins received provided some rich material, the 
conclusions he draws are ‘subjective’.  Embarrassment is even less suited to this 
method of information gathering.  There is a certain nobility in tears, embarrassment 
on the other hand, is risible, making it less likely that others would be willing to 
expose their feelings.  Exactly what embarrasses us reveals too much; it is 
embarrassing.  Further, it is an uglification that discredits, so generally, people are 
likely to disown it and unless the embarrassment manifests as a furious blushing,  
                                                 
43







the feeling may be so easily side-lined.  Also, the embarrassments that interest me 
are slight, and so are not good subjects of stored memory or confession.  To ask 
directly; ‘Does art embarrass you?’ is to miss the mark.  Embarrassment is a subject 
best approached obliquely.   
 
Besides submitting my embarrassment to scrutiny, I have supplemented my own 
experiences with ‘found embarrassments’, mentioned in passing and discovered in 
texts I have read, and in discussion, and sometimes in the artworks themselves. 
Some of the most interesting ‘found embarrassments’ in other people’s writing are 
quite incidental to the subject; they are not writing about embarrassment, but ‘about’; 
in the looser sense of being in proximity to embarrassment.   The embarrassment of 
the text is oblique, an allusion that hovers around the margins of the (more weighty) 
subject matter.  For example, the comments of Elkins’ correspondent, who would 
rather be thought unfeeling than show the ‘weakness’ of a soft underbelly, can be 
read as symptomatic of an underlying embarrassment about the unruly feeling-ness 
of emotion as incommensurate with the dignity of scholarship. 
 
In trying to remain true to the principle that in theorising embarrassment, I must take 
it personally, there is also the need to write it personally.  As a PhD thesis, this work 
is subject to a considerable amount of precedent; there is a respected convention of 
an academically accepted language and an intellectually dispassionate tone.  This 
conveys reasonableness, seriousness; rigour, objectivity.  Academic language and  
tone does not readily convey the subjectivity of embarrassment.  It does not capture 
embarrassment’s flimsy, foolish-feeling, of being hardly worth mentioning, nor 
embarrassment’s all-consuming, self-centred sensationalism.  Academic language, 
in its anatomically correct, politically inclusive terminology does not (usually) blush 
and squirm.  Academic tone, comfortable in its abstract neutrality (usually) eschews  
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the confessional taint of first-person and the immediacy of present tense.   Academic 
argot will not account for embarrassment, and so at times, in an attempt to capture 
the slight and unruly feeling-ness of embarrassment, there is no option but to write it 
personally.  Sometimes the effects of emotive language or a non-academic turn of 
phrase, and hesitation, and circumlocution, and repetition that are characteristic of 
‘feeling’ jar in the context of an academic text.  Sometimes the personal is just 
‘difficult’, and this at least is a well-documented difficulty, particularly from a feminist 
perspective as generations of feminist writers have struggled against the patriarchal 
tone of ‘theory’.  Jane Tompkins, for example, exclaimed; 
I say to hell with it.  The reason I feel embarrassed at my own attempts to 
speak personally in a professional context is that I have been conditioned to 
feel that way.  That’s all there is to it.46    
 
But still the difficulty remains.  Sometimes the personal is slated as a poor substitute 
for originality, or merely self-indulgent, and sometimes this is true and the criticism is 
deserved.  And perhaps there is a need for the difficulty, perhaps if the personal 
were thoroughly and acceptably integrated into theory, there would be no 
opportunistic space ‘outside’, no way to say something else.  So the difficulty 
remains, we preserve it, and to speak frankly of what is embarrassing, because it is 
personal, and because it is marginal, is frankly, embarrassing. 
 
And in fact, it seems that pinning this insubstantial subject matter down and 
subjecting it to language can be, in itself, embarrassing.  If I try to mitigate the 
damage by choosing my words carefully so as to establish my un-embarrassment, I 
find my efforts are counterproductive.  The use of euphemism can cause more  
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embarrassment than it spares; its words are usually clichéd and coy or cheese-
paring, and draw attention to the embarrassment they were meant hide and I am 
caught out in the act of avoidance which compounds the problem.  It is difficult to 
skirt round embarrassment.  Language outs the speaker, but to say nothing at all 
may produce an embarrassing silence.  Denise Riley gives a great account of 
language and embarrassment, and language as embarrassment in her essay ‘All 
Mouth and No Trousers’ in which she discusses the embarrassment of finding the 
right words to discuss sex: 
The awkwardness of naming is embroiled with the awkwardness of 
demurring.  A compounded verbal-emotional mortification appears in my 
secret hesitation in the face of some expected utterance I might have been 
able to use, were I not so hopelessly and culpably self-conscious.  This 
embarrassment stops me on the verge of utterance to fish up a 
circumlocution, makes me quietly scan for a substitute for what I want not to 
have to say.47 
 
 
One of the notable things about embarrassment is the awkward pause it creates.  It 
is like an Althussarean hailing that stops us in our tracks; momentarily, we freeze, 
and this relates to its etymology; from embaras, which is a blockage.  
Embarrassment very often is cause and effect of a blockage of language leaving us 
tongue-tied, lost for words.  It seems to be an unspeakable feeling.48  But to take 
embarrassment as the subject of research demands that the words are found.  So in 
order to write about embarrassment, it seems desirable, necessary even, to adopt a 
tongue that is capable of speaking feeling.  Slipping from feeling as emotion to 
feeling as touching Roland Barthes writes; ‘Language is a skin: I rub my language 
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against the other.  It is as if I had words instead of fingers, or fingers at the tip of my 
words.’49 Sometimes language only works if it makes contact.   
 
One potential approach that might capture the feeling of feeling and be capable of 
being critical is the somewhat out-dated and awkwardly feminist ‘anecdotal theory’ 
which mined the personal account of event for theoretical insight.  During the 1980s 
and 1990s feminist writers such as Jane Gallop, Jane Tompkins, and Nancy Miller 
experimented with forms of writing, which used personal experience, event and 
occasion as the catalysts to develop theory as ‘an explicitly autobiographical 
performance within the act of criticism.’50  Writing the personal is not of course 
radically new, nor was it radically new when Miller, Gallop and Tompkins began 
writing personally.  Montaigne, for example wrote personally, but about four hundred 
years earlier.  Barthes, who is cited as influential by both Miller and Gallop wrote 
personally and eponymously in his strange, fragmentary self-narrative Roland 
Barthes, going beyond the ‘metonymic marks’ of what he termed the 
biographeme.51  Writing personally might involve a certain amount of thick 
description, scene setting detail, or confession, but not necessarily so.  As Berlant 
points out; autobiographical is not the same as personal, although the two are 
proximate.  What the personal seems to depend on is being ‘true’.  It needs to be 
born of experience; that is, embodied, lived; real.  And in being ‘true’ and as a  
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residual fragment of lived experience, of having been there, it brings to mind not 
only the biographeme but also the punctum which is not present in all photographs, 
only a rare few, and this might serve to signal how rarely writing is really personal 
even when it is an account of our private lives.  
 
The product of anecdotal theory might be a discursive backdoor, a way in to theory-
proper in the form of an opening or a wedge, or a countertheory, or something that 
reverses established theory, turning it on its head, or inside out, or an amorous 
theory, or a perverse theory, one that is knowingly and pleasurably wrong.  This line 
of thought presupposes it as counter to a particular sort of theoretical discourse with 
an established and pervasive dominance; a patriarchal theory, a hegemonic theory, 
one that assumes a pedagogical role, and a role of re-production of the conditions of 
production.  Anecdotal theory takes up a position in relation to ‘theory-proper’ that 
replicates the relation of emotion to reason.  It plays the role of the underdog.   
 
Gallop comments on how the anecdote is in many respects inherently 
disadvantaged in relation to theory.  ‘‘Anecdote’ and ‘theory’ carry diametrically 
opposed connotations: humorous vs. serious, short vs. grand, trivial vs. overarching, 
specific vs. general.’52  This again replicates the lack of value that emotion suffers in 
relation to reason.  We value the serious over the trivial, the deep over the 
superficial, and reason trumps feeling.  The qualities of the anecdote listed by 
Gallop; humorous, short, trivial and specific all apply to embarrassment, endorsing 
anecdotal theory as ideally suited to expressing the subject of embarrassment.   
 
Because anecdotal theory has strong links to feminist writing of a previous 
generation it is already positioned as both inside and outside established academic  
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discourse.  It is positioned as critical of other discursive standpoints and in search of 
a less dogmatic attitude.  It is also just old enough to be considered slightly 
unfashionable, and in the true spirit of the confessional nature of such writing I must 
admit to approaching anecdotal theory with some ambivalence.  I am not sure if to 
use it has the smug achievement of a ready-made, or perhaps the embarrassment 
and bad fit of wearing someone else’s shoes.   This trifling awkwardness over 
allegiance to a methodology and a body of work, not currently admired as cutting-
edge is axiomatic of the very nature of embarrassment as a conservative force.  The 
way that I feel, the slight reluctance to express how I feel, the reluctance to feel what 
I feel; these things are symptomatic of embarrassments’ role in endorsing 
hegemonic norms.  As Tompkins put it; ‘the reason I feel embarrassed . . . is that I 
have been conditioned to feel that way’.  But far from being apologetic about the 
espousal of anecdotal theory, I feel some quiet satisfaction at a very slight but most 
appropriate embarrassment. 
 
There is an agreeable degree of disorder about the anecdotal; its allegiance is not to 
the abstract authority of theory, but to contingency.  Emotion, especially 
embarrassment comes unbidden, often unexpectedly and inconveniently, and 
insistently in the present.  The inconvenient feeling happens, like an event, and it is 
very hard to defer the feeling to a later moment.  And like embarrassment, the 
anecdote can be disruptive, an interruption to the anticipated narrative.  Gallop sees 
the disruptiveness of event as another potential weakness;  
Although I can’t say that I like it, I can see that it is precisely this ability to 
interrupt and divert a project conceived in theory which makes incident a 
force with which theory must reckon.  I can see that anecdotal theory must 
be, whether or not I like it, this juncture where theory finds itself compelled – 
against its will, against its projects – to think where it has been forced to 
think.53 
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Gallop’s comment demonstrates an ambivalence over what she sees as a conflict 
between incident and theory; ‘I can’t say that I like it . . .  whether or not I like it’, she 
says.  This disruption is not a conflict but a site of compromise, a potential for the 
emergence of a hybrid necessitated by a compromising situation.  It is the 
disruptiveness of event, and of embarrassment, that can potentially be critically 
productive.  Gallop does, in the end, concede that this is promising.  She writes; 
‘Subjecting theory to incident teaches us to think in precisely those situations which 
tend to disable thought, forces us to keep thinking even when the dominance of our 
thought is far from assured.’54  And for me, this is the whole point of anecdotal theory 
as a methodology for this thesis; to use the telling of the anecdote as a tactical 
process to think through the disruptive emotional response - the response to 
embarrassment - that I find quite disabling.  Anecdotal theory pushes the mind into 
working alongside, or through the embarrassing blockage of feeling to produce 
something that might otherwise have gone unsaid. 
 
In its valorising of the minor narrative of personal experience, anecdotal theory, 
besides being old shoes is also very contemporary.  The characteristics of personal, 
real, and trivial are shared with the confessional ‘Oprah’ culture, with reality TV, with 
blogging, and Facebook, and the rise of the Twitterati.  The theoretical arm of all this 
universal-singular story telling is autoethnography, and although it is personally 
predicated, I believe autoethnography makes claims that are too strong for a project 
of embarrassment.  As a growing body of work, autoethnographic texts describe or 
exemplify the personal to varying degrees, ranging from allowing a subjective  
authorial voice, to full Springer-style disclosure.  Good autoethnography is; ‘ . . . the 
examination of how human experience is endowed with meaning; a concern with 
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moral, ethical, and political consequences’55  The criticisms leveled at 
autoethnography are of self-indulgence, introspection and irrelevance.  As Jackson 
notes; ‘there is the dismissive sneer of “lifestyle politics,” that reductively fits this kind 
of autobiography into the polarities of economic/class politics or navel-gazing’.56  
Both Miller and Gallop have commented on the embarrassment of the personal as a 
subject of academic study, and at its best, autoethnography might dispel that 
embarrassment by legitimating the self as both a subject and a context of research.  
 
The value of autoethnography should perhaps be recognized as the successful 
transfer of attention from the singular to the general, and from the personal to the 
social.  Church comments on two important principles of autoethnography that 
underpin this; ‘The social analysis accomplished by this form is based on two 
assumptions: first, that it is possible to learn about the general from the particular; 
second that the self is a social phenomenon.’57  The relationship between singular 
and general is always one of metalepsis with each the cause and effect of the other.  
And whilst this thesis too is invested in the theoretical interest of singular stories, it is 
somewhat resistant to generalisation.  I suspect that any value that might be 
ascribed to embarrassment is always stuck in the singular, confined to the ‘pockets 
of terrains’ of weak theory, and making weak truth claims which may not complete 
autoethnography’s Möbius loop of cause and effect.  
 
So, although autoethnography evidently has much in common with its antecedent, 
anecdotal theory, and both would appear to offer an effective strategy to describe 
and analyse emotion, I believe the aims of autoethnography exceed those of this  
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project.  Although this thesis is, broadly speaking, in an autoethnographic vein, its 
aim is not social analysis but a critical attention to the marginalisation of dysphoric 
feelings within a cultural context, and furthermore, it is invested in the potential 
interest of experience as singular rather than universal, general, or generalizable. 
And importantly, where autoethnography is certain of its validity, anecdotal theory 
seemed to accept, even prefer to maintain a degree of marginality that is lost in 
autoethnography’s presumption of legitimacy.  This project then, does not claim the 
legitimisation offered by autoethnography and remains instead, in antithesis to 
‘theory-proper’.  I propose that this study of embarrassment is more suited to the  
older anecdotal theory; embarrassment does not presume to offer a grand narrative 
or an overarching theory of critical authority.  I think that embarrassment should be 
content to settle for the marginal status of a counter-theory, of a minor register, and 




 WHEN IT HURTS ITS TRUE:  SOME DIVISIONS OF SELF 
 
One of the questions that this thesis asks is; in what way can we understand 
embarrassment to be a ‘good feeling’?  In its persistent return to ‘self’ it could be 
claimed that embarrassment is narcissistically satisfying (though not always 
pleasurable), or the experience might be considered somehow therapeutic.  
Alternatively, if the causes and outcomes of embarrassment are interrogated they 
might bring sociocultural knowledge; of habitus, or embarrassment might also bring  
self-knowledge.  But knowledge cannot be assumed to be unambiguously ‘good’, 
and besides, there is a sense in which embarrassment’s relation to knowledge must 
be understood to be both negative and minor; it is a knowledge riddled with not-
knowing, or in Sedgwick’s term; ‘opacities’.  Might her observation on the 
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epistemology of the closet be applied to embarrassment’s epistemology?  ‘Particular 
insights’ she says, ‘are lined with, . . . and structured by particular opacities.’58  The 
not-knowing or opacities of embarrassment are figured as doubtful situations, 
doubtful outcomes, and self-doubt (which I shall argue is a kind of embodied 
criticality) but always, always with the promise of a better outcome next time, with 
the promise of a coherent self that has, just for the moment escaped our grasp.   
In the midst of this doubtfulness and promise is something embodied, something 
irrefutably, insistently present, a freeze-frame of now, something real.  Sartre writes 
of a ‘solidification of self’, Barthes of an ‘amorous panic’ and both of these borrowed 
fragments come close to expressing the momentary, exquisite discomfort of being, 
and being seen to be flawed.  There is something about this visceral experience that 
is real in the sense of being empirical, derived from experience of life; not 
conjectured, not theoretical, not abstract.  Although this reality is a ‘feeling’ it is 
somehow concrete or as Sartre says; a solidification, that makes the self, for a 
moment, an overwhelming and solid presence to itself.  Or, according to Gilbert and 
George: ‘When it hurts then its true for us’, they said.  Their statement knots 
together the two concepts; the hurt and the true-ness, and whatever value, or queer 
value might be ascribed to embarrassment is within that knot.   
 
When it hurts, ‘it’ is experienced bodily, the pain, the stab, the wound, but this is in a 
minor register so the discomfort is more likely to be superficial; a scratch or a bruise.  
But also an affect, an emotional experience; feelings are also hurt.  And this flags up 
the paradoxical nature of embarrassment as a problem of depth.   Embarrassment 
is on the one hand, a shallow feeling.  Some might say that embarrassment is only 
skin deep.  And indeed, I have presented embarrassment as marginal, slight in its  
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effects, and easily brushed aside.  Ridout comments that embarrassment is ‘a 
flaring in the face rather than a searing in the soul’.59  The self that we are keen to 
protect in this sense is not some deep essence, or essential core, or soul, it is all on 
the surface, it is about who we are seen to be.  So if embarrassment is all about 
image then yes it is superficial.  And yet . . . , and with embarrassment there is 
always a ‘but’ or a ‘yet’; embarrassment always seems to have a supplementary  
cause, or meaning, or outcome.  It always seems to indicate something else, 
something latent or liminal, as if it had a deeper meaning.   
 
And yet, as embarrassment can also involve loss or damage to the self-image which 
belongs to a private, internal domain, then the hurt it inflicts is deep.  So 
embarrassment is a predicament that compromises insides and outsides, deep and 
shallow, private and public.  The self-image is an intensely personal feeling of deep 
and private ‘insideness’, but the losses embarrassment entails are right out there in 
public.  We generally dismiss the damage of embarrassment as superficial, but if 
embarrassment ‘just’ bruises our ego, how deep does that hurt go? 
 
In examining embarrassment’s knot of hurt and ‘true’ one of the theoretical 
resources used in relation to both subject and context of the self is Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory, and particularly, the diffuse, and sometimes ambivalent 
absorption of Freud into the cultural infrastructure as an enduring, but inexact 
cultural currency.   And I would argue that it is in fact, the dispersed and dog-eared 
ideas of ‘Freudiana’ that are implicated in the experience of embarrassment, rather 
than the unadulterated Freud of a session on the couch.  We are familiar with the 
lexis of psychoanalysis, with castration anxiety, penis envy and with the Oedipus 
complex, which have slipped into ordinary and imprecise usage, and we are alert to  
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the equation of knowledge and sex, the interpretation of dreams, sublimated 
meanings, Freudian slips.  Whilst I hold out no hope of a cure for embarrassment, I 
propose that the ‘talking cure’ offers a productive framework for submitting 
subjective and very personal experience to an analytical end.   
 
One of the uses made of psychoanalytic theory in this thesis is as an endorsement 
of the self as fractured and faceted rather that a seamless whole; a condition of self  
that is extant in Goffman’s definition of embarrassment as a failure to present a 
‘coherent self’.  Psychoanalysis understands the self as divided, theorised as an 
ego and an id with corresponding conscious and unconscious psychic apparatus.   
Whilst the self exposed by embarrassment might be thought of as a sum of 
(incoherent) parts, I will argue here that the embarrassed self is divided, but divided 
differently to the Freudian schematic.   
 
The self that is exposed by embarrassment is not envisaged here as split between 
conscious and unconscious parts but more simply, between an inside and an 
outside.  Whilst both are largely ‘known’, the extent to which we can know ourselves 
inside out is of course not entirely complete as some parts may be repressed, or 
perhaps unexamined.  The division of the self along the axis inside/outside is here 
theorised as an inner self that is the private self-image, the self we think our self to 
be which is vulnerable to exposure, and, an outer-facing self that is the public image 
of the self, perceived by others and is vulnerable to evaluation embarrassment 
when we ‘lose face’.   
 
Barthes refers to an inner self as the ‘image-repertoire’ and also as the private life; 
‘le privé’.  He insists that there is something basically detrimental in its exposure; 
that exposure allows the other an advantage.  
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It is certainly when I divulge my private life that I expose myself most; not by 
the risk of “scandal”, but because then I present my image-system in its 
strongest consistency: and the image-system, one’s imaginary life, is the 
very thing over which others have an advantage: which is protected by no 
reversal, no dislocation.60  
 
He suggests that this inner self is vulnerable, susceptible to damage or hurt, and 
also that it is perhaps the most fundamentally ‘true’ part of the self.  But the public 
image of self is also vulnerable and this is what is at stake when we ‘lose face’.  
Although the ‘face’, the outer image is, to some extent, a front we put up, it is no 
less ‘true’ or truly ours than the private inside.61  Embarrassment may be caused by 
exposure and evaluation of either the private self or the public image; both are 
important to us and within the context of embarrassment and its epistemology, 
surface matters, so depth should never be misconstrued as synonymous with 
importance.   
 
In Sincerity & Authenticity, Lionel Trilling ponders on the dictum, ‘to thine own self 
be true’.  The self, for Trilling, is divided differently again; not topographically as an 
inside and outside, but rather as variable qualities, that of a good self and a less-
good or not good-enough self that may bring discredit.   Trilling asks if the self to 
which we should be true, or hold as ‘true’ is necessarily our ‘best self’.  Instead, he 
offers another self which is; ‘less good in the public moral way but which, by very 
reason of its culpability, might be regarded as more peculiarly mine.’62  And this self 
with all its less-good qualities is mooted by Trilling as unquestionably ‘true’, as if in 
our natural pessimism, or modesty or anxiety we are conditioned to believe the 
worst of our self.  Trilling argues that we feel, or should feel, an obligation to accept  
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ownership of the less-good, culpable self that is particularly, peculiarly, our own.  Is 
it then the truth of this ownership, of ‘owning up’, that hurts?  If this is so, then the 
counterpart of this would be that it is the hurt we feel that gives provenance to the 
‘true’ self; ‘when it hurts then its true’.   
 
But the true-ness is a weak truth claim and must be qualified.  Not just ‘when it hurts 
then its true’, but (as G&G said) ‘when it hurts then its true for us’.  The truth that 
this hurt offers to tell is embodied and experiential, but above all personal.  It hints at 
knowledge, it promises some form of knowledge, but what we can know is stitched 
to its indivisible lining of not-knowing that is doubt.  We might also understand this 
truth that we feel to be intentional in the sense that my aim is true, or amorous in the 
sense of true-love which may not last but in the moment it is experienced, in this 
moment, it is true.  It is so true that it hurts, and it is embodied and singular and 
particular, so that no other person could feel exactly this, or as Sedgwick might say, 
the hurt and the truth are ‘localised and nonce’.63  What embarrassment exposes 
may be either inside or outside; a best self, or some other less-creditable version, it 
may be the discrediting of our image or a ‘loss of face’; in any case, the skin may 
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 In Touching Feeling for instance Sedgwick writes of ‘local theories and nonce 
taxonomies’, p145.    
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The context within which I examine the embarrassment of the exposure and 
evaluation of the self is that of the spectatorial experience of the visual arts.  In 
situations of spectatorship, the museum, gallery etc. not only may we look, but we 
are supposed to look, we have paid to look, and furthermore, we look in public, we 
are seen to look and our response is ‘on show’.  The spectator–text relationship, that 
is, the encounter of an individual with a particular artwork is figured here as an 
experience that is resistant to the universalising of social analysis, but might be 
thought of as having a critical potential that exists in its singularity.  The call to 
‘expose yourself to art’ is not made in anticipation of a major confrontation, or act of 
indecency, but instead, a minor breach of the boundaries of self as an openness to 
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 ‘Expose Yourself to Art’ is the title of a photograph that found moderate fame as a poster.  
The photo, by Michael Ryerson shows Bud Clark (later Mayor of Portland) flashing to a 
statue of a nude woman by Norman J. Taylor, titled Kvinneakt.  
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both feeling and criticality.  The self, as subject, looks at the art object, but 
sometimes, such as in the instance of a perceived, or in fact actual reverse gaze, the 
object looks back.  The self sees itself seeing, it is in fact ‘caught looking’, and is 
momentarily, and for itself, objectified.  The confusion of subject and object positions 
is felt, uncomfortably as embarrassment.  This is not to say that the effect of 
exposing one’s self to art might be therapeutic in the sense dismissed by Bersani as 
the ‘redemptive aesthetic’, the idea that art can repair the damage inflicted by life 
and give value or meaning to otherwise pointless existence.65  But rather, that this 
exposure is damage (but obviously only minor damage; we can’t be shamed by 
looking, but we might be embarrassed). 
 
The feeling of minor or superficial damage is identified here as ‘spectatorial 
embarrassment’, a feeling of awkwardness in the encounter with art.  In exploring its 
causes and effects I have drawn on arthistorical theories of reception and ‘the gaze’, 
on film theory, and also theories of the wider ‘field of vision’.  Sources include Laura 
Mulvey’s polemic ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ which has been the 
catalyst for a wave of response, refutation and revision to the proposition that man 
looks and woman is looked at.  In contrast to the intensely gendered look theorised 
within feminist studies, film theory, and queer theory.  I have also drawn on an  
existentialist theory of seeing and being seen in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, 
which neuters vision by thinking ‘man’ as ‘mankind’.   
 
The embarrassment of looking, or ‘spectatorial embarrassment’ is examined here in 
relation to two co-existent but conflicting dynamics of visual art; firstly, that of ‘the 
gaze’; a disinterested aesthetic appreciation, and secondly, the emotive disruption of 
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‘transgressive’ art.  The question in both cases is; ‘within the context of 
spectatorship, how does embarrassment figure as part of the experience of art?’   
Much art is of course, precisely about looking; about the politics of looking, the 
genderedness of looking, the ethics of looking.  Furthermore, spectatorial response 
in some cases is appropriated as the content and the meaning of the work.  One 
such is Marcel Duchamp’s Etant Donnés where the spectator must put her eye to a 
hole in a door and peep through to see a strange view beyond.  The faintly bucolic 
landscape we chance upon is occupied by a spread-eagled female nude holding a 
lamp.  She, the body, is otherworldly but corpse-like lying in an uncomfortable nest 
of twigs and dried leaves.  She is anatomically disturbing; the legs, spread wide, are 
impossibly jointed and unequal in size, her genitals are not so much mutilated as 
appear to be partially missing as if they have started to heal over.   
 
            
      (installation view)                      (through the keyhole) 
      Marcel Duchamp, Etant Donnés (1946-1966) mixed media 
 
In a reconstruction of Etant Donnés at Tate Modern I peeped through the hole in the 
door, spying, a voyeur, feeling a little quiver of misdemeanor.  I was unsettled by 
both the peeping and the strange vista.  Her exposure exposed me.  Then I sat for a 
while, just looking, from a comfortable distance, and noticed that many visitors 
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glanced briefly at the door, but then moved on.  Peeping through holes is perhaps 





To refer to looking as ‘the gaze’ is to embarrass the spectator with an encumbrance 
of theoretical presumptions.  In arthistorical terms it suggests a degree of privilege 
and carries with it connotations of detachment, knowledge, and connoisseurship 
that underwrite cultural competence.  Feminist art historians have accurately read 
this as a competence authorized by the patriarchy and thus the gaze is now not a 
gender neutral term.  Film theorists borrowed ‘the gaze’ to label the look of the 
camera and the film-goer, and in mainstream western cinema, this has largely been 
the perspective of the normative, white, heterosexual male.  In film theory the gaze 
is never gender neutral; it is informed by psychoanalytic concepts of desire and 
anxiety, and in the case of commercial cinema, is also driven by the demand for 
profit, and therefore vulnerable to allegations of exploitation.  In addition to being 
instrumental in the objectification of women, and sometimes men, the gaze also 
stands accused of bias and exploitation on grounds of race and sexuality.  The gaze 
that I am considering here as imbricated in embarrassments takes into account the 
more recent layers of meaning of pejorative (gender) differentiation, but as 
supplementary to the deeply rooted original meaning of a look of cultural 
competence.  For my work on embarrassment, ‘the gaze’ is considered to be a 
loaded term that takes it as read that spectatorship is a scene of objectification. 
 
The spectatorial position characteristic of ‘the gaze’ is identified here as a potential 
source of embarrassments: firstly there may be a failure to display the necessary 
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disinterest that is the sign of cultural competence, and opposing this, there is a 
certain revulsion towards the idea of cultural competence as an embarrassing white, 
male, middle-class stereotype.  Then there is the feeling of voyeurism, of being 
caught looking, and the discredit of ‘getting away with it’ offered by the gaze as the 
‘alibi of art’.  Finally, there is perhaps a small and academic embarrassment in 
talking of ‘the gaze’ at all.  It is a little passé; an overworked, over-critiqued and 
overdetermined phrase inclined to be dismissed in some quarters as just ‘over’, with 
the implication that everything that there is to be said, has already been said.    
 
In Critical Terms for Art History Margaret Olin defines the gaze;  
‘Gaze’ is a rather literary term for what could also be called ‘looking’ or 
‘watching’.  Its connotation of a long ardent look may bring to mind the 
intensity in which knowledge and pleasure mingle when I behold a work of 
art.  Whilst most discourse about the gaze concerns pleasure and 
knowledge, however, it generally places both of these in the service of 
issues of power, manipulation, and desire.66  
 
The gaze assumes a particular spectatorial standpoint; that of cultural competence 
and identification with the socio-ideological hegemony.  This is extensively theorised 
by Bourdieu who states, with specific reference to looking at art, that seeing is 
ancillary to knowing; ‘the capacity to see (voir) is a function of knowledge (savoir)’ 
and that seeing/knowing then enables a culturally competent person to decode 
elements of the artwork and so appreciate it in the legitimate, that is, correct and 
appropriate manner.67  Such competence or ‘cultural capital’ may, according to 
Bourdieu be an innate competence born of social privilege, or a competence that is 
acquired through education.  
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 Margret Olin in Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff, eds., Critical Terms for Art History 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). p318. 
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 Bourdieu, p2. 
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But what if such cultural capital is doubtful?   Like the Autodidact in Sartre’s Nausea, 
the spectator may feel incompetent, or illegitimate in the art gallery.  They may feel 
they are missing something, and afraid that that signals inadequacy, a lack of 
competence, exclusion from a coterie of cultural privilege. 
The Autodidact suddenly grows sad: 
‘Those portraits in the main hall?  Monsieur,’ he says, with a tremulous 
smile, ‘I don’t know anything about painting.  Naturally I realize that Bordurin 
is a great painter, I can see that he knows his stuff, as they say.  But 
pleasure, Monsieur, aesthetic pleasure is something I have never known.’68 
 
The Autodidact (self-taught and thus in possession of illegitimate knowledge rather 
than innate cultural capital) is gropingly aware of something that he knows he 
doesn’t know.  Something that he feels he doesn’t feel.  What he is failing to find is 
not in fact knowledge, or feeling, but distance, a detachment that brackets out life.   
What is missing is a critical distance that quite separates life and art. 
 
Differentiating between those individuals whose cultural capital originates in social 
privilege and ‘legitimate’ education and those who aspire to a cultural competence 
in excess of their social origins, Bourdieu notes; ‘the autodidact, a victim by default 
of the effects of educational entitlement, is ignorant of the right to be ignorant that is 
conferred by certificates of knowledge.’69  I find that I too am ignorant of the idea 
that ignorance might be anyone’s by right.  And I am certainly embarrassed by my 
lack of critical distance.  The response to art that I berate myself for consistently 
failing to achieve is predicated on Kantian aesthetics and propagated by an old-
school modernism.  Clive Bell argued, almost a century ago, that there is a ‘peculiar 
emotion’ that all true works of art produce.  He called this ‘aesthetic emotion’ and 
considered it to be infinitely superior to the common-or-garden type; the ordinary 
emotions of life;   
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 Jean Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans., Robert Baldick (London: Penguin, 2000 (1938)).p157. 
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 Bourdieu, p329. 
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To appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life, no 
knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions.  Art 
transports us from the world of man’s activity to a world of aesthetic 
exaltation.70 
 
Evidently I fail to leave the ideas and affairs of life behind.  I am not exalted.  As a 
spectator I am never apart from my biography; my gender and my social origin are 
the conditions of my looking.  Real, inconvenient, ordinary life persistently corrupts 
my spectatorship, and my response is embarrassingly emotional in the ordinary 
idiom.  
 
Another embarrassment that disgraces the gaze is its voyeurism.  Olin’s definition 
goes on to say that the gaze is like ‘the publicly sanctioned actions of a peeping 
Tom’.71  The gaze is a look that satisfies appetites for difference, for sex and 
violence, and also for sentiment.  It is a dubious look, already guilty, with the 
implication that the spectator, like Sartre’s voyeur at the keyhole knows he and his 
peeping are seen by the other, he has been caught looking.  ‘The gaze’ causes the 
uncomfortable feeling that in the context of art, we are always ‘caught looking’.  But 
if one of the embarrassing things about looking at art is its propensity to address our 
appetites for transgressive images, the counterpart of that embarrassment is what 
Cashell calls ‘the alibi of art.’72  The diplomatic immunity of ‘art’ lets the spectator 
‘get away with it’ by invoking a dispensation to indulge a taste for images that if not-
art might be considered socially or morally bankrupt.  The art-ness of the image in 
fact, not only authorises our looking, but reframes a voyeuristic look as urbane and 
cultured.  I would argue that the alibi, as an alibi is embarrassing.  It suggests a 
degree of hypocrisy that may conflict with our sense of a best self.  I find that I am 
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 Kieran Cashell, Aftershock: The Ethics of Contemporary Transgressive Art (London: I B 
Tauris, 2009). p1. 
57 
 
embarrassed not (only) for enjoying ‘difficult’ images, but for enjoying them ‘as art’.  
I am not censorious of ‘difficult’ images (quite the opposite), I enjoy looking at them 
and sometimes they are embarrassing but I would prefer to own my choices, in fact 





It has become a commonplace to describe art, and particularly contemporary art as 
‘transgressive’.  In Transgressions: The Offences of Art, Anthony Julius identifies 
three types of transgression that art might stand accused of:  Art might, and perhaps 
should transgress against the canon, art might transgress against the spectator, and 
less commonly, it might transgress against the law.  Transgressive art of the most 
prevalent, second type hijacks emotions, taking spectatorial response as its subject 
and its meaning.  It demands a response that evades or exceeds the pure gaze.  
Faced with a ‘transgressive’ image or event, the neutrality of disinterestedness is an 
untenable position, and the spectator is moved; shocked, angry, aroused, disgusted, 
or delighted, maybe even embarrassed.  There is a tacit assumption that art that 
transgresses by arousing spectatorial emotion is somehow therapeutic, that it 
constitutes a kind of affective labour.74 
 
At the heart of much contemporary transgressive art is a trashing of the ivory tower 
of aesthetics and a poke in the eye to the bloodless composure of the gaze.  It 
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defies the ‘pure gaze’ of Bell’s aesthetic emotion and denies suspension of the 
messy feeling-ness of life.  This is the view put forward by Kieran Cashell in 
Aftershock: The Ethics of Contemporary Transgressive Art.  He sees the project of 
transgressive art as the utter demolition of the gaze and its privileged vantage point 
of disinterest.   
What contemporary transgressive art – more aggressively than any previous 
cultural practice – has actively sought to do is invalidate the principles of 
institutional aesthetics.  To this end, the principal target of transgressive 
antagonism will be discovered to be the paradigmatic concept of 
philosophical aesthetics, namely, the so-called ‘disinterested’ mode of 
aesthetic contemplation.75  
 
Cashell maintains that in its annihilation of the refuge of disinterest, transgressive 
art does not constitute an aesthetic of immorality, but in fact, a reinstitution of the 
moral and ethical dimensions of art spectatorship.   
 
As might be expected, embarrassment, as a minor foolish-feeling is not (usually) 
central to the project of transgression.  But there are contexts in which transgressive 
art is cause for the small feelings of embarrassment and it is therefore important to 
establish at least some of these contexts.  I suggest that three notable 
embarrassments of transgressive art are; as a meta-feeling, the exposure of le 
privé, and where there is an unintentional failure.  One additional point of note is 
that although transgressive art’s stock in trade frequently includes low cultural 
forms, it tends to maintain, and perhaps even intensify ideas of cultural competence, 
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Embarrassment may be a subsidiary feeling; the residual affect of something 
stronger.  The emotion elicited in response to the artwork may have been a powerful 
emotion, perhaps anger, shock, or disgust, but subsequently the spectator may feel  
the embarrassment of having drawn attention to themselves, or behaved in a 
manner incompatible with their sense of self by showing strong emotion, or perhaps 
by showing any emotion at all.  Such emotional engagement is to be avoided at all 
costs according to Elkins’ art historian who preferred to be thought to be stony and 
unfeeling rather than risk being seen to let emotions get the better of him.  Jennifer 
Doyle describes experiencing just such a meta-feeling at having betrayed her critical 
self by openly crying at Franko B’s I Miss You.   
 We stumble over our own feelings – and over the discomfort they pose, 
especially for the critic.  They force us to confront the inhibitions of 
(especially) art criticism: in which we aren’t supposed to write from the 
proximity of love, but from a distance of assessment. (Literary critics got over 
this ages ago.)76  
 
The criticality we might expect of ourselves has a quality of distance, whilst emotion 
suggests a more proximate engagement.  In showing what we feel, and even that 
we feel at all, we expose ourselves to the embarrassment of both observation and 
evaluation.  We risk making a fool of ourselves.  
 
(ii)  EXPOSURE OF LE PRIVÉ 
Alternatively, embarrassment may in fact be the primary emotion the work seeks to 
provoke.  For the provocation to be embarrassing it must address what Roland 
Barthes terms ‘le privé’, the private life of the spectator, who we think we are.  The 
temperament of le privé is not fixed, but subject to ideology and changes ‘according 
to the Doxa it addresses:’  
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If it is a Doxa of the right (bourgeois, petit bourgeois: institutions, laws, 
press), it is the sexual private life which exposes most.  But if it is a Doxa of 
the left, the sexual exposition transgresses nothing: here “private life” is 
trivial actions, the traces of bourgeois ideology confessed by the subject: 
confronting this Doxa, I am less exposed in declaring a perversion than in 
uttering a taste: passion, friendship, tenderness, sentimentality.77  
 
Ideology, has for many thinkers, been conceived as running from left to right, or 
from west to east, as if located either side of the Seine or Central Park.  Bourdieu, 
for example, writes of; ‘the contrast that is usually drawn between ‘intellectual’ or 
left-bank taste and ‘bourgeois’ or right-bank taste’78  There is a minor, perhaps 
academic, embarrassment in the use of such out-dated sources; do they lack 
credibility or are they just unfashionable?  It could be argued that Barthes’ doxa is a 
very specific doxa of a post-war France, and Bourdieu’s ideas of ‘taste’ are similarly 
historically specific, but, I would contend that the premise of left and right as 
ideological directions remains valid.  They are constantly evolving and no more fixed 
than the culture they are embedded in.  A more contemporary example of left and 
right doxas is provided by Rancière.  In 2009 under the heading ‘The Misadventures 
of Critical Thought’ he wrote; 
Thus on the one hand we have left-wing irony or melancholy.  It urges us to 
admit that all our desires for subversion still obey the law of the market and 
that we are simply indulging in a new game available on the global market – 
that of unbounded experimentation with our own lives.79 
And; 
 Opposite this left-wing melancholy we have seen a new right-wing frenzy 
developing that reformulates denunciation of the market, the media and the 
spectacle as a critique of the ravages of the democratic individual.80  
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Both left and right ideological doxas have their own points of embarrassability that 
can strike at the self-image.  The right wing doxa is the province of small c 
conservatism, thus embarrassability factors will be nudity, sexuality, perversion, and 
deviance but also lawlessness, injustice, irrationality, dissonance, exhibitionism.  
The values of this doxa are exposed and challenged by things that break rules, 
initiate change and deviate from norms.  A left leaning doxa, on the other hand, is 
invested in the idea of freedom to deviate, expressed by Rancière as ‘unbounded 
experimentation’, but finds trivia, romance and affection, banality or domesticity can 
give rise to embarrassability.  Within an intellectual context (including this), the left is 
usually preferred and the right disparaged as repressive and pedestrian.  The left is 
however defensive of its left-ness so that, as Barthes notes, it is particularly 
embarrassed by ‘the traces of bourgeois ideology confessed by the subject’.81  That 
is to say, a sense of self as intellectual and free is embarrassed by gestures of a 
residual conservatism, such as sentimentality and confession.   In considering the 
points at which class, and particularly middle-class-ness might figure in spectatorial 
embarrassment, it seems probable that ‘traces of bourgeois ideology’ might be 
particularly troublesome to those who are middling in class and defensive about 
having, or being mistakenly assumed to have middle-brow taste.   
 
Although transgressions that embarrass may seem to be minor infringements and 
lack the outrage factor, they actually strike hardest at the heart of the ‘private self’.  
Anger for example may be a strong; an intense emotion, but despite its strength 
may not challenge our sense of self.  Righteous anger in fact would be self-
affirmative.  An embarrassing sentimentality, however, may seriously contravene a 
sense of self if we preferred to consider that self as radical and bold.   Also, whilst 
the exposures of the right wing may be numerous, more prone to be 
sensationalised, and capable of arousing strong(er) feelings, the transgressions that 
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expose the private self as subject to a left wing doxa, may in fact, be the very ones 
most likely to embarrass.  It is in fact possible that showing feeling, letting feelings  
get the better of us is exactly what is most embarrassing to the ‘boiled rabbits’ of the 
intellectual left.82  The one-to-one encounter of performance art might be exemplary 
of this category of transgression.  Being singled-out, having to engage when we 
might naturally prefer to spectate from a safe and critical distance can be 
embarrassing.  We are exposed, and the problem is in the proximity and the 
intimacy of the encounter.  Where we might expect of our self a capacity for reason 
and for impersonal criticality, we are mired in feelings. 
 
(iii)  FAILURE OF GESTURE 
And lastly, there is the case where the transgression of the artwork is slight, a minor 
ruffling of the feathers of social niceties, or an underwhelming sense of anti-climax; 
and we are left asking, ‘is this it?’  This category of transgression is unintentionally 
embarrassing.  The spectator is embarrassed by the failure of gesture.  Where we 
anticipated horror, disgust, abjection, we were psyched up for sex, or braced for 
decency to be outraged, the offence is limp and inoffensive.  The burden of failure, 
of the failure of gesture is then shared by the spectator who has failed to summon 
up an appropriate intensity of emotion and may be embarrassed and even  
apologetic about their indifference.83   The failure of gesture might be symptomatic  
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of the mediocrity of the artwork.  Sometimes the spectator is suspicious of the 
work’s integrity, or originality, or point; the work might be banal, or clichéd, or 
pedestrian.  This can be embarrassing as the mediocrity or pointlessness of the 




ARTWORKS & NAVIGATION 
The artists whose work has been the catalyst for thinking about embarrassment in 
this project are Gilbert & George, Jemima Stehli, Franko B, Adrian Howells, and 
Sarah Lucas.  They perhaps have little in common.  They are contemporary, mostly 
British, not ‘great’, sometimes challenging.  The works discussed here, each in 
different ways deal with the prevailing dramas of our times; identity, gender, class, 
sexuality, power, liberty, but what connects them in the context of spectatorial 
embarrassment is less immediately apparent than subject, period, or genre but 
might be glimpsed in the manner in which they anticipate and address the spectator. 
 
(i)  CONTEMPORARY & BRITISH 
The artworks under consideration span a period beginning in the last decade of the 
twentieth-century and the first of this one.   They are British, and might be 
considered to address a largely British audience, and that is significant in terms of 
the emotional register of the work and its narrative, and also the emotional 
repertoire an audience might carry with them.  Strictly speaking, Gilbert Proesch 
and Franko B are Italian by birth, but as both have been working in Britain for so 
long, it is fair to say that they work in a British idiom.84  Against a prevailing trend of 
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increasing globalisation, not just in the art world but in societies generally, this has 
been a productive era for artists working in a recognisably British vernacular.  As 
Malik comments, in the 1990s British art adopted ‘a position of increasing 
localisation that exposed its peculiarities.’85  Its exponents are notable for an 
irreverent yet sophisticated approach to critique, exhibition and (self-)promotion.  
 
(ii) NOT ‘GREAT’ 
According to Ngai, there is a direct correlation between the inter-emotional ranking 
system and canonical status.  Great works narrate and elicit great emotions and 
minor works trade in minor feelings.  Ngai writes; ‘something about the cultural 
canon itself seems to prefer higher passions and emotions – as if minor or ugly 
feelings were not only incapable of producing ‘major’ works, but somehow disabled 
the works they do drive from acquiring canonical distinction.’86  Whilst I would not 
described any of the artworks discussed here as ‘great’ in the sense of being 
canonical, neither do I claim for them a trash aesthetic; ‘so bad it’s good’. They are 
however, to some extent, doubtful in their critical acclaim, and that doubtfulness, 
perhaps even mediocrity, is important to the ambivalence of spectatorial response.  
Gilbert & George, for instance, are not overly much-admired.  Despite endorsements 
such as representing the UK in the 2005 Venice Biennale and the major 
retrospective at Tate Modern in 2007, they remain a curiosity, an anachronism, 
somewhere between the greatness of Bacon and the populism of the yBas.  They 
are probably on the brink of being cosily regarded as ‘National Treasures’.87  Much 
of their output, I would argue is characterised by a deliberate mediocrity; they trade 
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in the banal and the repetitive with a boyish glee in being filthy.  I am attracted to the 
dubiousness of it all; I don’t know if I should be taking it seriously.  I don’t even ‘like’ 
some of it, but I find it compelling viewing.   
 
(iii) SOMETIMES CHALLENGING 
To some degree or extent, each work encountered here might be described as 
‘transgressive’ in that they seek to undermine received values, transgressing 
against both the canon and the spectator, but, and most importantly, in only a 
modest way.  They operate in a minor key, at low intensity; their provocation is 
understated so that the contravention of artistic or social protocol is masked or not 
immediately apparent.  Coming in the wake of a previous trend for high-voltage, 
confrontational art dealing in extremes of shame, outrage or trauma, the works 
under discussion here prompt a very much more muted response.  The peculiar 
temperance of audience feeling and paucity of critical attention they attract are 
interesting and arguably worth investigating, firstly due to the value of attending to 
hitherto overlooked subjects, but secondly and more importantly, because of the 
potential counter-value of a spectatorial and critical response that is low-key and 
lukewarm.  
 
(iv)  TOWARDS THE SPECTATOR 
Besides the loose connections of time and place and an irreverent attitude, where I 
think there is common ground in the artworks discussed here, is in the attention to 
the spectatorial as a compromising position.  The spectatorial position they 
anticipate in relation to their work is not particularly one of agency, but it carries with 
it a sense of provocation and obligation; we are unlikely to get away with ‘just 
looking’.  Also, each artist is very ‘present’ in their work.  Rather than being an 
invisible hand or omnificent narrator, they are insistently, unnervingly part of the 
encounter and we are on first name terms.  When the spectator engages with the 
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work, she seems also to engage with the producer, producing the feeling that there 
is no anonymity in the consumption of these works.  Furthermore, the artworks 
discussed here, each contest the idea of spectatorship as a position of privilege and 
ease, and instead, configure spectatorship as a look-looked-at, a look that is 
always, on some level, ‘caught looking’.  Spectatorship is posited as a position of 
responsibility; the spectator must account for herself and for her looking, and to 
some degree, for the object of her look.   
 
What sort of spectator do these works imagine or anticipate?  Malik writes of 
Lucas’s work; ‘there is a knowing use of words, gestures and forms that defines a 
culturally specific spectator.  In this case, middle-class aspirations are being quoted, 
staged, maybe even mocked.’88  This is an interesting premise, and one that might 
easily be imagined as extending to other works considered here.  However, what 
these artworks actually seem to achieve is not to define or predict a ‘culturally 
specific spectator’, but to procure a particular degree of spectatorial self-
consciousness so that the spectator is aware of herself/himself as ‘culturally 
specific’.  He or she is a specific and singular product of gender, class, habitus, with 
specific knowledges and opacities, specific doubts and tastes.  These artworks each 
belong to an unstructured but cumulative body of works that single out spectators as 
persons. They are working against the grain of globalisation, and arguably, against 
the collectivism of multitudes and swarms.  The spectatorial experience they 
anticipate is one of discomfort and uncertainty, but if we slow down the experience, 
allow the intensity and pause of the blockage, it is also one of originality and 
possibility. 
 
In Artificial Hells, Bishop discusses the politics of spectatorship in contexts where 
the spectator is an active element of the work rather than ‘just looking’.  She notes 
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 Malik, p63. 
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the transformation of audiences throughout modernity; what they were named and 
what that developing taxonomy might mean to the experiences of spectatorship.  
She writes; ‘the identity of participants has been reimagined’ as; a crowd, the 
masses, the people, the excluded, the community, and most recently, volunteers.  
This, she offers, might be seen as ‘an heroic narrative of increased activation and 
agency of the audience’, or alternatively, as their gradual commodification.89  What 
each of the artworks that are discussed in the following chapters, in terms of 
spectatorial embarrassment, most have in common is perhaps that they address, or 
feel as if they address, not an audience of a mass or a crowd or a community, but a 
person.  Rather than being one of many, now we are each on our own.  These 
artworks engender the sensation of being addressed as an individual and culturally 
specific person whose relation to the work; its subject matter, its maker, is an 
inimitable moment of confrontation and exchange.   The value of that exchange is 




My encounters begin with a visit to the major 
exhibition of Gilbert & George’s work at Tate 
Modern and  explores the embarrassment caused 
by the outdated but tenacious modernist imperative 
that I should leave my emotional baggage at the 
door and view art from a position of ‘disinterest’; a 
position I cannot occupy comfortably; and perhaps 
not at all.  The conventional atmosphere of the 
museum/gallery, as a space of cultural capital is 
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 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (London: 
Verso, 2012). p277.   
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considered as adverse to emotional engagement: it is a public space where private 
feelings should be suppressed.  The excessive male bias of the work of Gilbert & 
George draws attention to me, as female, in a way that is on the brink of 
embarrassment; it makes me feel self-conscious.  My spectatorial position, as 
female, is one of exclusion; I am ‘without’, unable to see my ‘likeness’ in their work, 
and I am in search of somewhere comfortable to look from that is not too ‘sticky’ with 




The second chapter explores the difficulty of 
theorising embarrassment using Sartre’s work on 
seeing and being seen from Being and 
Nothingness, and also anecdotal accounts of (the 
making of) Jemima Stehli’s Strip.  Stehli invited 
men from the art world; critics, curators, 
gallerists, to watch her strip, and the work 
consists of series of photographs of the men 
watching.  Strip is a disarmingly straightforward exposé of the ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’ 
of women that is (still) pervasive within the context of art and the power nexus of the 
art world.  Both resources used in this chapter are imperfect; the anecdotal accounts 
obviously ignore or edit out some embarrassments and Sartre’s theorisation of the 
look fails, because it fails to account for the genderedness of looking.  In the failure 
of theory, lies my embarrassment at not being able to see without an insistent, 
hierarchical and almost paranoid gendering.90  This leads me to consider 
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 From a feminist spectatorial perspective, the sincerity of Strip’s challenge to the art-world 
power nexus is not clear-cut, and the ambivalence of this is a potential site of 
embarrassment.  I have been using Strip as ‘an example’ since the work was first shown in 
2000, and the more I consider it, the more multifarious it becomes.  I have one of the prints, 
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embarrassment as an example of Tomkins’ ‘weak theory’, one that holds good in 
only limited circumstances and is not easily transferable.  Finally, I am unable to 





Don’t Leave Me This Way, a short work of one-to-
one performance art by Franko B provides the 
next encounter.  For three minutes I sat in almost 
total darkness a few inches away from the artist.  I 
could have spoken, I could have maybe touched 
him, but I ‘just’ looked, and was embarrassed by 
my desire to look and by the failure of a gesture of 
intimacy.  Franko’s ‘monstrous’ work is contrasted 
with Marc Quinn’s ‘freakish’ sculpture, Alison 
Lapper Pregnant, and using the monster and the freak as metaphors for the 
disinterest of the gaze and the interest of transgression, I consider an ethics of 
looking, and how this might be a cause of embarrassment.  My investment in looking 
at Franko B is finally considered as an economic embarrassment within the 
economy of affective labour.  I am embarrassed by the situation that I have paid to 





                                                                                                                                          






The offer of ‘intimacy and risk’ enticed me 
to engage in another one-to-one 
encounter.  The 14 Stations of the Life 
and History of Adrian Howells confirmed 
the marginality of embarrassment, not 
only as something slippery and elusive, 
but as always ‘incidental’.  In this performance Howells staged episodes from his 
history that exhibited a less-good self that he wanted to expose in terms of a 
narrative of confession.  His performance in fact hinges on ‘exposure’ as a breach of 
conventions of private and public.  I found little embarrassment in the intimacy of 
(his) confession, or the risk of participation, but it was unexpectedly manifested in 
the sentimentality of ‘unfinished business’ which is considered here as a touchstone 
of Lauren Berlant’s ‘intimate public’.  This particular embarrassment is one that 
predominantly troubles the radical nature of a left-facing doxa, and I was 
embarrassed to find myself indulging in a sentimental nostalgia, and to be counted 




Chapter Five is uncomfortably personal.  
Despite the challenge laid down by 
Gilbert & George of ‘perverse’ sexuality 
and its biblical condemnation in their 
work Sodom, I am instead embarrassed 
by connotations of intimacy.  Their 
intimacy exposes my uneasy relationship to the public intimacies of coupledom and 
my exclusion from them.  Sodom interpellates me; it singles me out and exposes my 
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interest in intimacy and asks that I account for myself and my single status.  As a 
singleton, I am embarrassed to find my state disparaged by what Berlant calls ‘love’s 
plot’, and the promotion of coupledom as ‘an institution of privacy’, which, as a 
woman  I am supposed to subscribe to, or at least aspire to.  Finally this chapter 
considers singularity as an expression of the first moment of embarrassment, a 
feeling of difference and attention, a state of animation, expectant and anxious, 




Chapter Six takes a less personal tone, and looks at 
the role of embarrassment in the work of Sarah 
Lucas, and in particular, in her self-portrait, Got a 
Salmon On # 3.  Lucas’s work has been described 
as small-time and low-rent and seems to eschew a 
high-brow theoretical position, which leaves the 
spectator unsettled and ‘without’.  The spectator’s 
capacity to know is restricted; we are not ‘in the 
know’, and less than comfortable with the things we think we know.  Through 
analysis of her apparent refusal of conventional femininity, I suggest that her 
disidentification with femaleness is a move to evade evaluation embarrassment, and 
that in fact, embarrassment is a female emotion.  The ‘female’ embarrassment 
Lucas refuses is off-loaded onto objects elsewhere in her work which are 
emphatically gendered and sexualised in ways that employ both misogyny and 
humour.  Evaluation of Lucas’s work is considered finally in association with 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory as a productive framework for the study of (female) 




CHAPTER SEVEN (CONCLUSION) 
The final chapter moves towards a critical epistemology of embarrassment as a 
‘body of knowledge’.  The method of feeling-capture used throughout, is re-
evaluated as a ‘weak method’ that is recognisable as the somewhat outdated 
literary analysis of ‘reader-response criticism’.  This is a form of analysis that pays 
intense attention to the reception of the text, and conceives of meaning as 
something that unfolds and evolves as a process of engagement.91  Gathering 
together the strands of what can be known of embarrassment, of a weak theory of 
embarrassment, of its weak truth claims, and its feeble political ambition this chapter 
proposes that what is now ‘known’ about embarrassment confirms its singularity; it 
is embodied, empirical, inimitable, and resistant to the generalisation of theory-
proper.  Singularity provides the cathectic intensity of embarrassment as ‘embodied 
criticality’ that makes us self-aware in situations of ‘without-ness’ when we can 
neither be nor belong comfortably.  I propose finally, that embarrassment, as a 
conservative mechanism reinforces social and cultural ideas of ‘normal’, but, when 
redefined as an embodied criticality, embarrassment is found to be critical of the 
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 Reader-response criticism emerged in the latter half of the twentieth-century with many of 
its main principles defined by theorists such as Wolfgang Iser, Stanley Fish, Jonathan Culler, 
and Norman Holland during the 1970s.  It centred on a relocation of meaning, placing it not 
in the text but in the reading process where the objectivity of the text becomes consumed by 
the subjectivity of the reader.  Tomkins writes; ‘the important point is that literature is the 
activity that the reader performs and not a stable artefact: ‘it refuses to stay still’.’ (pxvii) 
The experiential process of producing meaning for the reader is opposed to the concept of a 
mind/body dualism, but recruits all aspects of human existence and experience in the 
production of ‘literature’ as a subjective response which Holland describes as ‘an in-
gathering and in-mixing of self and other’.pxix. Jane P. Tompkins, ed. Reader-Response 
Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press, 





As I reach the end of this introduction, I am heartily sick of typing the word 
‘embarrassment’, and I suppose you will also soon sicken.  To mitigate this, I offer 
some thoughts on alternative words. 
 
Keats uses the word awkwardness, which accurately captures the mildness, and 
also the reticence to speak of the situation.  Ruskin wrote of ‘excessive self-
attention’, which alludes to both conceit and, surely unintentionally, to masturbation.  
Chagrin sounds pretentious.  Mortification is exorbitant.  I have considered 
discomfiture, which I like, and humiliation, indignity, and ignominy, which are all too 
strong.  Discredit is good in the sense of the discrediting of one’s image, and also it 
is suggestive of financial embarrassment.  Dis-ease is also good because according 
to Barthes, ease is the opposite of embarrassment.  Loss of face, loss of   
composure, and loss of dignity are all effective in suggesting that it is a temporary 
problem.  What is lost may be found and recovered.  Loss also suggests lack and 
thus a psychoanalytic interpretation.  Loss of face is particularly apt as it suggests 
the visually grounded discrediting of self-image.  Loss of face also alludes to the 
disfigurement of the blush, and to the superficiality of our image, of the front we put 







Chapter One:    
In The Gallery:  A visit to the Gilbert & George Major 
Exhibition at Tate Modern. 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
As Spectator I was interested [ . . . ] only for ‘sentimental’ reasons; I wanted to 
explore it not as a question (a theme) but as a wound: I see, I feel, hence I notice,  
I observe, and I think.                                                                        Roland Barthes1  





Gilbert and George said; ‘We wanted to do art to be embarrassed.’   And so do I, but 
when I ‘do’ art, my doing is not making, but seeing.  I like looking at art that makes 
me feel just a little bit uncomfortable, unsettled.  I look, look away, and glance back, 
slyly, shyly.  Should I be looking?  Is this worth looking at?  Sometimes the images 
ignore me, sometimes they stare back, a reverse gaze, returning me to myself.  I 
like to look at myself, but I don’t like to be caught doing it. 
 
I first encountered the images of Gilbert & George about twenty-five years ago at an 
exhibition in Liverpool; they were gaudy, holding hands, ten feet tall.  They leered 
down from the wall at me.  I wasn’t sure if I liked them but I definitely wasn’t 
embarrassed.  Over the years I have got to know their work better and become 
engrossed in the contradiction of respectability and rudeness that is their life’s work.  
My interest in Gilbert & George is grounded in the chronicling of their urban cosmos 
of graffiti, rent boys, tramps, litter, vandalism, hostility, shit, money, drunks, decay, 
and detritus that we call home.  Gilbert and George amble around this world like two 
latter-day Marco Polos, observing, with an eye for detail, with an eye for the 
ordinary, for all the things that are there all along, remarkable; unremarkable.  
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 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans., Richard Howard (London: Vintage, 1993). p21. 
75 
 
            
           Gilbert & George: at home in their urban cosmos 
 
Michael Bracewell compared their illustration of the urban environment to ‘a version 
of the Mass Observation projects carried out in the UK during the 1930s’ which has, 
‘a quality of detachment and suspension of moral judgement . . . and yet emotion 
spills over the edges of the facts’.2  And that is exactly how it is; their gritty realism is 
stained with sentimentality and sexuality, and importantly, any moral judgement is 
definitely the province of the spectator.  It’s all down to interpretation.  And now I find 
their work embarrassing, or to be more accurate, I am embarrassed by my response 
to their work.  And what I am most embarrassed about is the sense of exposure; 
does my response reveal too much about me?  Am I making an exhibition of 
myself? 
   
 
FEELING ‘STICKY’ 
In my spectatorial engagement with art, I struggle with an entrenched idea of a 
proper aesthetic appreciation that I fail to feel, or at least, any such feeling is 
overwhelmed by a personal and probably inappropriate response to the subject 
                                                 
2
 Michael Bracewell and Lisa G Corrin, Gilbert & George: Dirty Words Pictures (London: 
Serpentine Gallery, 2002). p12. 
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matter.  I do not feel the bloodless ‘aesthetic emotion’ of the pure gaze; but only 
everyday emotions, haphazard, messy feelings of the common kind.  Bourdieu 
asserts that the capacity to experience aesthetic emotion is a power not universally 
inscribed.  For him, it is of course, a question of social habitus that determines 
spectatorial capacity for the pure gaze and he notes the irritation of those, who like 
me, fail to feel aesthetic transcendence, he comments on their humiliation, and 
obscure sense of inferiority.3  Nothing in my own history offers an easy explanation 
for my incapacity to gaze’; my family background of middle-class ambition and 
industry, a privileged grammar school education, and a long-standing interest in the 
visual arts should equip me with confidence and mastery, yet my spectatorial self is 
doubtful and diffident.  ‘The gaze’, as a sign of cultural capital, denotes knowledge, 
privilege, and the gratification of desire in a way that confers a diplomatic immunity 
on the spectator.  From this position of comfortable authority over the object of the 
look, the spectator is secure in his subjectivity, his comfort, and his authority.  His 
subjectivity is underwritten by the (patriarchal) hegemony.   
 
This is of course a position that belongs to a much-contested old-school convention, 
but one that I believe still exerts an influence.  Although disparaged and disputed, 
there seems to be a tacit investment in the preservation of a ‘dominant but dead’ 
modernism, perhaps as a means of stabilising an artificial dichotomy between 
culture and counterculture, or between conservative and radical in which each is 
increasingly dependent on the other for definition and continuation.4  The gaze, as a 
stabilizer of the dynamic between the subject and the object of the look, theoretically 
allows the spectating subject a degree of privacy.  Without this, the spectator risks 
                                                 
3
 Bourdieu, p31.   
4
 The position that ‘Modernism is dominant but dead’ is considered by Jürgen Habermas, 
see ‘Modernity – An Incomplete Project’ (1980) in Harrison and Wood, p1125.  Such a 
division might be interpreted as a Foucauldian ‘repressive hypothesis’.  For a discussion of 
Foucault’s hypothesis applied to emotion, and the vague possibility of escaping binarism 
(that is also ‘repressive’), see Sedgwick, Touching Feeling pp9-13 and pp109-111. 
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the embarrassment of objectification; her look is a look-looked-at, she is caught 
looking and must account for herself and her looking.  The crux of the matter of the 
cultural competence of the gaze is said to be an ability to separate art and life; to 
achieve ‘a break with the ordinary attitude towards the world’, but when I look, I am 
unable to leave the thinking and feeling of ordinary life behind; they are an 
inseparable part of my looking.5  I am stuck with them.   
 
The spectatorial response elicited by the work of Gilbert & George is one of 
exposure, provocation and instability.  Lauren Berlant makes similar claims for the 
address made by queer fanzines to their readership.  She comments; 
This move to materialise the spectator as different from the spectacle with 
which she identifies has powerful political force for women, whose collective 
and individual self-representations are always available for embarrassment,   
[ . . . ] By reversing the direction of the embarrassment from the spectacle 
towards the spectator, the zines rotate the meaning of consent.  In severing 
sexual identity from sexual expressivity, the spectacle talks dirty to you, as it 
were, and you no longer have the privilege to consume in silence, or in tacit 
unconsciousness of or unaccountability for your own fantasies.6 
 
In a very similar way, the work of Gilbert & George also seems to materialise the 
spectator as different.  Looking, I am differenced; made strange by the ordinariness 
of their images and made ordinary by the strangeness of their images.  They do not 
flatter me or allow any comfort.  They talk dirty, to the spectator, and in so doing 
divert the direction of embarrassment.  The embarrassment they claim to value 
becomes spectatorial embarrassment.  If the spectator were able to muster the 
disinterested, aesthetic appreciation of the pure gaze she (or he) could perhaps 
keep her distance, and be as Berlant says, unaccountable.  But she hears, or 
maybe eavesdrops on the pictures’ dirty talk and her proximity, and thus emotional 
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 Bourdieu, p31.   
6
 Lauren Berlant, The Queen of America Goes to Washinton City: Essays on Sex and 
Citizenship (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997). pp170,171. 
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investment (interest, curiosity, prurience, expectation) entraps her.  The cost of 
looking is accountability; the spectator must account for the ‘I’ that the spectacle 
talks dirty to.  She must account, as Berlant notes, for her difference. 
 
 
 Gilbert & George Dog Boy (1980) Photopiece, 181 x201 cm 
 
 
Dog Boy is one of Gilbert & George’s works that unsettles and exposes me.  My 
interest is sentimental, and biographical; I take it personally.  The work dates from 
the early days of their adventures in colour and Dog Boy is black and white, flanked 
by six flower heads on solid yellow ground.   He is caught, framed against the last-
ditch security measure of a metal gate set in a crumbling doorway of a rough 
neighborhood.  Boy, about fifteen, maybe younger, a package under his arm, cheap 
79 
 
windcheater unzipped to reveal a scrawny body in a t-shirt.  Hair, a bit long, a 
mistrustful look in his eyes, lovely mouth, like a girl’s.  It’s like looking back into my 
adolescence; he looks like the boys from the comprehensive school back home, the 
ones that were never going to make much of themselves.  Not like the grammar 
school boys for whom achievement was mapped.  He is vulnerable; life will happen 
to him.  He is not as tough-looking as many of Gilbert & George’s boys; not so 
street-wise as the Knights, not as cocky as the Patriot, or as churlish as the 
Britisher.   
 
The title, Dog Boy, is ‘sticky’.  The abjection of ‘dog’ as an insult, ‘sticks’ to the boy.  
The dog in the image is far from abject, a sturdy little Jack Russell in a studded 
collar, tail up, ears pricked, but still, the term ‘dog’ dogs the boy.  Sara Ahmed 
applies the term ‘sticky’ to emotion and emotional contexts, but also to texts and 
speech acts about emotion;  ‘stickiness involves a form of relationality, or a 
‘withness’, in which the elements that are ‘with’ get bound together.’7  Sticking, says 
Ahmed, ‘is dependent on past histories of association that often ‘work’ through 
concealment.’8  Stickiness works at an unseen level, it is insidious, it is sub-
conscious, like unthought thought.  And it is the stuff of prejudice, of neuroses, of 
desire, of gut-feelings, and of embarrassment. 
 
A fine example of ‘stickiness’ occurs in Michael Petry’s account of the proposed 
artworks for the exhibition ‘Hidden Histories’ in Walsall in 2004, where one of the 
pieces, Felix Gonzales-Torres’s Untitled (Ross) was vetoed by the local council.  
The abstract conceptual work consists of a pile of wrapped sweets equal in weight 
to the body of Gonzales-Torres’s lover, Ross Laycock who was dying from an AIDS-
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 Ahmed, Cultural Politics, p91.    
8
 Ibid. p13.    
80 
 
related illness.  Spectators participate by helping themselves to sweets, and the total 
mass shrinks over time.  Petry reports first hand on the rejection. 
In a formal meeting to discuss all the works proposed for the show, the 
official [Head of Arts for the local council] angrily denounced the piece, 
stating that everyone knew that all “homosexuals” were “pedophiles” and that 
everyone knew that “pedos” try to catch children with candy, and that he 
would not allow such perversion to take place “on my [his] watch”.9  
 
 
      
          Gonzales-Torres Untitled (Portrait of Ross in LA) 
 
 
Allowing the furore over the sticky sweets of Untitled (Ross) to stick again and to 
articulate the homoerotica and homophobia that are always strong undercurrents in 
the consumption of Gilbert & George’s work poses the question; who is Dog Boy 
looking at?  Two old queers with a camera?  What have they offered him to pose for 
them?  No, to pose for me.  I am the one now looking, and so I am complicit in all 
the anxieties and desires that are ‘with’ the image of the boy.  I don’t devour him as 
a homoerotic fantasy, for me, the attraction is sentimental, recalling narratives of my 
past.  But something in his shifty look is replicated in my gaze, which is also shifty, 
furtive even.  And I worry for him.  ‘Go home; don’t take sweets from strangers’.   
 
                                                 
9




The stickiness of ideas and images embarrasses me.  I am embarrassed by the 
contaminating juxtaposition of the lovely Dog Boy with someone else’s homophobia.  
They came together in my head and now I can’t prize them apart.  And initially by 
‘prize’ I meant disentangle, but now I cannot value them apart either.  The  
transgressiveness of Gilbert & George’s work is often assumed to be the rude 
words, the flying shit, see my underpants, see my arsehole, as if in response to Bill 
Grundy’s moral majority provocation: ‘Go on, you’ve got another five seconds.  Say 
something outrageous.’10  But it is not.  The transgression of their work is not what 
they put in the images but what we as spectators read into them, or take out of 
them, as if the image is a repository for sticky thoughts.  Looking at their work there 
is always the hazardous potential that I, as the spectator, may expose myself, letting 
ordinary life corrupt my looking, having ordinary, everyday emotions when I should 
be more pure in gaze.     
 
If the work of Gilbert & George can be said to be a repository for sticky thoughts, to 
articulate those thoughts, to say what I see, is a form of sticky word association.  It 
brings embarrassment to light; it traps it in language, in discourse.  Putting 
embarrassment into words always makes things worse.  Denise Riley’s essay ‘All 
Mouth and No Trousers’ exactly captures how this can progress from an 
insubstantial idea of embarrassment to an embodied feeling, how; ‘the standing of 
the word as thing solidifies, and the coming flavour of it becomes hard to hold in the 
mouth.’11  To say what we mean, sometimes we have no option but to use words 
from a ‘linguistic constituency’ to which we don’t belong.12  This is always awkward.  
The embarrassment of solidifying difficult but deniable thoughts into the un-
deniability of language is like the bringing into existence that Lee Edelman claims for 
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 From Grundy’s interview with the Sex Pistols on the Today programme broadcast by 
Thames Television, 01 December 1976.  
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 Riley, p104.   
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 Ibid. p104. 
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psychoanalysis.  The analytic scene is according to Edelman, one that actually 
summons up emotional states rather than just talking about them.   
Freud’s metapsychological theories, after all, repeatedly articulate a 
structural return to a trauma occasioned by an earlier event that has no 
existence as a scene of trauma until it is (re)presented – or (re)produced – 
as a trauma in the movement of return itself.13  
 
So the (re)productive telling, as a solidification in language, calls into existence 
something out of nothing, or next to nothing.  In the same way, an embarrassing 
moment may pass unmentioned, passing into an unmentionable past, but 
alternatively, if we are called on to account for the embarrassment that was 
fleetingly felt, to try to specify exactly what was embarrassing, to designate or to 
name, to find the words, inadequate, unfortunate, loaded, compromising words, this 
actually causes a further layer of embarrassment.  The present becomes thoroughly 
sticky, contaminated by the past and by passing thoughts, and embarrassment is 
not just reproduced, but produced.  And not just as a thing of the past, but of now, in 
a present moment. 
 
The phenomenon of spectatorial embarrassment that I want to explore here is 
initiated by the spectator’s declaration (my declaration) of interest in the object of the 
look and the obligation to be accountable for the ‘I’ that looks.  But the account of 
that embarrassment is important in itself; the speaking/writing of embarrassment is 
what Sartre might call ‘a solidification of self’.  The temporal and spatial structure of 
embarrassment is inflected by Ahmed’s ‘stickiness’ of things being ‘with’, and by 
Riley’s ‘standing of the word as thing’, and by the psychoanalytical ‘movement of 
return’.  Each of these concepts imagines tentative relationships of substitutable 
causes and effects that are similar if not identical to the relationship between the 
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experience of embarrassment and its narrative, which are also metaleptically 
substitutable.   
 
The sticky associations and compromises of embarrassment, of seeing/knowing, 
and thinking/feeling, are blocked and complicated by the difficulties of language, but 
demanded by the narrative structure of the show-and-tell of disclosure and 
interpretation, by the analysis and distillation of theory.  The process of narrative 
calls for the transmogrification of feeling into the blunt solidity of words giving wordy 
substance to the slight and nuanced ephemera of affect.  The reification of 
embarrassment in language is mirrored and explored here through the narrative 
structure of the anecdote; a brief account, but made real by its contingency, by thick 
description, and by a commitment to being ‘true’.  This process of emotional 
blockage, difficulty of language, and the subsequent critical thinking it sparks is the 




SPACES OF CULTURAL CAPITAL 
Spectatorial embarrassment experienced when looking at art may be compounded 
by the specific context of that spectatorship.  The museum or gallery has a 
longstanding investment in procuring a particular spectator-experience, and whilst 
intentions of directors and curators may be changing to encourage a less formal 
encounter, the spaces of cultural capital they work within have a history of the 
promotion of serious learning and contemplation.  The art gallery according to 
Bourdieu, ‘often calls for an austere, quasi-scholastic disposition, oriented  . . .  
towards the accumulation of experience and knowledge.’14  The gallery, the 
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museum, or the exhibition space is a place of cultural capital in the way that a bank 
is a place of financial capital.  The similarity might extend to the architecture 
declaring wealth, authority, endorsing enlightenment values and aesthetics.  Other 
parallels have been drawn; with temples, as places of ritual, and with schools as 
places of pedagogical intent, they are, as Doyle notes, ‘spaces in which we 
encounter culture, usually on someone else’s terms.’15  All are places and spaces of 
institutional inequality.  
 
In theory, according to Carol Duncan, the gallery is;  
 A liminal zone of time and space in which visitors, removed from the 
 concerns of their daily, practical lives, open themselves to a different quality 
 of experience.16  
 
In practice, Duncan recognises the failure of this;   
In reality, people continually “misread” or scramble or resist the museum’s 
cues to some extent; or they actively invent, consciously or unconsciously, 
their own programs according to all the historical and psychological 
accidents of who they are.17  
 
Biography, then undoes the capacity, or inclination to be ideal spectators who meet 
the anticipated criteria; who see what they are expected to see, who know what they 
are expected to know, and feel what they are expected to feel.   ‘Spectator’ is a role 
we are supposed to know how to play.  In the gallery, there is a code of appropriate 
behaviour, a prescriptive ‘norm’ that as a spectator I am expected to approximate.  
Deviate from this and I will draw unwanted and unfavourable attention to myself.  
Deviate from this norm and I may be embarrassed.  Walk, don’t run.  Talk quietly, 
don’t shout.  Look.  Look as if I am engaged.  Absorb the image, take it all in, but 
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 Duncan compares museums to temples; Carol Duncan, Civilizing Rituals: Inside Public Art 
Museums (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007)., Doyle compares them to schools.; ‘Critical Tears: 
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don’t be taken in by it, it is art, not reality.  Consider, reflect, study, approve, 
disapprove, but don’t crowd, keep a distance.  Sometimes things are roped off, or 
there is a line on the floor that the visitor must not cross.  Don’t cross the line.  Keep 
a safe distance, physically and emotionally.  Don’t laugh.  Don’t cry.  Don’t cry out in 
pain or jump for joy.  Indifference is perfectly acceptable.  It is okay to look bored.   
 
One of the things spectators are embarrassed to do in the place of cultural capital is 
to show emotion.  Not only is looking at art sometimes embarrassing in itself, but 
moreover there is the meta-embarrassment of being embarrassed by an 
inappropriately emotional response.  Elkins, Doyle, and Butt have all written of being 
moved to tears by art or performance, but felt that there was something 
unacceptable about the emotion they felt, and about its public display.18  Jennifer 
Doyle says; 
When an artist successfully overrides the self-consciousness and the 
inhibitions that settle on us in places like galleries and classrooms, it comes 
as a shock: finding ourselves crying, laughing, afraid, disgusted, aroused, 
outraged – can leave us feeling a bit naked.19  
 
Both innate self-consciousness and the politics of display that proscribes certain 
types of behaviour as inappropriate may cause the spectator to police their 
instinctive response.  But sometimes we just can’t help ourselves; the emotional 
reaction is unstoppable, and the best we can hope for is to hide our feelings, and to 
keep our response as quiet as we can; to try to ‘cover up’.   
 
Doyle describes an occasion when her emotions ‘got the better of her’.  She was at 
Tate Modern watching a well-attended performance piece by Franko B, called I Miss 
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 See instances of tears in Elkins, and Doyle in Baume, and Gavin Butt, "How I Died for Kiki 
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You.20  Franko, naked and covered all over in white paint, like the vernix of a new-
born, walked up and down a canvas cat-walk, all the time bleeding onto the canvas 
through catheters inserted into his arms.  The piece speaks of many things, of 
painting, of the fashion industry, of duration and endurance, of bodies and bodily 
fluids, but Doyle was affected by the intimacy of the work.  She responded to the 
apparent desolation of a lone man, purposefully walking, growing weaker, walking, 
bleeding, bleeding for something?  In spite of being just one member of a sizeable 
audience, she took it very personally; he was bleeding for her, she was the ‘you’ that 
Franko’s ‘I’ was missing.  She says; 
When Franko walked out of our view and the lights went up, I was overcome 
by tears – not by gentle tears, but by a wave of feeling so intense it 
threatened to take me over with racking sobs – the kind of crying that makes 
you shudder. [ . . ] And it’s about the last sort of feeling I expected to have in 
a museum.  I managed to shake it off, but not without giving myself away.21  
 
And then to compound the embarrassment of having sobbed at the conclusion of 
the piece, having ‘given herself away’, Doyle suffers the further indignity of hearing 
others in the audience ‘scoff’ at those who cried (she was apparently not the only 
one).  The intense, personal, immediate and instinctive response of those who cried 
was derided.  Perhaps for the failure to demonstrate the pure gaze of cultural 
capital, perhaps for the lack of critical engagement, perhaps more basically that it 
shows weakness, sentimentality, a soft underbelly. 
 
The conclusion Doyle draws from her emotional outburst (note the pejorative term) 
is that despite the disparagement of a perhaps out-dated modernist aesthetic that 
privileges a seemingly cold-hearted transcendence of reason, and the detachment 
of the pure gaze, what we as spectators increasingly look for in art is emotion.  The 
desired emotional transaction between image and spectator must, above all else, be 
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sincere.  As the affective turn impacts on our social and cultural relations in ways 
that are subtle, insidious and pervasive we look to art to provide an emotional 
experience, as Bourriaud would have it, a relational aesthetic.22  We seek to make a 
connection and need to be sure we can trust the other party with our feelings, and 
with our soft underbelly; we don’t want to get hurt.  Doyle sees the spectator drawing 
closer to the image, checking it out for the sincerity that makes it worth the 
emotional investment; 
Ultimately, what matters is how these works provoke us to scrutinize the 
image, looking for signs of sincerity.  In doing so they court our attention and 
force us to draw near.  That ambiguity is the very thing that seduces us: in 
our hearts we hold on to the possibility that someone might be crying for us. 
(“I miss you.”)23  
 
 
This indicates potential for spectatorial embarrassment.  If the spectator draws close 
to the work, looking for sincerity, looking for the possibility of a genuine emotional 
interaction, opening themselves up to this possibility, it replicates the conditions of 
Silvan Tomkins’ account of the beginning of shame-embarrassment; ‘ . . because 
one wishes to look at or commune with another person but suddenly cannot 
because he is strange, or one expected him to be familiar but he suddenly appears 
unfamiliar.’24 The expectation of an intimate exchange can be vexed, not necessarily 
cancelled, but things may not be as imagined and the spectator is wrong-footed, left 
feeling exposed, having approached and made eye-contact, offered up her belly, but 
a stranger looks back.  The spectator is then embarrassed, unsettled by both her 
initial desire and the resulting anxiety of the strange.   
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 ‘MAJOR EXHIBITION’ AT TATE MODERN 
Tate Modern looks nothing like a bank or a temple but it is however a memorial to 
industrialisation and capitalism, men making power, men making money out of men 
making power, and its scale is monumental.  It is also a monument to re-
appropriation and reinterpretation, rejuvenation even, and reputed for its 
enthusiastic inclusiveness and earnest assumption of pedagogical responsibilities.  
In 2007 this was the industrial-scale arena for the most comprehensive exhibition of 
the work of Gilbert & George to be staged in the UK.  It is fair to say that the Tate 
was not an early adopter of Gilbert & George.  They invested in some early works, 
(such as Balls) but didn’t show them until considerably later.  The relationship 
between Gilbert & George and the Tate has been mildly antagonistic; Gilbert and 
George have from time to time berated the Tate’s exclusionary tactics and have 
been less than complementary about Tate Modern.  They like to play the part of 
outsiders, with the Tate as the establishment opposition, but by 2007 they had, as 
George put it, ‘managed to kick in the door of the Tate’.25  
 
             
       Tate Modern 2007 
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 Hans Ulrich Obrist, Gilbert & George, The Conversation Series (Koln: Verlag der 
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François Jonquet asked them: ‘What do you think of the Tate Modern?’ and Gilbert 
replied; ‘A sausage machine!  People go into a sort of art factory, and people come 
out.  The artist is not the most important part.  More than the art it’s the movement in 
and out.’26  He seems peeved that the artist should not be pre-eminent, but why the 
artist and not the visitor?  On bad weather days the most important things are 
apparently the gift shop and the café.  In good weather it is a matter of location.  
Sometimes though, the publicity Tate generates threatens to overtake all to become 
the most important thing (and in this it truly does resemble a sausage machine).  
Tate Modern has an aptitude for controversy and (occasionally) manages to make 
art dangerous.27 
 
            
             Gilbert & George discuss hanging at Tate Modern, 2007 
 
 
I am in the gallery.  Within the context of this exhibition there is no disputing the fact 
that size matters.  The works loom large, and wandering from room to room, I am 
somewhat overawed, perhaps belittled.  Looking at the works I find I am attracted 
and repelled in equal measure; and in that moment of confusion, I find that I don’t 
know where, or how exactly to look.  I want to both look, and look away.  I feel 
                                                 
26
 Jonquet, p330.   
27
 Carsten Hӧller’s slides (2006), Doris Salcedo’s Shibboleth (2008), and most recently Ai 
Weiwei’s sunflower seeds (2010) have all made the headlines on health and safety issues. 
90 
 
obliged to look.  I have paid to look.  I feel physically awkward, I feel too much of 
myself, an embarrassing surplus as I admit to an uneasy resistance to the images.  
As I stand there ‘just’ looking, I don’t know what to do with my hands; palms are dry, 
mouth is wet.  Saliva gathers; I swallow it.  It is unacceptable to spit in galleries, I 
think.  Is anyone else looking? 
 
There’s the rub; is anyone else looking?  For embarrassment is a self-
consciousness with others.  Others either really present at that moment, standing 
behind me, watching me, or imagined others, or the vague discomforting unfamiliar 
of ‘Other’, but always others who judge, and I suppose, find me wanting.  What 
should be my response to this image, to this situation?  I am alone, in the sense of 
being there at the exhibition on my own, so I don’t have to speak in a literal sense, 
but there remains the problem of body language.  Should I look thoughtful, amused, 
disgusted, bored?  Can I fake a pure gaze?  Can I look neutral?  If I could look 
neutral, maybe what I think, maybe how I feel won’t show, maybe others won’t see 
that I am moved, that I am inappropriately emotional, making connections between 
these images and my ordinary life.  Maybe they won’t see that I am embarrassed.   
 
The work of Gilbert & George deliberately challenges the embarrassability of the 
spectator.  It has a capacity for double entendre, and in a perverse way.  If works 
that are seemingly innocent are loaded with (perhaps queer) erotic potential, so too 
works that are rude and unseemly might be read queerly as something quite lovely, 
or indeed charming.  As spectators we are continually wrong-footed, exposing our 
own prejudices, neuroses, and desires.  The perverse double entendre of their work 
exemplifies Roland Barthes’ proposition that what exposes a person to 
embarrassment depends on the discourse involved.  Bourgeois discourse, he said, 
is scandalised by the exposure of ‘the sexual private life’, whilst left-wing, radical 
discourse is offended by ‘traces of bourgeois ideology confessed in the subject . . . 
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passion, friendship, tenderness, sentimentality’.28  Gilbert & George manage to 
expose the spectator to both of those embarrassments. 
 
I am capable of being embarrassed by the sexual private life they describe, or to be 
more accurate, it is my insatiable and prurient curiosity that feeds off it that is 
embarrassing, and I feel bad that I am insufficiently cool about it all to be 
disinterested.  Other images have the capacity to embarrass me quite differently.  
The mawkish sentimentality of their work and its tacky patriotism can also make me 
squirm, as can its mediocrity.  So as I stand ‘just looking’, failing to present a  
‘coherent self’, what part of me feels embarrassed?  Surely not my bourgeois self?  
Surely I am not embarrassed by the cartoon nudity, the super-sized turds, the 
references to ‘deviant’ sexuality?  Or is it the ordinary shitty world I live in?  Is it the 





In my spectatorial engagement with Gilbert & George I am looking, as Doyle 
suggests, for signs of sincerity.  The signs are elusive.  But ambiguity is there in 
spades, everywhere I look I see ambiguity, double entendre, banality that must 
mean something, meaning rendered meaningless.  This was also noted by David 
Sylvester, who said: 
There is something deeply equivocal about what is expected of us. However 
forthright, however shockingly forthright, they [both] are in some areas, 
insufficient information is furnished to tell us in what spirit we are meant to 
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react.  The work may be meaningful to ordinary people, but that does not 
mean that the meaning is clear.29  
 
Underpinning my response is a gnawing sense of doubt about the integrity of their 
work.  The sheer longevity of their performance as living sculptures, and the 
overwhelming volume of work at the ‘major exhibition’ might be taken as 
confirmation of the seriousness of their work, but still there is a suspicion that it 
might be some elaborate (and very long running) hoax, and does that rule it out as 
art?  I doubt the integrity of the work, and yet it moves me.  It makes me feel 
unsteady, as if I cannot be certain that I am seeing what I see.  It makes me feel 
queer.  And the queer I invoke here is the queer of my Enid Blyton childhood.  
Queer, as in not straightforward, not all that it seems.  I want to use this naïve older  
meaning, which can now only be read by looking backwards, through the theoretical 
harnessing of queer as a refusal of the normative, through the recuperation of gay 
pride, and through homophobia.  Yes, all ‘sticky’ situations, that leave their mark on 
the meanings we ascribe, and all relevant to the reception of Gilbert & George’s 
work.  But this queer feeling is potentially the beginning of an adventure.  It dares 
me to look, and to say what I see.  And queer also has the old meaning of 
fraudulence and of forgery, as in ‘queer as a nine bob note’, which again throws into 
question the integrity of artistic intention and the sincerity of any emotional 
transaction I might get involved in. 
 
There is, in the field of art history/art criticism a lack of consensus on how, or if, to 
pigeonhole the work of Gilbert & George.  It has variously been described as 
conceptual, realist, and performance art; for some critics it is barely art at all.  Gilbert 
& George have repeatedly pooh-poohed any suggestion that their art is conceptual. 
Gilbert commented; ‘Everybody was doing Conceptual Art but we wanted to express 
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feelings, something real.  An art of feeling.’30  Their stated ethos and methodology 
however, are purely and essentially conceptualist.  In an Artforum article of 1967, 
‘Paragraphs on Conceptual Art’, Sol LeWitt offers a working definition of conceptual 
art;  
 When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all the planning 
 and decisions are made beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair.  
 The idea becomes a machine which makes the art.31  
 
This is a description of Gilbert & George’s mechanistic working methods; 
 We have a system for making each work of art, and once we’ve decided on 
 the system we cannot change it.  That’s it – you have to accept it . . . we’ve 
 never rejected an art work we’ve made.  What we’ve finished is finished.32 
 
The artworks are perhaps no more than a bi-product of the arc of their work; the 
sustained concept of being the artist ‘Gilbert & George’. 
 
  
       The idea/machine at work 
 
 
What LeWitt describes as an idea that becomes a machine is ‘Gilbert & George’.  
The idea/machine once created, acquires an autonomous energy whilst George and 
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Gilbert surrender agency and become drones in the production of the artworks.  The 
idea is everything, and the resulting image should stand, without editing, however 
embarrassing it might be. There is however, a natural revulsion to the idea of 
autonomous energy supplanting human creativity.  How can a spectator entrust the 
soft underbelly of her emotional response to an idea/machine?   
 
The idea/machine, or perhaps the firm; ‘Gilbert & George’ has a curious quality of 
middle-aged, middle-class, mild-mannered respectability which exists despite Gilbert 
and George’s flagrantly unconventional lifestyle with its stifling adherence to routine, 
and also in spite of their subject matter, sometimes risqué, rude, or sometimes just 
downright crude.  Alex Bacon comments on the ‘respectability’ of the firm, which is 
‘always undercut by an edge of the vulgar and unseemly, something which cannot 
be simply understood as a residue-effect of some of their more incendiary 
artworks.’33  
 
The queerness of Gilbert & George is hidden in plain view.  Their relationship, for 
example, though rarely questioned, is always and essentially in doubt.  Petry 
comments on their long-running refusal to confirm or deny that they are ‘a couple’;  
‘Were they to foreclose the argument, the artist (Gilbert & George) might cease to 
exist, as uncertainty is integral to the programme of the two men.’34  This long-
running ambiguity even manages to outlast the recent legitimization of their 
relationship by a civil partnership, not apparently in imitation of a straight marriage 
but undertaken for ‘administrative reasons’.  Of course no one is really fooled.  
Besides ‘administrative reasons’ we suspect there may be love.35 
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Some of their later works are for me, embarrassing particularly because of the 
intimate coupledom that is revealed, and this is discussed at length in Chapter Five, 
but here, I will concentrate on the cultivated ambiguity that is the dominant feature of 
their life and work.  The fastidiously maintained strategy of humdrum respectability 
has enabled Gilbert & George to present themselves to the world as both very 
straight and extremely queer.  The double standard is an example of how Sedgwick 
suggests ‘codes of gay “knowingness” are imbricated with codes of gay 
deniability’.36  The ways in which Gilbert and George have produced themselves 
draw on a number of cultural tropes both flaunting and cloaking queerness, including 
the flânuer, and the bachelor.37 
 
        
        Morecambe & Wise 
 
In other words we agree to turn a collective blind eye.  Gilbert & George have been 
compared to comedians Morecombe & Wise, who were often seen side by side in 
bed, in their pyjamas, discussing Ernie’s plays on prime time ‘Aunty’ BBC television.  
It was unthinkable that there was anything queer about this.  As a nation, we publicly 
overlooked the peculiarity whilst privately enjoying the inference that we didn’t see.  
More recently a journalist writing on the alleged tax evasion of Dolce and Gabbana 
                                                                                                                                          
George solemnly, "because if something were to happen to one of us, it could be a 
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referred to them as ‘the Gilbert and George of the fashion world’, conferring on them 
an old-school respectability, not so much of two old queens but of two old dowagers, 
whose establishment is beyond reproach.38 
 
In their long-running routine as ‘Gilbert & George’, Gilbert and George have come to 
occupy a marginal but privileged position similar to that inhabited by the characters 
identified by Bakhtin as the rogue, the clown and the fool who ‘create around 
themselves their own special little world, and their own chronotrope’.39  They occupy 
a position associated with theatrical trappings (and thus artificiality) and yet belong 
to the public square of reality.  The rogue the clown and the fool, advises Bakhtin, 
should be seen metaphorically:  
Sometimes their significance can be reversed – but one cannot take them 
literally, because they are not what they seem . . . they are life’s maskers; 
their body coincides with their role, and outside this role they simply do not 
exist.40   
 
The co-extensivity of role and body claimed here is echoed in Gilbert & George’s 
declaration that they have no life outside art.  ‘We don’t have any other private life: 
we eat, go to sleep, think about art.  When we have an exhibition, we get drunk, 
that’s it.’41   
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              Poseurs? 
 
This gives rise to the fascination of trying to catch them out.  When they take off the 
responsibility suits at night, do they revert to being something or someone else?  
Despite an ‘inning’ revealing that George was married and a father of two, all the 
evidence indicates that when they shut the door of the house in Fournier Street, they 
remain Gilbert & George.42  But still the sticky suspicion lingers.  There is always in 
their life and work a degree of implausibility and the spectator is unable to be certain 
of reading the works as either ‘frank’ or alternatively ‘insincere’.  Professional cross-
dressers such as lady-boys, who aim to completely fool, are traditionally the cause 
of mortal embarrassments; they make a fool of the spectator.   However, the 
pleasure of seeing a really good drag queen is not in the perfection of the illusion but 
precisely in the imperfection, in the spectatorial collusion in the artifice.  Gilbert & 
George, in their respectable responsibility suits frustrate their audience with a 
performance that prevaricates, fudging the division between the flawless deceptions 
that ‘fool’ and those accompanied by a conspiratorial wink.   
 
The fastidiously maintained façade of Gilbert & George is both the cause and site of 
embarrassment.  The comfort of certain knowledge is denied.  The spectator may be 
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embarrassed by the suspicion that she is not ‘in the know’.  I read their work as 
‘queer’ but without confidence in the meaning, or indeed meanings of the word.  I 
suspect that my spectatorship may also be queered, like a pitch.  As a spectator I 
am disinclined to get too close to an unfeeling idea/machine, and seeing no clear 
sign of sincerity, I am reluctant to engage emotionally, and to trust them with my 
feelings.  The difficulty and attraction of the doubt I feel is in the precarious balance  
between frank and fraud, and the caught-between-the-two-ness that results in  
spectatorial ambivalence.  But still I look; my look is drawn in to the vacuous space 
of doubt and my only option is to try to cover up my ignorance, not knowing if I am 





One thing I am very certain of is that the work of Gilbert & George, and my 
spectatorship of it, mark me out as female.  The gendering of spectatorship is not in 
itself a cause of embarrassment, but feeling female establishes a predisposition 
towards an emotional response and towards exposure of the self as flawed.  Being 
female is to be sexed rather than neutral, and to be a body rather than an intellect, 
and so the potential for a dis-passionate response is already foreclosed.  The cause 
of the excessive femaleness of my spectatorship is the remarkable gender bias of 
their work.  The landscape of Gilbert & Georgeworld is exclusively a spunkland, a 
boys-own, boys-only terrain.  It is peopled by boys and men, rent boys, cocky boys, 
old men, religious men, black men, men in suits, pretty boys and derelict men.  
Women are completely absent, but not, I would argue, due to misogynism; simply 
that we, women, don’t figure.  Gilbert and George have stated that everyone else 
paints women; they don’t.  Representation of the female body within, and as art is so 
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ubiquitous that a deliberate omission should perhaps have attracted more attention, 
but like their sexual preferences, it goes largely unmentioned.  The female absence 
within the frame draws attention to the genderedness of looking, a genderedness 
experienced as a surplus, outside, looking in.  As I will discuss, the spectatorial 
position is a potential inversion of Mulveyan, normative gender roles, which posits 
woman as spectacle and man as bearer of the look.  So whilst the exclusively male 
content of the work makes me aware of my gender, so too does the very act of 
looking.   
 
Laura Mulvey’s ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ is the benchmark for a 
gendered and psychoanalytic reading of the spectator-text relationship.  Though 
flawed, contested, and revised it remains an important work.  Mulvey’s basic 
premise is that mainstream western narrative cinema; metonymically standing for all 
visual experience is produced to gratify the appetites of the normative heterosexual 
male.  Everything is organized from this specific viewing position, for his viewing 
pleasure.  The man looks and the woman is looked at, or as Mulvey famously and 
splendidly puts it, ‘woman connotes to-be-looked-at-ness’.43  The woman is the 
object of multiple looks; she is looked at by the other (male) actors, by the camera, 
and finally by the cinema audience.  Hers is a passive role of display, whilst the man 
enjoys the mobility and power of the look as a tool for control, and for fulfillment of 
desire; a look that within film theory is ‘the gaze’.  The (heterosexual) male is offered 
two types of visual pleasure; scopophilia, objectification of the image, subjected to a 
controlling and curious gaze, and narcissism, a fascination with likeness and 
recognition, rather than possessing the image, here the one who looks fantasizes 
that he is the image. 
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Mulvey’s much criticised gender binary originally presupposed a straightforward 
heteronormativity – and given that she was analysing mainstream western narrative 
cinema, this was not unreasonable.  Duncan makes the same assumptions for the 
gallery/museum; 
Nevertheless, not only is the museum’s immediate space gendered, but so 
also is the larger universe implicit in its program.  Both are a man’s world.  
This job of gendering falls largely to the museum’s many images of female 
bodies.  Silently and surreptitiously they specify the museum’s rituals as a 
male spiritual quest, just as they mark the project of modern art in general as 
a male endeavour, built on male fears, fantasies and aspirations.44  
 
In Gilbert & Georgeworld, woman is completely absent (yet still it reads as a man’s 
world) and so, if the object of the look is never female, could spectatorship of their 
work call for a reversal of ‘normal’ subject/object positions?  Looking at a male 
object of display, is the spectator invited or obliged to adopt a female viewing 
position?  Is the spectator, perhaps momentarily, objectified?   
 
Spectatorship may be feminised but this does not of course necessarily frame it as 
female.  Spectatorship of this male territory is not a simplistic inversion of the 
Mulveyan gender binary but is characterised as restricted, passive, emotional, and 
excessive.  The images that confront the spectator are imagined for a male viewer, 
who is denied the normative viewing pleasures (looking at women) and forced to 
come face to face with an intense vision of (his own) masculinity.  And yet, as the 
construction and stability of masculinity depends on its ‘other’, the absent feminine is 
more troubling in its absence than its controlled, i.e. looked at, presence could be.  
In Mulvey’s Freudian interpretation, woman is the object of pleasure but also causes 
anxiety; ‘in psychoanalytic terms, the female figure poses a deeper problem.  She 
also connotes something that the look continually circles around but disavows: her 
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lack of penis, implying a threat of castration and hence unpleasure.’45  The absent 




Gilbert & George Spunkland (1997) Photopiece 190 x 302 cm 
 
 
The intrusion of femaleness into their boys-own world is evident as the imagined 
unpleasure of castration anxiety.  This is closest to the surface in Spunkland, a vast 
image of magnified ejaculate creating a landscape that has a quality of fossilised 
minerals, lava flows, or petrified forests.  A planetary object above adds to the sense 
of a barren landscape, and to the disconcerting instability of scale as if Gilbert and 
George have found themselves shipwrecked in Brobdingnag.  In this fragile phallic 
world Gilbert and George wander hand in hand like lost boys.  Because they are 
turned away from the viewer, their bare bodies, pink, like newborn mice, have no 
(visible) penises.  The spectacle of the smallness of the figures with their evident 
lack juxtaposed with the excessive maleness of ten feet of spunk is an embarrassing 
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display of castration anxiety.  The self-contained and reductive maleness brings 
about the realisation that the image of woman has nothing at all to do with male 
desire; my role is to be anxiety. 
 
As a female spectator, I am aware that my spectatorship of Gilbert & George 
intrudes on an exclusively male scene, by men and for a male gaze, a scene of 
pleasures I could or should take no part in.  This makes me feel voyeuristic, like a 
tourist in their world.  I am especially aware of indulging in gender, or perhaps even 
sexuality tourism, while standing for a long time, too long, reading the New Horny 
Pictures, each a matrix of ads for rent boys.46  I read them with pleasure and some 
fascination knowing I am not the target audience of the ads and aware that this 
leaves me in a curious relation to the (content of the) art work.  I read:  
LET ME BE YOUR FANTASY . . . Older gentlemen welcome . . . 100% discreet 
 . . .  In/Out . . . rough & ready dead handsome VWE . . . Keep my phone 
number, you may need it.    
 
 
Gilbert & George Named (2001) detail 
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The ads are interspersed with images of G&G, impassive, suited, staring straight 
ahead.  Formally these works are not engaging; the content however claims my 
prurient interest.  Gilbert and George have described them as a memorial, and there 
is indeed a rather maudlin similarity with reading the inscriptions on gravestones.  
The spectator is eavesdropping on other lives, other deaths but there is a degree of 
sentimentality about the spectatorial position with its spurious distance and vicarious 
pleasures.  In Epistemology of the Closet, Sedgwick notes that ‘the position of 
sentimental spectatorship seemed to offer coverture for differences’ and she lists 
wealth/poverty and sexual entitlement as sentimentalised differences, both of which 
are poignantly, sentimentally applicable to these works.47  And in a wider sense, the 
way that The New Horny Pictures spectacularise homosexuality, reducing it to just 
cheap sex, could be read as an acute observation on what Sedgwick calls ‘a 
sentimental appropriation by the larger culture of male homosexuality as 
spectacle.’48   
 
Or the spectator might take them at face value; they are very much about looking, 
and most specifically the intensity and duration of the look that we invest in them.  
This may range from a cursory glance, or browsing, through to a systematic and 
thoroughly engaged survey of the services available for hard cash.  And that is 
where they become embarrassing, when the look lengthens into window shopping.  
They invite both too much interest and paradoxically too little; we risk taking them 
too literally.  Each ad is complete with a phone number.  I don’t know if they are real, 
or just another tease.  I never had the balls to ring. 
        
As a tourist in spunkland, snooping around the blatant homoeroticism and its evil 
twin; homophobia, my spectatorial position is comparable to that of Fanny Hill 
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peeping through a hole in the wall at ‘two young sparks’ in an adjoining room at an 
inn, engaged in preposterous pleasures, a spectatorial event that she recounts in 
her ‘memoirs’; A Woman of Pleasure.  Fanny is in many ways a reliable witness, 
and gives a good account, despite her extravagant use of euphemism with its 
obvious links to embarrassment.49  She does not shrink from her duty to see 
everything she can, and to say everything she can see.  Looking through her 
spyhole, she reports the following: 
Slipping then aside the young lad’s shirt, and tucking it up under his clothes 
behind, he showed to the open air those globular, fleshy eminences that 
compose the mount-pleasants of Rome, and which now, with all the narrow 
vale that intersects them, stood displayed and exposed to his attack: nor 
could I, without a shudder, behold the dispositions he made for it.  First then, 
moistening well with spittle his instrument, obviously to render it glib, he 
pointed, he introduced it, as I could plainly discern, not only from its direction 
and my losing sight of it . . . 50   
   
At one point Fanny considers that one of the boys may be a girl in disguise, but then 
discounts this as a mistake on her part.  The homoerotic scene, described with the 
same candour that she brings to bear on all her other descriptions, is one of 
misrecognition, mistake and mispleasure (is this also a particularly feminised 
viewpoint?).   
 
Like Fanny, my spectatorial position is precarious.  The vicarious pleasure I take is 
one of both recognition and misrecognition, and the embarrassment that Gilbert & 
George cause me is one of exposure.  I am caught looking at something that quite 
explicitly excludes me, but as I look, I am drawn in.  My awareness of exclusion is 
uncomfortably close to a desire for inclusion.  That I am left out makes me feel 
                                                 
49
 The vocabulary that Cleland gives Fanny is a satirical swipe at other writers of ‘whore 
biographies’ particularly Defoe and Richardson.  The language now lends the episodes an 
element of humour, which partially negates the pornographic content.  John Cleland, Fanny 
Hill or Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (London: Penguin Books, 1985 (first published 
1748)).   
50
 Ibid. p195. 
105 
 
exactly that; left out.  I am excluded twice, once by femaleness and then again by 
straightness.  I am embarrassed by my petulant desire to be counted in.  Calvin 
Thomas offers a frank account of his straight relationship to ‘queer’, admitting the 
awkwardness of ‘the decidedly ambiguous labor of straight queer aspiration.’51 
Looking, perhaps unreasonably, for a direct address to him in Butler’s Bodies That 
Matter, Thomas acknowledges his hope to be ‘liked’.  Firstly he wants to be liked, 
that is to be valued, and secondly to be ‘made visible, counted in, to be liked in the 
mimetic sense of having one’s own likeness reproduced.’52  
 
If I am embarrassed by not being ‘liked’ in spunkland, here I differ from Fanny.  She 
is not embarrassed; she feels outraged.  Her response is typically of her life and 
times, she burns ‘with rage and indignation’ at the unspeakable vice.53  Fanny is 
exposed by her outrage at a scene of mutual pleasure, which she goes to extremes 
to see; she pierces the paper wall between herself and the scene with a bodkin to 
make a peephole, and stands on a chair to get a better view, and has the patience 
to see it through to the end.  Is it possible that Fanny’s outrage is somewhat 
disingenuous, less at the ‘odious’ scene than at her exclusion from it?  Within the 
scene she witnesses there is no space for her, no likeness of her, no potential for 
identification; her would-be place has been usurped by a ‘sweet pretty stripling’ who 
was ‘like his mother behind’.54  And Fanny is left without. 
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Fanny is exposed by her outrage, and I am exposed by my exclusion/desire for 
inclusion; I am fascinated, touched, appalled, compromised, and without.   ‘Without’ 
here is working for me like Edelman’s ‘behind’, and Thomas’s ‘liked’, doubling its 
meaning to indicate both my spectatorial position as a mere onlooker, outside the 
frame of action, and also the embarrassing sense of lack that the image causes me 
to feel.  This is what Barthes would term an amphibology; a ‘sticky’ homonym that 
infers a relation between two meanings.  Not so embarrassing as a Freudian slip, 
and subtler perhaps than a pun, more like a double entendre.  An amphibology 
insists on meaning both its meanings at once, ‘as if one were winking at the other 
and as if the word’s meaning were in that wink.’55  The meaning, like the 
embarrassment is in language, but also embedded in discourse.   
 
Fanny’s spectatorial position has been interpreted as inversely gendered.  Nancy  
Miller recommended that ‘Fanny must be viewed as ‘a male “I” in female drag’’,56 
and Edelman also reads Fanny’s position as one of reversal, associating her 
privileged seeing subject position with masculinity; ‘Fanny’s very spectatorial 
position, for example, confers upon her the power to see without becoming an object 
of scrutiny herself – a power culturally coded as the prerogative of the heterosexual 
male’57  Edelman, continuing his conceit of the analytic scene as a sodomitical 
(be)hindsight also comments that like an analyst, she was able to ‘come upon the 
sodomitical scene from behind.’58  Fanny was able to ‘peep’ unobserved, but in the 
context of the museum or gallery, this is not the case.  I am seen to look, I am 
‘caught looking’.  As a spectator, I am defined by my act of looking and the visibility 
of that looking, within the gallery space, perhaps inhibits me from fully and  
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comfortably occupying the privileged and fully subjective spectatorial position.   
I still feel very female. 
 
The spectatorial position of woman in a queer homoerotic environment is figured by 
Doyle as one of empowerment, but without any recourse to the role reversal of 
looking ‘in drag’.  Doyle envisages it as an opportunity for straight pleasure; to run 
an eye over the male body with impunity.  Citing the work of film theorist, Laura 
Marks on gay porn, she suggests that; ‘some people may intensely enjoy haunting 
spaces in which they are invisible (or at least differently visible), and consuming 
images not only not intended for them but not interested in representing them and 
their desires.’59  Doyle argues that a queer homoerotic space is not experienced by 
woman as an asexual place, but actually, one in which her sexual subjectivity is 
‘acknowledged in all its unruliness’ and that she freely enjoys her subjectivity as time 
out from her objectivity; that is, as a sex object.60  But if, in this space she is 
invisible, who acknowledges her unruly sexual subjectivity?  Who sees her at all? 
 
Doyle and Marks both argue that the female spectator in gay male spaces enjoys a 
mobility in the freedom from connoting ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’, and with that mobility 
comes power, to run amok, to haunt, to see without being seen.  But it seems to be 
a restricted freedom, a kind of impotent power that in this space lacks agency.  As 
Marks writes; ' . . . this power is short-term and contingent as any other kind of 
looking.'  Although I would not argue that the freedom of the female spectator in the 
queer environment of Gilbert & Georgeworld is casual in embarrassment per se, it is 
on the brink of embarrassment because it brings about an intense self-
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consciousness.  Although I, as the spectator, am invisible to the male subjects and 
objects that are each to the other reversible; I see me.  And I know that I am also 
‘caught looking’.  In the same way that in embarrassment the self experiences being 
everything and nothing, in embarrassment the self may feel both hyper-visible and 
invisible.  In the imaginary space of spunkland, I am intensely aware of seeing 
myself seeing, and it is I who must acknowledge my unruly sexual subjectivity.  I 
might haunt the margins of Gilbert & George’s scenes of masculinity, as Marks says, 
‘dropping in on other desiring gazes’, but my marginality, my without-ness, is mine, 
returning me always to myself as a mere borrower.61 
 
Alex Bacon argues that gender and sexuality are determining factors in establishing 
a spectatorial viewpoint in relation to Gilbert & George.  He makes the point that the 
masculinities ‘framed’ by their work are unstable, or ‘shaky’ as a result of their 
excesses.  The excessiveness of their images applies certainly to gender and 
sexuality but also to class, patriotism, blackness, whiteness, symbolism, faith and 
shit which are frequently overdetermined, and so complicate the picture.  The 
excess of masculinity implicates the spectator in objectification of, or identification 
with, the image so that; ‘the particular ways in which the viewer is figured and 
implicated in their seeing of the work mean that they must at least provisionally, 
momentarily, even antagonistically, encounter a gay male gaze which here does not 
belong to any single body,’62  Bacon draws a direct comparison between a gay male 
gaze and a feminine or at least a feminised gaze, arguing that; ‘the parallel between 
Gilbert & George’s queer(ed) masculinity and femininity is centred in the fact that 
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many of Gilbert & George’s masculinities operate excessively, which is to say 
(ontologically) like femininities.’63   
 
 
But as Bacon says, the female gaze, my gaze, as a twice-excluded heterosexual 
woman, is not exactly coincident with a gay male gaze and can only assume, 
borrow, or perhaps even usurp this spectatorial position, at best ‘provisionally, 
momentarily’ and at worst, ‘antagonistically’.  The overriding factor is not the 
sameness of desiring men, but the difference of being woman, and being 
disadvantaged, marginalised, dis-liked, without, unimportant, impotent, and 
embarrassed.  Part of the difficulty of analysis of the motivation of the gaze as 
gendered and/or sexed, is in maintaining the distinction between how we look and 
who we look as.  Spectatorial embarrassment as self-consciousness, persistently 
returns the spectator to the quiddity of her/himself, paradoxically always 
materialising ‘the spectator as different from the spectacle with which she 
identifies’.64  This absurdity reveals a preoccupation with self/image and 
same/strange, with each self (myself, Thomas, and Fanny) tending towards a 
narcissistic and somewhat peevish fixation with being ‘liked’.   
 
Arguably then, if Gilbert & George’s excessive masculinities oblige the spectator to 
adopt an excessively feminised (but not female) gaze, this, regardless of who we 
look as, prefigures an emotional spectatorial response.  Doyle notes the tendency to 
disparage a personal, embodied response to art as a breach of established order; or 
as she says; ‘a failure of intellect to rise above emotion.’65  The male/female, 
reason/emotion dualism this conjures up is part of a conceptual diachronic hierarchy 
of the universe where emotion is always maintained as inferior to reason; always the 
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underdog.  The feminised gaze will incline towards the embodied, emotional, 
passive, and excessive, whilst the masculine gaze that is occluded would have been 
rational, articulate, and able to maintain critical distance.  Thus the possibility of 
Bourdieu’s ‘pure gaze’ and Bell’s ‘aesthetic emotion’ in response to Gilbert & 
George is always difficult, maybe even impossible.   
 
If the feminised gaze predisposes the viewer to adopt an emotional viewpoint, 
producing an embodied response, it is then the feminised gaze that is most 
susceptible to Barthes’ punctum.  In Camera Lucida Barthes proposes that images 
have an ordinary content, the studium, which is available and communicable, and 
supplementing this, some but not all have an element that he calls the punctum that 
is capable of piercing or bruising the viewer; something that  perhaps cannot be 
explained without recourse to its visceral effect.  Barthes identifies the punctum as 
being particularly and exactly a phenomenon of the photograph, attributable to its 
real-ness; to being a testament of a real moment caught in an indisputable past that 
was always destined to become bygone.  But in a looser sense there is perhaps 
something recognisably punct-ish about certain (photographic and non-
photographic) fragmentary visual details (the ‘partial object’) that are arresting in a 
way that is wholly experiential and not easily anticipated or rationalised.  This is 
experienced imprecisely, as a feeling; in the moment of the glance, as a sticky/slippy 
friction that is resistant to analysis.  Something ‘catches my eye’.   Even as I look 
away I am slightly piqued by what I am now not looking at.  The desire to re-look 
may be curious, or prurient or sentimental.  It is a moment of hesitance, of dithering, 
of regret or difficulty.  Is the feminised gaze (passive, receptive, disenfranchised) 
particularly disposed towards, or sensitive to, this combination of interest and 




Barthes states that the punctum is indescribable.  He states; ‘what I can name 
cannot really prick me’ and thus establishes an abstractness of cause in opposition 
to the concreteness of the bodily damage it incurs; the prick, the bruise.  The 
abstract, un-nameable-ness of the punctum is symptomatic of its capacity to disturb; 
to name what is punctum would be to diminish its power or magic, but there is a risk 
of also diminishing the spectator.  Barthes cautions; ‘to give examples of punctum is, 
in a certain fashion, to give myself up’.66  Perhaps this indicates that it is in fact 
possible to know exactly what it is about an image that attracts and distresses, but 
there is  an inherent disinclination to know, to say, to name, to be diminished.  
 
Certainly, I believe it is possible to locate the disturbance of ‘partial-objects’ that are 
punct-ish.  But to say what it is that pricks, that ‘piques’ that attracts and distresses, 
is however, sometimes difficult and embarrassing because it entails exposure. It 
entails admitting that our appetite for a particular image may in fact be prurient, 
sentimental, or just in bad taste.  Barthes says of the punctum that it ‘shows no 
preference for morality or good taste; the punctum can be ill-bred.’67  Sometimes we 
would prefer to project a more cohesive, better-bred self.  Sometimes what we 
would say is shallow or insubstantial and seems insufficient reason for the sentiment 
we feel.  Sometimes what we would say would expose our shabbier, less impressive 
selves, the selves that are responsive to the bad taste, immorality or even amorality 
of the punctum.  I suspect that our disinclination to say what, exactly what, about an 
image is punctum or punct-ish, is no more than a blockage; the blockage of our own 
embarrassment. 
 
Or is it possible that looking at the work of Gilbert & George, the spectatorial position 
is not feminised, but sodomised?  And in suggesting this, I tender sodomy as an 
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overturning of norms, without comment on the gender of the spectator; as Fanny 
noted, we are all like our mothers from behind.   Returning to the embarrassment of 
language, of a difficult word sitting like a stone in the mouth, I admit, I am 
uncomfortable about using such an extravagant metaphor (or conceit maybe?).  Not 
embarrassed at the conjunction of spectatorship and sodomy, but at the 
extravagance of the sodomitical being brought to bear on the slight and marginal 
affect of embarrassment.  The metaphor is certainly not intended to attempt a 
neutering of sodomy, or a domestication of its power to disturb but as a way to 
explore the negative value, or perhaps counter-value of spectatorial embarrassment.   
 
This proposal annexes properties of sodomy as semantically and syntactically 
negative, that is; ‘saturated with socially stigmatised meanings’, and ‘organised by 
trajectories of repulsion’, (Ngai’s description of ‘ugly feelings’).68  The negativity is, I 
think, an important aspect of spectatorial embarrassment; it is a wrongfootedness, 
but one that can potentially overturn conventional outcomes of looking.  Thinking the 
spectatorial position as sodomised is quite productively, an acknowledgement of the 
antagonism between categories of ‘normal’ and ‘not normal’, with normal, like 
normal behaviour in a gallery or museum, coercively framed as a desirable 
okayness, confirming  conditions of competence and composure; conditions I find 
myself ‘without’.  I am excluded from being ‘in the know’, without reason, without 
cultural competence, and outside the frame of reference.  Even where ‘normal’ is 
queerly reconfigured I am discomfortable.  By framing the spectatorial position as 
sodomised, looking at the work of Gilbert & George, the spectator is faced with an 
opportunity to resist the coercive force of okayness.  By overcoming the ‘natural 
trajectories of repulsion’ that incline the spectator to look away, by looking, we 
confront desires and anxieties that are both sexual and sentimental, and the 
dialogue that ensues if we say what we see, can be an awkward one.  Spectatorial 
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embarrassment is perversely a coming face to face, with a self that is neither as 
whole, nor as wholesome as we imagined it to be.   
 
 
REFUSING  EMANCIPATION 
The spectatorial position I have outlined is perhaps an unenviable one.  The 
spectator whose feelings I describe suffers a number of embarrassments; she is 
daunted and unsure of her cultural competence.  In her bringing of real life to the 
frame of art she is exposed by her antipathy for displays of sexuality, or 
sentimentality, sometimes unfortunately both.  She is baffled by the lack of clear 
meaning, wondering if G&G is an in joke that she is not ‘in’ on.  Exposed as female, 
she is without the frame, looking in at exclusively male world, and ‘without’; excluded 
from male pleasures (but yet the cause of their anxieties).  She is not ‘liked’.  And 
she is always disadvantaged, on the back foot, always on the wrong side of the 
reason/emotion divide, excessive, and vulnerable to the bruising of the punctum.   
 
Rancière offers the spectator emancipation; and perhaps this may include freedom 
from embarrassment.69  Rancière’s spectator originates in, but is not confined to the 
auditorium of a theatre; she may be at the cinema, at an exhibition, or alone on the 
sofa watching television.  Spectatorship, in theatrical terms, has been considered 
problematic and in need of emancipation because it puts the viewer in a 
compromised position, one in which the capacities to know and to act are restricted.  
The first problem is that viewing is posited as the opposite of knowing.  The second 
is that viewing is the opposite of acting, that it is a passive state.  Two principal 
solutions proposed in the realm of theatre relate to distance; firstly that the spectator 
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should maintain distance, observe, evaluate and calculate in a ‘distanced 
investigation’.  The alternative is to collapse distance, to abandon the position of a  
neutral observer in exchange for ‘vital participation’.70   
 
Rancière takes a more radical approach questioning the assumption of the 
hierarchical pairings of terms as essential opposites.  He argues instead that terms 
such as ‘viewing’ and ‘knowing’, ‘seeing’ and ‘doing’, and even ‘activity’ and 
‘passivity’ are not logical oppositions but terms describing the ‘distribution of the 
positions and capacities and incapacities’.  Whilst the terms lie within frameworks of 
inequality, emancipation becomes possible when the spectator understands that 
‘viewing is also an action that confirms or transforms this distribution of positions.’71   
However, in Rancière’s challenge to the opposition of activity and passivity, he still 
privileges the capacities and meaning of ‘activity’.  He argues in fact, that viewing is 
already active, that we do it all the time, and that it is ‘normal’.72   
 
Rather than following Rancière in seeking to reframe the spectatorial position as one 
of strength, of certainty, and of action, or even of normality, I suggest instead a 
reconsideration of the values that pertain to the minor affective register of doubt and 
passivity, indeed of embarrassment itself.  This must not be a reversal of values but 
what Edelman calls a ‘queer oppositionality’, one that ‘opposes the logic of 
opposition’.73  Strength, certainty and action that are the ‘opposite’ of 
embarrassment draw their credentials from a phallocentric system, which as Bersani 
says must preserve the ‘denial of the value of powerlessness in both men and 
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women.  I don’t mean the value of gentleness, or nonaggressiveness, or even of 
passivity, but rather of a more radical disintegration and humiliation of the self.’74  
My contention is that there is in art and particularly in the art of Gilbert & George, a 
capacity to engender a minor instance of just such a ‘radical disintegration and 
humiliation’ of the self, and that spectatorial embarrassment is symptomatic of that 
capacity.75  The undervalued feeling of spectatorial embarrassment, of being in a 
doubtful space, of being blocked, restricted, queered or sticky manifests as a lack of 
coherence, a coming apart and a going to pieces.  I believe that whilst being hard to 
ascribe any value to this in conventional terms, it holds out some sort of promise.  
 
Gilbert & George deliberately deny the viewer any degree of certainty, or comfort, or 
even cover; we are exposed.  In the moment of embarrassment, when we know that 
we have failed to present a ‘coherent self’, I suggest that there is an opportunity (if 
only . . . ) to consider what other categories of self might have been possible, might 
be possible next time.   Despite Rancière’s proposed emancipation of the spectator, 
I am still (and willingly) embarrassed by Gilbert & George, or more accurately, by my 
spectatorial response.  I am still embarrassed by the subject matter that matters to 
me, by my failure to maintain a critical distance, and how this results in exposing too 
much of myself.   Leaving the Gilbert & George exhibition, and mindful of Fanny, I 
am careful where I tread.  Fanny, you may say, got her comeuppance.  As she quit 
the scene of peeping through the hole in the wall, and flustered by all that she had 
seen, in her agitation she tripped and fell, face down, arse up.  This might be a 
compromising position, but alternatively, I prefer to see it as another failure of 
intellect to rise above emotion.
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Chapter Two:   
Interface:  On using anecdote and theory to account for 





But to my embarrassment I find I cannot disentangle an erotic which I believe to be 






The interesting thing about embarrassment is that the less there is of it, the more 
interesting it seems to become.  But the less there is of it the less inclined we are to 
mention it, let alone theorise it.  Embarrassment can be so transient, so insubstantial 
that it is in fact embarrassing to subject it to the rigours of academic attention.  It is 
so lightweight that like a little bit of fluff, it dances away as soon as it approaches 
critical mass.  This chapter is about the difficulty of trying to theorise the 
insubstantial feeling-ness of embarrassment.  The framework for this somewhat 
awkward manoeuvre towards theory is a single artwork; Jemima Stehli’s Strip, which 
encapsulates instances of looking, being looked at, and being ‘caught looking’, any 
and each of which, might prefigure spectatorial embarrassment.  The methodology 
adopted in this chapter is a juxtaposition of anecdote and theory used as contrasting 
(and sometimes conflicting) resources in thinking about the seeing and being seen 
that is played out in the series of images of Strip.  The anecdotes are personal 
accounts of the making of Strip from Stehli and from some of the male contributors.  
The theory comes from the work of Jean-Paul Sartre whose emotive interpretation 
of the field of vision is of a combat zone of subject and object positions.   
 
                                                 
1
 Gallop, Anecdotal Theory, p108. 
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Whilst I have no doubt that Strip is a work that is in some way embarrassing, the 
embarrassment is not always where I expect to find it.  When I try to pinpoint it, it 
gives me the slip, leaving me empty handed, and curiously red-faced, embarrassed 
at missing my mark.  The site of embarrassment in Strip evades my theorising only 
to resurface, around the margins, in contradictions, repressions or pauses, in 
language, and frequently in what is not said at all.  What I find embarrassing about 
Strip, like so many embarrassments, is a bit insubstantial, it is barely there, and 
somewhat self-effacing; this is in itself a stumbling block.  Like embarrassment, 
Strip, is academically lightweight.  Can this rather clichéd artwork, and the mildly 
dis-comfortable sensation it produces be a worthwhile subject for study?   
 
 






Jemima Stehli invited a number of men to come and watch her take her clothes off. 
Not just any men, but men of some standing from her world, the art world; writers, 
critics, curators, gallerists.  One by one they came to her studio to ‘sit’ for her and to 
118 
 
watch her strip.  And they didn’t just get to look, they were documented as looking.  
While Stehli stripped, her watchers, each watching an exclusive audience-of-one 
strip show chose the moments at which to record themselves watching.  One of 
them commented: 
Along with five other men, I sat in front of her camera taking photographs 
with a long cable release as she casually took off her clothes.  The 
photographs could be seen as a series of collaborations but ultimately any 
notion of equality disintegrates as the viewer contemplates just who is 
caught posing and who is caught enjoying looking at whom.2   
 
The true subject of the work seems to be neither Stehli, nor her chosen men, but the 
look itself, as both a look-looking and a look-looked at, with attendant interpretations 
of scopophilia, voyeurism and the specifically art-world look of ‘the gaze’.  The looks 
within the work act as a prequel to the spectatorial position which is implied to be 
equally exploitative in its consumption of the image.  The work engenders 
spectatorial ambivalence, producing what Rosalind Krauss calls ‘the visuality-effect’.  
‘This double effect, of both having the experience and watching oneself have it from 
the outside’.3 Strip makes the spectator uncomfortably aware of seeing herself 
seeing.  It offers nowhere comfortable to look from.  Strip asks ‘who are you?’  
‘From where do you look?’  Do you imagine yourself sitting sweaty-palmed, dry-
mouthed, with your trouser legs riding up?  Do you imagine un-hooking, un-zipping, 
un-dressing?  Do you reveal too much?  Are your desires and anxieties on show?  
Are you enjoying this?  Are you caught with your pants down?  Are you caught 
looking? 
 
I feel mildly embarrassed about Stehli’s awkward undressing, yet my spectatorial 
identification is more strongly cross-gendered, identifying with the men, facing the 
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 Burrows in David Burrows and John Slyce, Jemima Stehli (Birmingham: ARTicle Press, 
2002).  p6.   
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camera, tight-lipped, faking nonchalance.  The men are each uncomfortable; they 
are scapegoated for the exploitation of woman in, by, and as art.  Their cultural  
power, and by implication their masculinity is questioned by the obvious 
interrogation of subject/object positions, and they are represented as voyeurs with 
all the seedy connotations of ‘peeping’.  These factors, by extension apply to the 
spectator who is also watching Stehli strip.  I too look, gaze, peep.  Some of my 
embarrassment is second-hand; I am embarrassed for the subjects of Strip but I am 
also caught looking, and caught enjoying looking, enjoying the exposé, with more 
than a little schadenfreude at the predicament of the chosen men.  One final 
embarrassment arises from the fact that the images also make me feel stereotyped.  
I am reluctantly pigeonholed as a knowing consumer of art, and as an ambivalent 
feminist, wondering if it is okay (yet, or still) to like the shoes. 
 
 
          
     Jemima Stehli Strip  No 4 Curator, (1999) shots 4 & 11 of 12 
 
 
Stehli’s choice of dress for the project is interesting.  She rejected any overt 
theatricality in favour of a pair of Levis and a black t-shirt.  This deliberate 
practicality and anonymity reinforces Stehli as artist and Jemima as everywoman.  
Underneath she wears a black bra and a very comprehensive pair of black pants, 
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the kind of matching combination that I would hope to be wearing in the event of 
being knocked over by a bus.  But the shoes say something altogether different.  
Stehli was already known for her shoes; they are ‘her thing’.  This is evident in 
works such as The Pink Shoes (1996)4 and Wearing Shoes Chosen by the Curator 
(1997)5 in which she displays herself lying prostrate on a concrete floor wearing 
nothing but shoes.  Both are somewhat abject.  The shoes selected for Strip 
however have something else to say for themselves.  They speak of Stehli’s own 
choice, and of power.  They are also a little out of sync with the rest of the outfit, a 
little tongue-in-cheek dominatrix.  The Strip shoes are black stilettos with five-inch 
heels.  They have an ulterior motive and might be referred to as ‘fuck-me-shoes’.   
In short, they punctuate the outfit and bring an element of fetish to her otherwise 
unremarkable attire.  On a practical note, Stehli commented that the shoes made 
her feel good by making her taller; both taller than the seated men and taller than 
they expected her to be, thus even stripped of their fetish-power the shoes are very 
much part of the power play of the work.6  They were the only thing she didn’t strip 
off. 
   
 
ANECDOTE AND/OR THEORY 
The two resources used in this chapter are quite at odds.  As Jane Gallop noted in 
Anecdotal Theory, ‘anecdote’ and ‘theory’ carry diametrically opposed connotations 
with the anecdote always short, self-effacing and trivial in contrast to theory’s 
earnest and reputable academic project.  The anecdote promises something 
                                                 
4
 Stehli, J. The Pink Shoes (1996) is a study in abjection and objectification showing Stehli 
lying face down wearing only the shoes.  She has her arms by her side palms upwards and 
turns her face away from the camera.   
5
 Stehli, J. Wearing Shoes Chosen by the Curator (1997) Stehli displays herself on the 
gallery floor as something like an installation piece for the exhibition, ‘Peripheral Visionary’ at 
Eindhoven.    
6
 Interview with the artist  25.02.09 
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personal and true, an account of what really happened, and so it is contingent.  Its 
status is marginal; it is an aside, a digression from the main subject, and therefore  
no more than trivia.  Theory, on the other hand, implies a general application; the 
truth it offers is only ever ‘generally’ true, but yet it claims an abstract authority.  
Both, as I will show, are a bad fit for this project, both are most effective in 
accounting for embarrassments at the points where they are least effective on their 
own terms; both work best where they fracture and fail. 
 
What is compelling about Sartre’s theorisation of vision and visibility, is the 
emotional and negative qualities of his accounts of seeing, of being seen, and of 
being caught looking.  He solicits our engagement through little vignettes; they have 
a quality of event, but yet are abstract propositions.  Sartre’s philosophy, in fact, 
makes little or no distinction between perception and feeling; both are essential, and 
to some extent, indivisible elements of the human experience of existence, an 
experience Sartre initially associated with nausea, but might equally be one of an 
aversive self-consciousness, in fact, of embarrassment.  In Nausea, the protagonist, 
Roquentin reflects: 
We were a heap of existents inconvenienced, embarrassed by ourselves, we 
hadn’t the slightest reason for being there, any of us, each existent, 
embarrassed, vaguely ill at ease, felt superfluous in relation to others.7  
 
At the moment of embarrassment we see our self, as seen by the other, and we 
experience too much, too intensely, too much of our self, we feel a superfluity of 
self.   
 
The other intriguing aspect of Sartre’s theorisation of the look is that it is gender- 
neutral or at least neutral in the default sense that ‘mankind’ is neutral.  For Sartre, 
the subject and object positions are cut loose from the emotive burden of gender, 
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 Sartre, Nausea, p184. 
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and expressed only as difference between self and other.  The idea of a gender 
neutral experience of seeing and being seen as a source of embarrassment, is both 
engaging and disturbing.  The potential of theorizing embarrassment as a basic 
human experience existing extrinsically to gender is one that we might want to 
believe.  But Sartre is presenting a hypothetical situation, an ‘abstract proposition’, 
and in reality, we are subject, as Rose says, to ‘ . . . the always-waiting structure of 
sexual difference which gives to [our] attempted bodying and disembodying the 
most predictable and stereotyped of sexual tropes.’8  If embarrassment were solely 
a matter of exposure, then the gender-neutral theory might stand up to scrutiny.  But 
factor in that embarrassment is exposure of a gendered self to a gendered other, 
and is additionally a feeling of evaluation, again of a gendered self by a gendered 
other, and Sartre’s theory fails to fully account for the complexity of the emotional 
investment.  The conditions of maleness, femaleness and all stations in between 
can, in themselves, provide exceptional conditions of embarrassability, but to a 
post-Mulveyan and feminist sensibility, to turn a blind eye to gender proves to be a 
source of embarrassment too.  
 
Sartre’s work offers a theory that from the outset is only partially effective.  It is too 
abstract.  Where it fails, it fails to keep at bay the gendering of vision, it fails to 
account for the embarrassment of being the subject, or the pleasures of 
objectification, and, when applied to Strip, it fails to account for the pleasure of the 
shoes.  The insidious gendering of everything has the potential to embarrass; it is 
excessive, suspicious and corrosive.  The embarrassments of gender, and 
particularly gender stereotypes, result from the coercive norms of hegemonic 
ideologies and structures to which we are expected to belong.  Sedgwick comments 
on the feminist inability to think without the assumption or presumption of gender: 
                                                 
8
 Rose, J. ‘Sexuality and Vision: Some Questions’ in Foster, p120.   
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The absence of any guaranteed nonprejudicial point of beginning for feminist 
thought  . . .  has led to the widespread adoption by some thinkers of an 
anticipatory mimetic strategy whereby, a certain stylized violence of sexual 
differentiation must always be presumed or self-assumed – even, where 
necessary, imposed – simply on the fact that it can never be finally ruled 
out.9 
 
In considering the possibility of a gender-neutral feeling of embarrassment in 
contexts of seeing/being seen, Strip is arguably an awkward text to examine; why 
use a gender-neutral existentialist theory of the look to analyze a hypergendered 
work?  Or conversely, why use Strip, which so blatantly addresses our assumptions 
about gender to exemplify a gender neutral theory?  Despite the ostensible 
perversity, the use of Strip as text makes apparent the methodological failings, 
opening up possibilities of exploring the potentials of a ‘bad fit’.  In this context, Strip 
is what Žižek would define as a ‘materialist example’: 
There is always more in the example than in what it exemplifies, i.e., an 
example always threatens to undermine what it is supposed to exemplify 
since it gives body to what the exemplified notion itself represses, is unable 
to cope with.10 
 
So like Žižek’s notion that represses what it cannot accommodate, Strip undermines 
Sartre’s theory, giving quite literally, ‘body’ to theory’s failure to account for the fact 
that some of the men Sartre sees, and is seen by, are in fact, women.  
 
The anecdote, like theory is only partially effective at capturing and accounting for 
embarrassment.  Anecdote is always generally disadvantaged by its perceived 
status as marginal, of less account than theory.  In this, as I have argued, the 
relatively low status of anecdote is comparable to that of emotion, always playing 
second fiddle to reason.  Furthermore, it is always singular and personal, and that 
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 Slavoj Zizek, Enjoy Your Symptom! (New York: Routledge, 2008). ppxi,xii. 
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diminishes its academic standing.  Some of these failings however, are exactly what 
enables the anecdote to account for marginalia; for small feelings in a minor 
affective register, and to situate experience within social contexts webbed by 
expectations of, for example, class or gender.   
 
The anecdote has also a quality of being grounded in actual event; the story it tells 
is a true record; ‘this is how it happened’, and so lends an ‘off the record’ veracity 
which the neutral voice of theory cannot always match, and does not always agree 
with.  But the anecdote makes only ‘weak’ truth claims; it is an account of something 
‘true’ but only particularly rather than generally true.  Gallop notes that the 
unpredictability of the real and incidental frequently disrupts theory, creating a 
juncture where theory is found to be a bad fit.  The interruption of event produces a 
dissonance that shakes the complacent assurance of theory.  The dissonance of the 
compromising situation of embarrassment, if we can overcome the blockage it 
produces, is just the same; an opportunity for a ‘next time’, for a different self, or a 
different theory.  Gallop notes that the moment when incident jars against theory, 
the moment when emotion rather than reason is uppermost is exactly the moment 
that is worth thinking in and about, and this is the moment that anecdote tries to 
capture and anecdotal theory builds on.11  As I have said, this is the whole point of 
anecdotal theory as a methodology; to think through the emotional response, 
through the blockage of embarrassment, to find a way to speak the unspeakable, 
and that the speaking has the promise of an embodied criticality.   
 
Where anecdote is effective at producing or accounting for the elusive feeling of 
embarrassment is in its digressional inclusion of seemingly inconsequential detail,  
allowing embarrassment to slip in, and out of the story.  In the relaxing of linguistic 
vigilance, sliding towards ordinary talk rather than the prescriptive jargon of the 
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theoretical doxa, the anecdote produces spaces for embarrassment to appear 
betwixt and between, sometimes in what is said, and sometimes in what is left 
unsaid.  Sometimes it is actually in the language, as an awkwardness, in the words 
and in the syntax.  It is evident in the pauses and unfinished sentences, where the 
right word eludes the speaker, or the word is there, but is a wrong word, a word that 
seems out of place, a word that would betray the speaker and give a wrong 
impression, so we leave it hanging, or substitute something else at the last moment.  
Sometimes the embarrassment can be caught in words that are sticky, words that 
slip, or words that are working double time, carrying two meanings, like Barthes’ 
amphibologies. 
 
Anecdote is however an imperfect resource.  Some of its ‘failings’ work to its 
advantage, but not all.  One of the critical failings of anecdote, and by extension, of 
anecdotal theory as a tool to examine embarrassment is that the anecdote is an 
edited version of event and so often, the embarrassment has been already edited or 
edited out.  Anecdote, by definition, is a story, either a telling or a re-telling, and in 
the telling, the one who tells may be meticulously honest, or may self-fashion, 
revising the event with a little artistic license.  Anecdotes about embarrassment tend 
to be self-deprecating, relieving the awkwardness of the situation by reliving it with a 
little humour and a little distance.  Anecdotes about embarrassment can thus have a 
cathartic effect; the awkwardness of the embarrassing moment is historicized 
through telling, it is accommodated and becomes part of the narrative of our lives.  I 
have proposed that the slighter the embarrassment the more interesting it is, but the 
very slightest of embarrassments do not make good stories, they lack substance, 
and to try to put them into words seems overly self-interested, and redolent of a 
navel-gazing narcissism.  So the slightest of embarrassments, where they are to be 
found in anecdote, are not found in subject matter, but in omissions, in language, in 
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inference, and in insignificance.  The most interesting accounts of embarrassment 




EXISTENTIALIST STRIP  No 1:   SEEING AND BEING SEEN 
My initial encounter with Strip was not with the work itself but with a review of its first 
showing.  I was hooked by the story it told, by the review as an account that was 
‘about’ a predicament.  It was about being visible and being vulnerable, yet trying to 




             




Adrian Searle, art critic for The Guardian.   In Strip, Searle is a man trying to look 
like a man who is confident and professional.  His backdrop is a deep and dramatic 
red; the red of passion and anger; a serious colour.  He took ten shots, in six of 
them Stehli is either bending over or crouching; in two she is balanced on one leg.  
There is something a little sadistic in his choice of shots.  They are however an 
evenly spread documentation of the strip process and they are also compositionally, 
amongst the best.  In his review he offers the following anecdotal account of his 
involvement.   
I feel like a man in a Francis Bacon painting, churning on my seat.  In my 
hand is the trigger, the cable snaking away to the camera that faces me.  
Also facing me, and between me and the camera, is the artist.  She begins 
to undress.  I’ve got 10 shots.  I can fire when I like.  I squeeze the bulb that 
drives the shutter.  Everything about this situation feels loaded.  I’m 
extremely self-conscious.  I find myself firing the camera whenever she 
appears awkwardly balanced – unhitching her bra, bending to take off her 
shoes, untangling herself from her jeans.  I guess I’m trying to wrest some 
power from the situation, to catch her at a moment of vulnerability, to catch 
those moments between moments. [ . . . ] I notice that one of my trouser legs 
has ridden-up and that somehow that look of power and confidence I wanted 
to present (I was as careful to dress as Stehli was to undress, in my critic’s 
black suit and Profumo-era tie) has managed to go awry.  Rather more of 
me is exposed than I would like.12  
 
 
Searle’s account is self-deprecating, he admits his vulnerability and exposure, which 
were feelings he both did and didn’t expect to feel.  He reveals his grasp of the 
subject/object positions involved as hierarchical.  He interprets the situation as a 
struggle for mastery and has tried to come out on top.  His advantages; being male, 
having professional status, keeping his clothes on, and having (some) control of the 
camera do not seem to have been sufficient to overcome his handicaps; passivity,  
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voyeurism, being photographed.  He dressed carefully, defensively even, and during 
his participation, and later in his review he takes care to establish his cultural 
capital.  His ‘Profumo-era tie’ was chosen and mentioned to signify his competence 
in areas of style, history, politics, and culture.  But it was not enough.  He became 
aware that his trouser leg had ridden up exposing sock, ankle, incompetence.   
 
Largely, Searle’s account of Strip can be read in terms of a Sartrean theorization of 
seeing and being seen as a struggle between self and other, that is, without gender. 
 Sartre’s premise of the confrontational nature of vision begins with the simplest of 
situations; that he sees the other and its/his presence for him is one of object-ness.  
But rather than ask us to agree to this as a proposition, Sartre asks that we 
‘experience, in imagination a familiar emotion.’13  And to demonstrate the 
antagonism of subject/object, he describes a scenario that does not merely show 
but makes us imagine ourselves in that position and feel the truth of what he says:  
‘I am in a public park.  Not far away there is a lawn and along the edge of that lawn 
there are benches.  A man passes by those benches.  I see this man.’14  He 
describes how he sees something; ‘an object’, but knows it to be a man.  And 
because the other that he sees is a person not an object, his person-ness must also 
be manifested in some way, and that refers to the man’s being-for-himself and 
Sartre’s being-for-others.  The person-ness of the other inevitably indicates Sartre’s 
state of object-ness for the man.  Thus for both the self and the other the look is a 
combative field with each jousting for the power that accrues to the subject, for to 
see confers subjectivity, and to be seen imparts objectivity.  Each wants to see 
without being seen; to be a subject, and avoid being an object.  
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 Sartre, Being & Nothingness, pxiv. 
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 Ibid. pp277,278. 
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The other, as subject, has the freedom not only to see Sartre but also to judge him, 
and it is this freedom to judge that enslaves Sartre who expresses his predicament 
in strongly emotive terms: 
Thus being-seen constitutes me as a defenseless being for a freedom which 
is not my freedom.  It is in this sense that we can consider ourselves as 
‘slaves’ in so far as we appear to the Other.  . . . I am the instrument of 
possibilities which are not my possibilities . . . and which deny my 
transcendence in order to constitute me as a means to ends of which I am 
ignorant – I am in danger.15 
 
As Sartre describes it, the condition of seeing and being seen is one of reciprocity.  
As both Sartre and the man are simultaneously object, both are compromised by 
being seen.  As the look, in the park, at the edge of the lawn is reciprocal, it is 
inferred that simultaneously each inflicts on the other the same judgment, slavery, 
danger, and embarrassment.  The uncomfortable state of being seen is curiously 
like the theatrical predicament of the spectator, one in which the capacities to know 
and to act are restricted.  Thus the attribution of qualities of activity and passivity 
connoted by Sartre; that the one who looks is active, is contrary to the assumption 
that the looking of theatrical spectatorship is a passive looking, but accords with 
Rancière, who argues that the passivity of the spectator is a fallacy, and that the 
spectator is already emancipated and is already active. 
 
Searle watched Stehli strip.  As she stripped, she watched Searle watching.  Their 
looks position them each as both subject and object, both master and slave.  In 
trying to catch the awkward moments when her attention is on a zip or a button, 
when her balance is precarious, Searle is trying to find, and capture a moment when 
Stehli is not looking at him, when he is master of the visual field, as he says, ‘to 
wrest some power from the situation’.  I suggested this struggle for power to Stehli  
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 Sartre, Being & Nothingness, p281. 
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and she completely disagreed.  Her account is that Searle’s own aesthetic 
sensibilities kicked in and it was a gesture of genuine collaboration with the artist to 
produce the most visually interesting images of the body in action.  But she also 
admitted that he displayed a degree of competitiveness towards the other sitters, 
and wanted his strip to be ‘the best’ (and that I can believe).16  So whilst Searle’s 
anecdotal account fits Sartre’s theory, Stehli edits it out.  Stehli chooses not to see it 
that way; she dismissed both Searle’s anecdote and Sartre’s theory as being 
incompatible with her own story of collaborative creativity.   
 
Despite the congruence between Searle’s account and Sartre’s theory, there is 
something omitted, that by its very omission, is problematic.  Sartre’s look, 
particularly the look-looked-at is emotive in its configuration and in its articulation; it 
is described in terms of defenselessness and danger.  So although we begin with a 
difference between an ungendered self and an equally ungendered other, there is a 
predisposition to read the subject as masculine because it is dominant, and to read 
the object as feminine, because it is inflected as more emotional, and because it 
loses the battle for subjectivity.  There is, to my mind, a difficulty in trying to maintain 
strict neutrality for the combative self and other, whilst knowing that the hierarchical 
gendering of looking equates the object position with the ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’ of 
woman.  Searle’s account indirectly suggests that he anticipated the connotations of 
being objectified.  His account of a carefully considered attire indicates that he self-
consciously presented himself as a self to be looked at; in fact, he displayed 
himself.  So when Searle strives to see without being seen, it is in effect, his 
masculinity that is a stake.  The problem is, it is embarrassing to let gender spoil 
Sartre’s theory, but also embarrassing to pretend that it doesn’t. 
 
   
                                                 
16
 Interview with the artist 25.02.09,  
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EXISTENTIALIST STRIP  No 2:  BEING CAUGHT LOOKING 
John Slyce, Writer.  Slyce has opted for casual dress and very shiny shoes.  His 
backdrop is boudoir pink.  He took nine shots; in the first Stehli is fully dressed 
(perhaps a premature squeeze on the trigger) and she doesn’t get her pants off until 
shot seven.  Either he got carried away early on, or was more interested in, or 
wanted to appear to be more interested in the process rather than the (naked) 
outcome; a privileging of means over the end.   
 
  







Slyce gives the following account: 
There are no neutral positions offered in Stehli’s work.  We are all caught 
looking [ . . . ] at once consciously and unconsciously aware that we are 
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always already equal parts fetishist and voyeur, exhibitionist and flasher.  
Just as these reversible positions are in turn mirrored in the figures of the 
artist and her model as they stare into a ground glass lens and their 
reflection in a looking glass – subject and object come unfixed and collide a 
search is driven to look over and again at the other.17   
 
                     
Whilst looking and being looked at are potential, and potentially equal causes of 
embarrassment, being ‘caught looking’ always carries the negative charge of 
voyeurism and that can be particularly embarrassing.  Sartre, again remaining 
impassively gender neutral, describes being seen peeping through a keyhole.  He is 
in a corridor, crouched down at the keyhole peeping at some unspecified scene 
within.  The fact that we don’t know what he is looking at heightens our curiosity, 
and so, our emotional investment.   
Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity, or vice, I have just glued 
my ear to the door and looked through a keyhole.’18  [and]  
Here I am bent over the keyhole; suddenly I hear a footstep.  I shudder as a 
wave of shame sweeps over me. Somebody has seen me.19   
 
Before being caught the viewer/voyeur is unselfconscious but in a state of emotion 
(anticipation, jealousy, curiosity, vice).  Once seen (or once he believes himself to 
be seen, and this is important) he is aware of himself and his being takes on a quite 
different dimension.  He is aware of his being-for-others, and feels shame-
embarrassment.  ‘Do we not have here’ asks Sartre, ‘an experience which is self-
destructive?’20  
 
What is particularly interesting in Sartre’s account is the distinction between the 
unobserved, un-self-conscious-self and the alternative unsettled state of mind that 
develops on the awareness of the other’s look.  Even though Sartre will also say 
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 Slice in Burrows and Slice, p21. 
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 Sartre, Being & Nothingness, pp282,283.   
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 Ibid. pp300,301.      
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 Ibid. p301. 
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that he is ‘always looked at’, in the vignette of the voyeur at the keyhole he 
expressly speaks of a ‘non-thetic self-consciousness’ which is unobserved so that 
‘there is no self to inhabit my consciousness.’21 It is the possibility of contrast 
between two states that is important here, for the embarrassment of being looked at 
in this instance is not a perpetual state of existence but a sometimes-feeling, the 
effect of a cause.  And the trigger, the catalyst is the other, but the cause comes 
from within the self, from the ‘possibilities’ of the self.  At the moment of 
embarrassment the self is aware that this was not the anticipated outcome, not the 
desired outcome, things could have turned out better, if only . . .   
 
             
              Jemima Stehli Strip (1999)  No 3 Critic  (shot 2 of 8) 
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As Slyce admits, the chosen men in Strip are all caught looking.  Although they 
have been invited to watch, they are caught looking, caught by the camera, looking 
at a striptease, and the looking is assumed to be libidinous.  Voyeurism implies that 
the looking, or what we have been looking at transgress some socially or even self-
imposed propriety.  ‘Being caught’ implies that we have been up to no good.  
Voyeurism is almost always inflected with sexuality and is an unpleasant, knicker-
sniffing sexuality.  Because ‘voyeurism’ is a term of Freudian psychoanalysis it is 
inescapably sexual and consequently gendered.  And the gender is male; he is a 
peeping Tom.  The voyeur is not only shamed, but also named.  To be ‘caught 
looking’ is then to suffer multiple disadvantages, the voyeur, is seen; he is 
objectified, he is a transgressor, a pervert, he is caught pleasuring himself in a way 
that is semantically negative.  It is a furtive looking that implies impotence.  His 
pleasure is passive and thus lacks the ‘normal’ and healthy attributes of an active 
masculinity.  So again, where Sartre’s theory of ‘being caught looking’ starts out 
gender neutral, the gendered implications of language are imposed as soon as  
‘being caught looking’ is described as voyeurism.  And again, theory fails to 




EXISTENTIALIST STRIP  No 3:  LE REGARD 
Whilst Sartre writes of the look as digital, potentially on or off, and producing 
different states of consciousness, and different emotional states as ‘a solidification 
and an abrupt stratification of myself’, he also writes of a more pervasive condition 
of feeling looked at which he calls le regard.  This is not the look of another person, 
though we might mistakenly see eyes and feel we are being watched: ‘On the 
occasion of certain appearances in the world which seem to me to manifest a look, I 
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apprehend in myself a certain ‘being-looked-at’ with its own structures which refer 
me to the Other’s real existence.’22 The visibility that Sartre terms le regard is 
situated outside the self, but not in the other, it is in otherness.  It is a diffuse and 
inescapable exposure and reflects a human predisposition to be self-reflexively 
aware of the self as constituted in relation to everything that is not-self, in short, in 
relation to the Other.23  This is the feeling that troubled Roquentin in Nausea; he 
was ‘embarrassed, vaguely ill at ease’.  It is not conceivable that being subject to le 
regard should be a chronic and continuous cause of embarrassment.  If we were 
endlessly aware of the self as ‘looked at’, in this excessive way, with our attention 
turned perpetually inward, life would be unbearable; nothing would get done.  As Iris 
Murdoch wrote; ‘To be damned is for one’s ordinary everyday mode of 
consciousness to be unremitting agonizing preoccupation with self.’24  We become 
aware of le regard only sometimes, in certain situations, perhaps triggered by the 
look of one who is strange, by the look of a libidinous or rival other, or when we 
think we see eyes, or we become aware of the rustling leaves, then we are re-called 
to subjectivity, and reminded that we are subject to le regard.   
 
Le regard is construed as operating at the level of culture, language, signification, 
and Stehli addresses exactly this through her choice of watching men.  Not only is 
she seen by Searle, Slyce, Stolper & co., she is also seen by the art world of 
exhibition, review, critique, commerce.  The first thing that is immediately obvious 
about the men in Strip is that they are all conscious that the self they are invited to 
show is their ‘professional’ self; Searle wears his ‘critic’s black suit’, Slyce 
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 Sartre, Being & Nothingness, p299. 
23
 Sartre’s ‘le regard’ prefigures Lacan’s theorisation of ‘the gaze’.  In Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psycho-analysis Lacan writes; ‘The gaze I encounter – you can find this in 
Sartre’s own writing – is, not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined by me in the field of the 
Other.’ cited in Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century 
French Thought (Berkley CA: University of California Press, 1994)., p362. 
24
 Iris Murdoch, The Nice and the Good (London: Penguin, 1978). 
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comments; ‘we each enact, more or less, our public self’.25  They had not been 
invited to contribute to this work by virtue of any personal qualities they may 
possess.  They were there not because of who they are, but because of what they 
are.  The titles of each segment contribute to their objectification; they are tagged by  
profession; ‘critic’, ‘curator’, ‘writer’, ‘dealer’.  Their look, besides being the look of an 
individual self, also signifies le regard.  And also, of course, their look signifies the 
specifically artworld look of ‘the gaze’, a look that like le regard, is self-reflexively 
aware of its power and its corruptions; specifically, the questionable distribution of 
authority and profit within the artworld.  By profession, each of the men is complicit 
in the objectification of woman, as image, as canvas, and in her commodification as 
collateral.   
                
David Burrows, writer.  For Burrows the invitation to take part in Strip was ‘a kind of 
challenge but also a kind of collaboration’.26  As Burrows is also a practicing artist, 
performance and nudity are for him, quite routine, and certainly nothing to get hot 
under the collar about.  His anecdotal account of Strip fails to exemplify any of the 
embarrassment I have tried to attribute to the disadvantaged position of the object, 
or the seedy connotations of being caught looking.  In fact Burrows claims to have 
maintained composure throughout.27  The embarrassment he admits to feeling 
came later: 
And it was only later, when the work was exhibited at the Lisson Gallery that 
embarrassment was a factor.  And this [relates to] the paranoid world of art 
openings: it is difficult not to be affected by the knowledge that everyone is  
judging art, and people in that context.  Artists, curators, etc. are very divided 
on Jemima’s work, [. . .]  What becomes embarrassing is the knowledge that 
others disapprove of my support of or involvement with Jemima’s work.  I did 
then and still do think that strip is an interesting series but there is still a 
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 Burrows and Slice, p17. 
26
 From private correspondence with Burrows 03.02.09 
27
 Burrows attributes this to the fact that the traditional role of male as bearer of the look 
remained intact. Ibid 
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feeling of embarrassment with the knowledge that some people disapprove 
or think that the work is not good and I have become identified with that work 
to a certain extent.28 
 
 
                   
                    Jemima Stehli Strip (1999)  No 7 Writer (shot 5 of 11) 
 
 
One final comment made by Burrows indicates the exposure to, and evaluation by 
the Other can cause the negative feeling of embarrassment even when the 
judgement turns out to be positive.   
A friend of mine had a show recently which he didn’t think worked that well 
and he said he felt embarrassed.  I often felt like this in the past, and also felt 
embarrassed when people congratulated me on a show.29 
 







The embarrassment is triggered by the realisation that the Other is attending to us, 
and we are evaluated.  This indicates that embarrassment ensues not only in 
instances of negative evaluation, but from evaluation per se.  In Sartre’s view, 
shame-embarrassment is not caused by the judgement of the Other as negative or 
positive, but rather, is caused by the objectification this entails: 
Pure shame is not a feeling of being this or that guilty object but in general of 
being an object; that is, of recognizing myself in this degraded, fixed and 
dependent being which I am for the Other.30 
 
 
Whilst Searle’s account of the making of Strip is of the visceral struggle for mastery 
of the object by the subject, the embarrassment described by Burrows is predicated 
rather on the more abstract ‘being seen’ of le regard, that is, being seen at a level of 
cultural signification.  Burrows is anxious about Strip’s use of the look as artistically 
privileged rather than libidinally charged.  He expressly connects the work to 
embarrassment but it is his professional proximity to the work that he is 
uncomfortable about.  He perceives in his involvement in Strip, a potential failure in  
the eyes of others, that is, a failure to advance the self he would like to be, or more 
accurately, since this is all about perception, a failure to advance the self he would 
like to be seen to be.  In its critique of the exploitative nature of the art world, Strip 
bites the hand that feeds it.  It very bluntly expresses the opposition between the 
body of a woman (artist) and the capital, both cultural and financial of the sitters; 
writer, critic, dealer; man.  Whilst Stehli’s work ostensibly draws attention to and 
perhaps challenges this opposition, the sincerity of that challenge is not so legible, 
and the friction between the too-legible content and the illegibility of intent has 
plagued the reception of the work.  Strip was briefly good tabloid headline fodder, 
but its critical reception has been less straightforward and there is something 
embarrassing about that. 
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 Sartre, Being & Nothingness, p312.   
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STRONG THEORY   
The instinctive and automatic-anxious gendering of seeing and being seen that this 
chapter superimposes on the neutrality of Sartre’s theory has been cited as the 
cause of some embarrassment.  But here, that is displaced by the embarrassment 
identified by Burrows pertaining to being seen, or perhaps to being not seen, being 
overlooked by the hypercritical gaze of the art world.  In his anecdotal account, the 
admission Burrows makes about this specific embarrassment unexpectedly 
provides evidence ‘about’ embarrassment.  He comments; ‘it is difficult not to be 
affected by the knowledge that everyone is judging (art, and) people in that context’.  
And his comment would be equally applicable to the presumptive gendering it 
displaces.  Once we have read Mulvey, and Rose, and Doane, once we ‘know’ that 
‘the true exhibit is always the phallus’ and ‘women are simply the scenery onto 
which men project their own narcissistic fantasies’, then it is, as Burrows says, 
difficult not to be affected by that knowledge, and to know that we are always 
exposed and evaluated by le regard, and by others who are ‘in the know’.31  Both 
Burrows’ anticipation of artworld condemnation and the feminist default position of 
always assuming the absence of any ‘non-prejudicial point of beginning’ are forms 
of paranoia, and as such, constitute strong theory.32 
 
In his work on affect theory Silvan Tomkins defined strong theory by the size of its 
domain, that is, the range of instances where the theory is applicable.  A strong 
theory is not necessarily a successful theory (success being defined as avoidance 
                                                 
31
 ‘Fears, Fantasies and the Male Unconscious, or ‘You Don’t Know What is Happening, Do 
You, Mr Jones’’ in Mulvey, p13.  Originally written in 1972 and published in Spare Rib, 1973 
32
 Paranoia has been ‘theoretically’ gendered as male, Ngai, writing of the paranoia of 
‘conspiracy theory’, terms it ‘a distinctively male form of knowledge production’. Ngai, p299.  
Freud established epistemological links between theory and paranoia.  There are however, 
strenuous claims that paranoia is also a paradigm case of feminist theorizing from writers 
including; Ngai, and Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, and Schor , N. “Female Paranoia: The 
Case for Psychoanalytic Feminist Criticism” (1981)  
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of negative affect or promotion of positive affect).  In fact, the more the theory fails, 
the stronger it grows. 
As it orders more and more remote phenomena to a single formulation, its 
power grows . . . A humiliation theory is strong to the extent to which it 
enables more and more experiences to be accounted for as instances of 
humiliating experiences on the one hand, or the extent to which it enables 
more and more anticipation of such contingencies before they actually 
happen.33  
 
By this definition, Burrows’ paranoia about his exposure to the hypercritical art 
world, and feminism’s accusative gendering of everything can be seen to be 
instances of strong theory. 
 
Feminist theory of the field of vision as inherently gendered, sees everything in 
binary, and sees every binary as hierarchical.  This strong theory is acutely alert to 
inequity, and as a result finds it everywhere, and so must continue to look for it.  We 
are always on the back foot.  Like Sedgwick claims for paranoia, feminist theory has 
a unidirectional vigilance, and the more it finds gender difference, the more it seeks 
out difference, and sees everything as differenced.  As a strong theory it, ‘ . . . 
seems to grow like a crystal in a hypersaturated solution, blotting out any sense of 
the possibility of alternative ways of understanding or things to understand.’34 
 
Harnessing the equally strong theory of Freudian psychoanalysis (always seeking to 
uncover something that is always hidden), feminist theory knows that seeing must 
be understood not only a matter of perceiving the world, but as a libidinal drive, a 
mechanism to achieve pleasure or avoid anxiety.35  This is always assumed to be 
egotistical, driven by self-interest, and always understood as taking place within an 
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 Tomkins, S. Affect Imagery Consciousness, cited in Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, p134. 
34
 Ibid. p131. 
35
 ‘Vision, pleasure in looking as a component instinct of sexuality bears no relation to seeing 
as the means of perceiving the real world.  Sight as a drive attaches itself to pleasure-giving 
or anxiety alleviation.’ Mulvey, p140. 
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ill-defined but all-powerful structure of patriarchy, and patriarchy is understood to be 
one of the nebulous ideological powers that coercively conscript the normal 
behaviours of being and belonging.   
 
The slight but nagging embarrassment I feel about the indiscriminate application of 
such a simplistic and accusatory binary may be symptomatic of a more widespread 
phenomenon.  Ngai notes an academic embarrassment that has begun to be 
apparent.  She suggests that the concept of ‘patriarchy’ has become the bogey-man 
of feminist rhetoric in the way that ‘conspiracy theory’ is to paranoia.  Patriarchy, she 
writes, is so ‘monolithic yet amorphously delimited and fundamentally abstract’ that 
it is ‘a source of embarrassment’ to academics, but yet, as she admits, it is a 
concept that we cannot think without, or indeed, outwith.36 
    
 
              
A WEAK THEORY OF EMBARRASSMENT  
This chapter tenders the proposal that embarrassment is somewhat indiscriminate, 
elusive and unpredictable, and whilst difficult to theorise effectively, it may be found 
in the failures of both theory and anecdote to fully account for it.  Bersani suggests 
that the moments when theory appears to fail, are actually productive.  He notes in 
the work of Freud instances of ‘textual embarrassment’ when Freud ‘appears to be 
resisting the pressures of an argument he does not make, will not make’ and when 
his work ‘depends on a process of theoretical collapse.’37  Following his line of 
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 Ngai writes of this emergent instance of embarrassment:   ‘Though increasingly a source 
of embarrassment in academics in today’s newly repositivized intellectual climate, terms like 
“patriarchy” and “patriarchy-capitalism”  which refer to monolithic yet amorphously delimited 
and fundamentally abstract systems, remain crucial for a critical language that in our anti-
theoretical time, not only seems fated to ring with the “debased rhetoric” of “conspiracy 
theory”, but seems capable of demonstrating how paranoia has become a normative state of 
affairs.  Ngai, p301. 
37
  Bersani, The Freudian Body, pp 2,3.   
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thought, it is then precisely at the moments of fracture and failure that I might locate 
a ‘theoretical’ embarrassment.  It is to be found, for instance, in the lacunae of 
theory, and in the failure of theory to accommodate or even to admit its own 
shortcomings.  The failure of anecdote, as something personal and true may hinge 
on in its failure to be sufficiently personal, and so becomes as Miller suggests, 
‘merely a rhetorical ploy’.38  Or the failure of anecdote may lie in being insufficiently 
true.  It may be a prevarication that tries to circumvent the discredit of an 
inconvenient truth, presenting instead an edited or expurgated version.  To theorise 
embarrassment as located in the contingency of error and omission is limited in 
terms of the extent to which it is effective.  But such limits can be critically 
productive, curtailing embarrassment’s theoretical domain and making only specific, 
that is to say, weak truth claims.    
 
This weak theory of embarrassment is confined to a narrative of some particular 
instances of minor awkwardness that are most effectively accounted for by the 
failure of account, and by theoretical unaccountability.  And the links between the 
instances are fragile, retaining for each account the singularity of event.  The links 
are fashioned of similitude rather than sameness, or what Sedgwick terms ‘textured 
analogy’ which nicely captures the degree to which they ‘feel’ the same.39  Such a 
theory of embarrassment would meet the criteria that Tomkins established for weak 
affect theory; of accounting only for ‘near phenomena’, of being rich in descriptive 
detail, but light on explanation.40  
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 As discussed in the introduction, Nancy Miller asked ‘Is it personal only if it’s 
embarrassing?’ Miller, p19. 
39
 ‘A weak theory’s domain can be thought of as pockets of terrains each in analogic relation 
to the others and expandable only by textured analogy.’ Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 
pp120,121. 
40
 Tomkins, S, Affect Imagery Consciousness cited in Ibid. p134. See also Tomkins, 
Exploring Affect.  
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Just as a strong theory is not necessarily successful, so in Tomkins’ terms, a weak 
theory is not necessarily unsuccessful.  As noted by Tomkins for humiliation theory, 
and as discussed by both Tomkins and Sedgwick in relation to paranoia theory, the 
more the theory fails to protect the holder of the theory from the negative affect, the 
stronger the theory grows as the reach of its domain is extended.  The strength of a 
theory may thus be seen to be, in part, predicated on ‘failure’.  To theorise the major 
embarrassment of say a major social faux pas or a highly public political gaffe might 
be thought of as a strong theory, causing its holder to avoid all social situations or 
resign from politics.  In contrast, to theorise the minor embarrassments such as the 
spectatorial embarrassments that arise from looking at an artwork that is perhaps 
‘sticky’, or trite, or that looks back, actually requires a weak theory.   
 
The interesting small embarrassments that we don’t usually speak of directly cannot 
be strongly or directly theorised because the exact cause and site of the 
embarrassment cannot be anticipated.  In fact, one of the interesting points about 
embarrassment is that as it always occurs as an unscripted and singular experience 
that may be difficult to articulate, and not susceptible to generalisation.  And 
because of this, it is difficult to claim for embarrassment any general value.  This is 
not to say that embarrassment is valueless, but that it should always be considered 
as a singularity, rather than collectively as something that can be relied upon to 
exhibit consistency. 
 
The formulation of a weak theory of embarrassment does not, in itself, fully answer 
the methodological experiment of this chapter, of using theory and anecdote to 
locate embarrassment.  We are conditioned to prefer resolution over uncertainty, 
and recognition over estrangement, and so expect one resource to be more apt or 
adept than the other; either theory or anecdote.  And whilst theory is inherently 
‘strong’ in the claims it makes, and anecdote is localised and singular suggesting a 
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‘weaker’ claim, there is in fact no neat outcome.  Both theory and anecdote have 
proved flawed in this instance, and to be most effective where they fail on their own 
terms; theory is effective because of its blind spots, anecdote is accidentally 
revealing where it fails to be sufficiently personal or true.  The lack of clear outcome 
here mirrors the spectatorial ambivalence that Strip generates that perhaps 
jeopardises any critique of the work.  But it is actually in the supplementation of one 
with the other, of bringing both theory and anecdote to bear on the process of 
seeing/knowing Strip that is productive.  It is the unlikely interface between theory 
and anecdote that yields an admixture of and or even but, in place of the 
exclusionary either/or, and so in the tentative theorisation of embarrassment using 
theory and anecdote as appositional rather than oppositional resources might be 
successful.   
 
What binds the two methodological gambits together is their failure to be fully 
effective.  The interaction of the strong theory of ‘theory’ and the weak theory of 
anecdote embodies what Sedgwick terms ‘interdigitation’, an interlocking of fingers, 
that she suggests occurs within an ‘ecology of knowing’.41  And she writes;  
 There may also be benefit in exploring the extremely varied, dynamic and 
 historically contingent ways that strong theoretical constructs interact with 
 weak ones [ . . . ] there are important phenomenological and theoretical 
 tasks that can be accomplished only through local theories and nonce 
 taxonomies; the potentially innumerable mechanisms of their relation to 
 stronger theories remain matters of art and speculative thought.42 
 
As I think Sedgwick makes clear, the overarching and authoritative general truths 
told by the strong theory of ‘theory’ are at certain times, in certain places ineffectual, 
or effective only when supplemented by specificity.  Theory is sometimes bettered 
or made better by the pin-point accuracy of a localised, non-transferable, special 
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 ‘But the history of literary criticism can also be viewed as a repertoire of alternative models 
for allowing strong and weak theory to interdigitate’.  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, p145. 
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 Ibid. p145. 
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telling of what is ‘true’.  And that the relation between the general and the specific, 
between strong and weak cannot be subjected to replicable systems; we must feel 
our way. 
 
What becomes increasingly clear from my attempts to theorise the embarrassment 
of Strip, and indeed embarrassment per se, is that this is part of, (to borrow from 
Sedgwick) ‘an ecology’, not of knowing but of failing.  Embarrassment and the 
attempt to subject embarrassment to theory belong to an ‘ecology of failing’ that 
assimilates the failure to know, and the knowledge that comes through failure.  And 
within the scope of this knowledge, is the underlying awareness of how personal 
such failures and such knowledge must be; that is to say, that the failure and the 




STRIP AS (PSEUDO) FEMINIST CRITIQUE 
This chapter has thus far yielded a credible ‘weak theory’ of embarrassment, but 
has not adequately addressed the remarkable embarrassment of Strip that both 
theory and anecdote have failed to mention; that of the ‘hypergendered scenario’ 
and the problem of reading it from a feminist perspective.  I came across a curious 
reference to Stehli’s work as ‘pseudo-feminist’; Slyce wrote; ‘Jemima felt that these 
works [post Strip] created the possibility to turn away from an anecdotal and what 
she terms ‘pseudo-feminist’ line her work had come up against.’43  I asked her what 
she meant, but she said she couldn’t remember.  Stehli’s disinclination to discuss 
the term may be symptomatic of an ambivalence about feminism(s).  Stehli’s Strip 
reads as ‘feminist’ because it ostensibly critiques objectification of women, however, 
that critique is undercut by the narcissism and exhibitionism evident in her work.  
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And so Strip’s commitment to a feminist project might be considered to be 
questionable, perhaps denigrated as ‘pseudo-feminist, or perhaps questioned and 
denigrated by ‘pseudo-feminists’.  In the same vein, my appreciation of Strip’s 
feminist critique is undercut by the pleasures of being catty about Stehli’s pants and 
envious of the shoes.  My pleasures show no sisterly solidarity and are neither 
socially nor academically admirable, they are in fact embarrassing.  Feminism has 
acquired an image of being strait-faced and averse to such silly pleasures; see for 
example Ahmed’s work on ‘Feminist Killjoys’ in which she suggests that; 
‘To be recognised as a feminist is to be assigned to a difficult category and a 
category of difficulty’.44  ‘Feminist’ as a category has coercive normative values, 
some imposed from within the category, and some from without.  The terms of 
belonging, of ‘being feminist’ seem to require constant definition, revision and 
qualification.  Without this, the terms may be divisive, hence the ambivalence.  We 
are prickly about pejorative assumptions of feminisms and even (or especially) 
‘post-feminisms’.   It is possible that when Stehli spoke of ‘pseudo-feminism’, she 
meant simply some other feminism; not hers.   
  
My category of difficulty, which is less militant than my mother’s generation, but 
more political than my daughter’s, is schooled in the mantra of equality but unable to 
forgo the pleasures of difference.  And my reading of Strip is from within this 
complicated and ambivalent space of belonging: 
  
This chapter has experimented with reading Strip through a pre-Mulveyan, 
existentialist viewpoint, and failed,  that is, failed to keep at bay the somewhat 
compulsive gendering of almost everything, I want finally, to attend to what Sartre 
leaves out of his theory, and what to a very large extent Stehli and the men leave 
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out of their anecdotal accounts of Strip.  What is avoided, and surely, because it is 
embarrassing is the ‘erotic’ of what Jane Gallop would call ‘a hypergendered 
scenario’.45  That is not to say that Strip is a work of much, or perhaps any eroticism 
if eroticism is defined as a tendency to arouse or excite real sexual desire.  Strip is 
curiously sterile (and that in itself is embarrassing).  The unmentioned dimension is 
of an assumed erotic and the assumed erotic is carrying the amphibious meanings 
of being both implicit and artificial.  This erotic is fundamental to Strip’s handling of 
desire and how that might be a source of pleasure, though always mediated by the 
concomitant threat of the dis-pleasure of anxiety.  This is the argument that like the 
arguments that Freud couldn’t, Sartre wouldn’t make because his theory did not see 
gender difference.  
 
As a hypergendered scenario; woman takes off clothes, man watches, Strip is a 
very sexist work.  In its shameless harnessing of our limited and pedestrian 
expectations of polarised gender positions, Strip is an example of; ‘the way sexual 
difference, if you give it half a chance, will take over any subversion or mutation of 
visual space.’46  Strip is both a product and a critique of the emotive clichés of 
sexual difference implicit in seeing, being seen and being caught looking that (now) 
seem too obvious, too obviously overstated.  And yet, although Strip might be 
disparaged as clichéd, I would defend the work as both knowing and witty; a point 
underscored by the oblique references in both composition and title to the comic 
strip.   
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 Gallop, Anecdotal Theory, p108. 
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 Rose, ‘Sexuality and Vision; in Foster, p120.   
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             Jemima Stehli Strip (1999)  No 5 Dealer (shot 2 of 6) 
 
Strip uses the normative, heterosexual, male, desiring gaze to suggest the absolute 
objectness of the female body that connotes a Mulveyan ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’, and 
draws equally on the stereotypes referenced by the work of stripper and the nude.  
The tension between ‘her’ availability and non-availability involuntarily frames each 
‘man’ as desiring.  What is particularly striking is the almost off-hand assumption of 
desire in the work, and how this is a particular site of embarrassment.  The desire, 
as part of the assumed erotic, is also assumed, in that it is not visible, but an 
imagined and imaginary desire that is an implicit connotation of looking.  It is 
assumed that he wants to have her, not least in the commercial sense, as a 
commodity.47   
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 And so they did, using ‘her’ and her work as subject material for newspaper copy (Searle), 
book publication (Burrows and Slyce) and profit on selling her work (Stolper). 
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This aspect of the (spectatorship of) the work is not accidental.  I asked Stehli about 
the importance of gender to the relation between the subject and object of the look 
and she said that she had tried the work with women watchers, but admitted that the 
results were not what she wanted.  Regardless of the sexual orientation of the 
woman audience, they did not look at her in the same way.  Women, she 
commented, always look at women as if in a mirror.  It seems that women measure 
themselves against what they see; there is always a comparative rather than 
commodifying motive in woman looking at woman.48  Man looking at woman 
however, is a most stereotypical look that includes an assumption of male desire 
and male prerogative, and I would argue that this aspect of the work should, in fact 
must, be accepted at face value as part of a Mulveyan critique of the normative (and 
thus always heterosexual) masculinisation of the spectatorial position.  The 
spectator is required to take this work as both straight and straightforward.  So 
whether the men in fact do, or don’t, their desire is taken as read, taken for granted.  
Their desire is used as part of the meaning of the work; it is in fact, commodified.  
And their desire is perhaps taken as red.  Because they are men, because they are 
looking, they are assumed to feel, normative heterosexual desire, and for this desire 
to be automatic, beyond control, involuntary, like an erection, like a blush.   
 
Slyce, focusing attention on the woman, has suggested that the challenge of Strip 
lies in, ‘ . . . the scandalous knowledge that a woman might find pleasure in the 
controlled objectification of her body and its image.’49 Here at last, we find mooted a 
notion of pleasure and perhaps a justification for the shoes.  Slyce suggests that far 
from being a completely disadvantaged position in a Sartrean sense, being looked 
at can be a source of power and pleasure.  This certainly seems a possibility, given 
the contrasting discomfort of the men.  Even though Burrows looks amused and 
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Collings laughs outright, their pleasure is uncertain; it may be a front to cover their 
embarrassment, to spare their blushes.   
 
From a feminist point of view, there is still ambiguity over how much pleasure a 
woman may legitimately derive from her own objectification.  The objectification of 
women within western cultural traditions is a widespread practice which twentieth-
century feminism vilified, thus making it if not ‘out of bounds’, then at the very least, 
a hugely contestable source of pleasure for both the subject and the object of the  
look.  The legacy of that vilification unintentionally produces the opportunity for 
viewing pleasures to be guilty pleasures; pleasures that we are inclined to disown 
because they embarrass.  
 
      
Allan Jones Chair (1968)                                    Jemima Stehli Chair (1997/1998) 
 
However, there is an alternative interpretation to the one offered by Slyce.  We 
might instead read Strip as being not about ‘her’ or her pleasure in being seen at all.  
Strip might be more accurately read as a contemporary, commercial and 
contextualised re-framing of the ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’ of woman.  In the same way 
that Stehli has re-presented earlier works by Helmut Newton (Here They Come), 
and Allen Jones (Table and Chair), Strip reiterates the sentiment of Mulvey’s (much) 
earlier account;  
Women are constantly confronted with their own image in one form or 
another, but what they see bears little relation or relevance to their own 
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unconscious fantasies, their own hidden fears and desires.  They are being 
turned all the time into objects of display, to be looked at and gazed at and 
stared at by men.  Yet, in a real sense, women are not there at all.  The 
parade has nothing to do with woman, everything to do with man.  The true 
exhibit is always the phallus.  Women are simply the scenery onto which 
men project their own narcissistic fantasies.50  
 
(And the indignation in Mulvey’s dated polemic is now lusciously embarrassing.) 
 
           
       Helmut Newton Here They Come             Jemima Stehli After Helmut Newton’s ‘Here 
             They Come’ (1999)  
  
 
The parade of Strip is a (pseudo-)feminist cliché that ‘has nothing to do with woman, 
everything to do with man’.  It is ‘about’ man.  Whilst the first thing that is 
immediately obvious about the men in Strip is that they are all conscious that the 
self they are invited to show is their ‘professional’ self; the second obvious thing 
about each man is that they each fail to conceal their personal self; facial 
expressions and body language betray them; they are all exposed.  Their own 
‘narcissistic fantasies’ are paraded for all to see.  Stehli commented on the 
responses of her chosen men;  
I was surprised.  What I didn’t expect was how much the male viewers who 
watched me strip revealed of themselves in the moment they chose to press 
                                                 
50
 ‘Fears, Fantasies and the Male Unconscious’ in Mulvey, p13. 
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the cable release that took the shot.  I had very mixed feelings about 
exposing that.  . . .  it was interesting to see their anxieties.51 
 
I enjoy seeing that.  I enjoy their embarrassment.  This, for me, is the pleasure of 







                                                 
51
 Rebecca Fortnum, Contemporary British Women Artists: In Their Own Words (London: 




Chapter Three:   





Detractors will say that I make monstrous work, and in a way it is: the Latin root 
monstrare means to show.  If a monster is therefore something that shows itself as 
much as it is seen by you, then let me be a monster.                                 Franko B1  
 





Spectatorial embarrassment may be triggered by the object of the look but it is 
rooted in the accountability of the subject, or at least in the feeling of accountability.  
By her looking she defines herself as a spectator and is accountable for herself, and 
also for her interest in the object of the look.  By just looking she signals her 
investment in the image; she is imbricated in its values, in its content, context, and 
quality.  This chapter considers that accountability and imbrication as an ethics of 
looking and considers the relation between the spectatorial subject and the art-
object as a potential cause of embarrassment.   
 
When I look at art I seem to be always ‘caught looking’ and in the caught-looking-
ness of the spectatorial position I am exposed and must account for the ‘I’ that looks 
and is exposed by looking.  What is at stake here in this exposure and accountability 
is not always the public face of identity, but what we identify with and as to our inner-
self.  This is what Barthes called le privé, the self-image that is at the very core of 
                                                 
1
 Franko B in  Adrian Heathfield, ed. Live: Art and Performance (London: Tate Publishing, 
2004)., p226. 
2
 Mary Ann Doane, "Film and the Masquerade: Theorizing the Female Spectator," in The 
Sexual Subject: A Screen Reader in Sexuality, ed. John Caughie and Annette Kuhn(London: 
Routledge, 1992 (first published in Screen 1982))., p236. 
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self.  Being exposed by looking calls on the spectator to be accountable for herself, 
and also accountable for the relation she bears to the object of her look, a relation 
that might be figured as desire or revulsion, interest or disinterest.   
 
Also considered in this chapter is the relation between embarrassment and 
transgression.  When we look at an artwork that is ‘transgressive’ it deliberately 
revokes the spurious anonymity of ‘the gaze’ and calls on the spectator to be 
interested, to be involved, enraged, disgusted, aroused, afraid or even 
embarrassed.  What transgressive art insistently demands is that we feel something.  
It directly challenges the spectator to relinquish the neutrality of detachment.  Doyle 
comments; 'The risk we take [ . . . ] is that we might actually feel something.  The 
truly shocking thing is that we have been so deeply trained to expect to feel 
nothing.'3 
 
In this chapter I examine my response to two works of art that might be considered 
to be ‘transgressive’ in terms of their demands on the spectator.  The looks they 
invite (or demand) are diverse and differently problematic.  Franko B’s ‘monstrous’ 
performance Don’t Leave Me This Way, which is the main focus of the chapter, is 
based on the ‘interest’ of face to face contact as a proximate and affective 
interaction which requires that we engage ethically with the object of our look.  This 
is contrasted with Marc Quinn’s ‘freakish’ sculpture, Alison Lapper Pregnant, which 
seems (at first) to allow the ‘disinterest’ of a variant of ‘the gaze’, that of the touristic 
gaze that maintains a distance from the object of its look.  This is a look that is 
exploitative, for pleasure or curiosity, offering nothing in exchange, and so shirking 
any ethical obligation.  Using the monster and the freak as metaphors for the 
interest and disinterest of the look, I consider an ethics of looking, and how this 
might be causal in spectatorial embarrassment because a breach of ethics may be a 
                                                 
3 Doyle, ‘Critical Tears’ in Johnson, p44. 
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challenge to, or compromise of, a person’s idea of themself.  A further ethical 
problem encountered in this chapter is the potential embarrassment of art when it 
constitutes affective labour within an exchange economy.  How comfortable are we 
with buying feeling?  This chapter attempts to own the embarrassment that can 
accompany the pleasures, (and dubious pleasures), and the cost of looking. 
 
 
I WENT TO SEE FRANKO B 
I went to see Franko B.  It was a curious experience, not embarrassing exactly, or at 
least not at the time, but afterwards, I felt embarrassed about my motives, and my 
taste.  I felt that the encounter exposed a self I was not entirely comfortable with and 
on reflection, the experience was one of coming to terms with that unsatisfactory 
self.  I had booked an ‘appointment’, an exclusive one-to-one encounter, an 
opportunity to ‘see’ Franko B.  I had paid.  It was an unexpectedly hot day, a day 
when Trafalgar Square was full of tourists.  They flocked, with maps, backpacks, 
and waterproofs. They were indiscriminately photographing each other and the 
pigeons, and I was impatient to get through the arch and out of the square.  Franko 
B was appearing at the ICA in a performance piece titled Don’t Leave Me This Way, 
(‘Please note that this performance contains nudity’)4 and once on the Mall I walked 
slowly so as to make my time slot, so as not to be too early.  When I got there, and it 
was my turn, I handed over my ticket, a man took me by the elbow and guided me 
through a doorway into the dark.  It was not dark entirely, but a thick and airless 
gloom.  As my eyes began to adjust I could sense shadows and glimmers, a sense 
of cavernous space.  Franko’s lair.  My guide took me a short distance, he seated 
me, and then he stood back.  He may have left, he may have stayed to watch me.  I 
                                                 
4
 ICA publicity material www.ica.org.uk (accessed 05.03.11)  I like that nudity continues to 
be something we should be warned about; I appreciate its power to disturb or disrupt, and 
hope that power is not eroded, for if we become insensitive to nakedness, then what else 
must be stripped off in order to disturb. 
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forgot about him.  Sitting in front of me was Franko B.  He was fat and naked, his 
body seemed to give off a faint hum of light.  I felt what Barthes describes as ‘a kind 
of alert fascination’:  
I am nailed to the scene and yet very wide awake: my attention constitutes a 
part of what is being acted out, nothing is external to the scene, and yet I 
read it: there are no footlights – this is an extreme theatre.  Whence the 
awkwardness – or, for some perverse types, the pleasure.5  
 
 
                  
      Franko B Don’t Leave Me This Way (2009) NRLA Glasgow,  




                                                 
5
 Barthes, Lover’s Discourse,  p123. 
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Vaginal Davis has described Franko B as mesmerically beautiful, but if beauty is in 
the eye of the beholder, this man was today, ugly.6  He was ugly for me.  His 
ugliness was of corpulence, excess; he spilled over the edges of himself.  It was as 
if his inside mass could barely be contained by his tattooed and scarred skin.  He 
sat silently with a toad-like stillness, displayed in a way that seemed barely human.  
He seemed sad, but I suppose he could have been bored.  Bored of sitting still to be 
stared at; bored of showing himself.  As I consciously tried to see as much as I could 
in the poor light, and to see all I could in my allotted time, I was extremely aware of 
‘seeing’.  I strove to see.  I wanted to look, no, stare, at his rolls of fat, at his love 
handles, at his jowls, at his penis lying like a slug, sleeping between thighs.  I 
wanted to see if he was sweating in the stifling heat, around his armpits perhaps, or 
the folds of his neck.  But what I saw most was his eyes.  I saw the pink rim of his 
eyes, unexpected and hurtful, as if I had seen it before, and I would see it again, and 
be bruised again, I would always see it.  It was like looking into the eyes of a caged 
animal that stares out between the bars in silent rage and disappointment.  Franko 
was staring straight at me; but his eyes seemed sightless.  I was looking for a sign, 
a token, a sign to know for sure that he saw me.  But I was left wanting.  I felt 
invisible.  Was I just another tourist?                                              
 
At the end of the time allowed to stare, a white light flickered briefly.  Its brightness 
calculated to make me blink, to miss the exit of the object of my gaze.  The light 
interrupted me, captured me, like the flash of a camera, or the death-zap of a take-
away fly-killer.  I was exposed, caught, and dispatched. 
 
                                                 
6 Vaginal Davis, "Papi/Diaspora: The Beauty of Franko B.," in Franko B: Blinded by Love, ed. 









Now my time was up, the guide reappeared and showed me the way out.  Out, into 
the sunshine, out through a back door with empty beer kegs lined up against the 
wall.  Blinking, shaking my head.  ‘You can go round again if you like’ he said, ‘just 
get another ticket at the desk.’  I walked away.  I cannot easily say whether I saw 
art, or an artist.  Maybe neither.  Maybe I saw a freak, a monster, a relic, a shrine.  
Maybe I saw a hoax, a faux.  Maybe I just paid to look at a naked chub.  Maybe I am 
no knowing consumer of art, just a voyeur, with my eye at the keyhole, putting my 
penny in the slot, a penny to see the peep show, the sex show, the freak show, the 
bearded lady, a piece of the true cross.  Just a sucker easily parted from her penny.  
Yes, afterwards, on reflection, I felt embarrassed.   
 
Franko B has said: 
Today . . . the artist is treated like a cheap Jesus, and I need to challenge 
that.  The difficulty rests in breaking down vision.  Our culture revolves 
around the look: if someone looks at you, they either want to fuck you, to rob 
you, or to sell you something.7   
 
The look was a difficult one, a face to face encounter with a man/monster who 
purported to offer me love, but during my few minutes, didn’t seem to notice me at 
                                                 
7 Johnson, p12.  
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all.  Perhaps it was a failed gesture of intimacy.  Was this his failure, or mine?  I 
looked at Franko wanting neither to fuck him, nor to rob him.  Perhaps I wanted to 
sell myself, not my body, but my self, as a good self.  Perhaps I failed.   
 
I could have been embarrassed by the way that Franko’s ‘sculptural’ body draws 
(my) attention to my body; that his nakedness exposes me.  I could have felt 
embarrassed about the exchange of looks.  He may have been looking at me; his 
eyes may have been better adjusted to the dark than mine, I may have been the 
object of his look, slave to his master.  I may have been troubled by the sexuality of 
the exchange of looks, for as Silvan Tomkins said, looking can be more intimate 
than sex.  I may alternatively have felt insignificant, that he did not see me, that I 
was not worthy of his look.  I may have been embarrassed by ‘the gaze’, by the fact 
that it is no better than authorised voyeurism, or by the gaze’s elitism that draws 
attention to my capacity to fit the stereotype of the straight, white, male spectator, 
and perpetuates a notion of cultural competence, a competence that I doubt I have. 
 
But actually it was none of these potential embarrassments that I felt just then.  I felt 
embarrassed about, in the vaguest sense of ‘about’, wanting to look.  Was it the 
chosen object of my look that discomforted me; that I had paid to look, and to look at 
something monstrous?  Not only the object of the look, but the circumstances of the 
looking were monstrous, and intimate, and dark, and empty, and costly.  What was 
really troubling me was my curiosity and my desire to look at this, and to look in this  
way.  Despite the awkwardness of being caught looking, yet there is a very prurient 
pleasure in the voyeurism of spectatorship.  I find I am drawn to images of ugliness, 
freakiness, monstrosity, perversity.  Despite the embarrassment, I am glad I looked.  
By the time I came out of the ICA, my desire had gone, not satisfied, just gone, 




The relation between desire and embarrassment mirrors that between shame and 
interest theorized by Tomkins.  For Tomkins shame is unthinkable without a 
preceding interest: ‘the innate activator of shame is the incomplete reduction of 
interest.’8  And for Tomkins, the term ‘shame’ designates an axis of feeling that 
encompasses embarrassment.  It is then the residual shred of interest, like my stain 
of desire, diminished and inappropriate but still felt that gives rise to shame-
embarrassment and this is clearly expressed in the compulsion to look and to look 
away.  What is initially a careless uncensored glance is followed by an instinctive 
and hurried aversion of the eyes as we register the object of our look as unsuitable, 
uncomfortable, strange.  The look may then be reprised as an uncomfortable gaze 
as we indulge our interest.  Without the investment of interest, or desire, the object 
of our look would not have the power to shame-embarrass us.  A similar pairing of 
affects is noted by Barthes in relation to the punctum which, he says, attracts and 
distresses.  The two feelings are again closely connected; if our attention were not 
attracted, we would be incapable of distress.  The second feeling of the pair never 
entirely eradicates the first.  The first is the root.  Sedgwick acknowledges the 
interdependence of the mixed feeling; ‘ . . shame is characterized by its failure ever 
to renounce its object of cathexis, its relation to the desire for pleasure as well as the 
need to avoid pain.’9 And it is the lingering pleasure of the first feeling; call it the 
desire, interest or attraction that might go some way to explaining Gilbert & George’s 
commitment to repeating the embarrassments of art and their estimation of 
embarrassment as ‘a good feeling’. 
   
Embarrassment, like shame, like the punctum carries two unequal affective charges; 
the positive of attraction or desire and the negative charge that is secondary, but 
stronger, engulfing but not entirely eradicating the first.  Interest and shame, 
                                                 
8 Sedgwick and Frank, p5. 
9 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, p117. 
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attraction and distress, desire and embarrassment; these are the opposing forces at 
work in Tomkins’ shame, Barthes’ punctum, and in embarrassment.  In each case 
there is an incomplete eradication of the initial positive by the stronger negative 
force.  The tension between the affective forces contributes to what Goffman refers 
to as ‘a failure to present a coherent self’.  In that incoherence, there is a sense of 
the conflict of positive and negative, of desire and distress that is internalised.  The 




EMBARRASMENT & MONSTERS 
I want to consider how the incoherence of embarrassment and the ugliness that I 
saw in Franko B finds form and signification in the figure of the monster.  And how 
looking at the monster, who shows himself to me (montstrare: to show) is a 
transgressive look because it declares spectatorial interest (attraction, desire) but 
also an ethical look that is spectatorially accountable.  The rubric ‘monster’ is used 
freely to include any number of creatures who inspire awe, terror, curiosity and 
revulsion.  Mary Russo’s work on monstrosity distinguishes clearly between two 
sub-categories; the grotesque (or monster) and the freak, differentiated not in terms 
of what their bodies are like, but how the relations between monster and not-
monster are played out in the field of vision.  How we look at these creatures and 
their potential to engender spectatorial embarrassment uncovers an ethics of 
looking. 
 
Drawing on the work of Bakhtin on the carnival, and Stallybrass and White on 
transgression as political, Russo defines the grotesque (and particularly the female 
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grotesque)10 as a creature of the carnival and of the uncanny.  The grotesque is 
figured as roaming free, participating in a broad and reciprocal specular economy; 
Russo writes: 
The grotesque body of carnival festivity was not distanced or objectified in 
relation to an audience.  Audiences and performers were the 
interchangeable parts of an incomplete but imaginable wholeness.  The 
grotesque body was exuberantly and democratically open and inclusive of all 
possibilities.11  
 
Stallybrass and White emphasise the instability that arises from rubbing shoulders 
with the grotesque; ‘the grotesque is a boundary phenomenon of hybridisation or 
inmixing, in which self and other become enmeshed in an inclusive, heterogeneous, 
dangerously unstable zone.’12  Looking at the monster (Russo’s grotesque) is a 
reciprocal look.  He shows himself, we are invited to look, and to look with a 
mingling of abhorrence and adoration.  This monster is something roaming free, 
walking amongst us and we may meet and commune, face to face.  The looking 
here may be an intimate relation, one where eye contact is made.  It is also an 
ethical relation because eye contact is made. 
 
The freak however, according to Russo, is quite separate and by its immitigable 
difference, it is spectacular.  The spectacle as a cultural trope is codified and 
commodified and the freak, as spectacle is both differenced and distanced from its 
audience. 
                                                 
10
 Russo’s main interest is in the specifically female grotesque.  Of the male grotesque she 
says;  ‘their identities as such are produced through an association with the feminine as the 
body marked by difference.’  And, they ‘are all set apart as heterogeneous particular men 
rather than the generic or normal men who stand in for mankind.’ Also, Russo suggests that 
in the case of a male grotesque, factors such as ‘male homosexuality and marked ethnicity 
interact with the iconography and aesthetics of the grotesque.’  This I think would apply to 
Franko B.  Mary Russo, The Female Grotesque: Risk, Excess and Modernity (London: 
Routledge, 1995). p13. 
11
 Ibid. p78. 
12
 Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (Ithaca NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1986)., p193. 
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A spectacle, by definition, requires sight lines and distance.  Audiences do 
not meet up face to face or mask to mask with the spectacle of freaks.  
Freaks are by definition, apart, as beings to be viewed.  In the traditional 
sideshow, they are often caged and most often they are silent.13  
 
The differentiation between the freak and the monster is expressed here in terms of 
the contexts of looking at.  It is a difference of how ‘we’ look at ‘them’ and contexts 
of looking at the monster or at the freak are both potential sites of embarrassment.   
 
The look at the freak is a touristic gaze, it is inherently unethical, we do not imagine 
they look back at us.  When we look at the freak we deny the reciprocity that Sartre 
ascribes to the look-looking and the look-looked-at.  We assume the privileges of 
freedom and subjectivity without reciprocity, without penalty.  When we look at the 
monster however, we are at risk; we know he sees us because he shows himself to 
us.  The monster invites us close, he engages us, we are proximate, and the 
proximity of our look is gendered feminine (though not, of course, necessarily 
female).  The proximity of our look suggests an over identification with the object 
and an already othered subject position, that is to say, marked as gendered and 
sexed, predisposing an emotional engagement with the object of our look.  Theories 
of the gendering of proximity in the field of vision go so far as to suggest an 
identification with the object, and perhaps even over-identification.  This is 
predicated on a tendency to conflate seeing and knowing, leaving no room, no 
critical distance between subject and object. 
For the female spectator there is a certain over-presence of the image – she 
is the image.  Given the closeness of this relationship, the female spectator’s 
desire can be described only in terms of a kind of narcissism – the female 
look demands a becoming.14  
 
                                                 
13
 Russo, pp79,80. 
14
 Doane, p231. 
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There is, in the engagement with the monster the risk of ‘inmixing’, the risk of 
becoming monstrous.  But, in contrast, the freak remains separate from ourself; we 
look at the freak from a distance.  It is a safe distance, but not an aesthetic distance, 
for we do not, cannot, find it beautiful. 
 
So when I went to see Franko B, did I see a freak or a monster?  The fact that I paid 
to look, and the theatrical framing of the look correlate with the freak show.  I even 
asked myself, ‘was I just another tourist?’  I certainly felt no better.  But in fact, I 
believe that Don’t Leave Me This Way is a work, as Franko himself entertains, that 
is monstrous.  ‘Detractors’ he writes ‘will say that I make monstrous work, and in a 
way it is’.15  He argues that in ‘showing himself’ to spectators, he embodies the 
monster.  The one-to-one-ness of the encounter, the reciprocity of the work, and the 
fact that he showed himself all make it monstrous.  The concentration of looking 
required to see Franko B in a near darkness drew attention to the intimacy and 
ethics of the face-to-face, mask-to-mask, look-looked-at of the encounter.  When I 
saw Franko B, he gave no sign that he saw me, but surely he must have?  I looked 
right into his eyes, and felt rejected by his impassivity rather than merely overlooked.   
 
The experience of looking at another, looking right into their eyes can be remarkably 
unsettling.  Silvan Tomkins wrote of the ethics of looking in terms of two socio-
cultural taboos; the first on looking directly into the eyes of the other, and the 
second, perversely, on not looking, or on looking away too visibly.16  Tomkins 
proposed three reasons for the restriction on looking directly at the other.  Firstly that 
mutual looking is intimate; more intimate than sex.  Secondly, that the look-look has 
a ‘unique capacity’ of ‘expression, communication, contagion, escalation and control 
                                                 
15
 Franko B in Heathfield, p226. 
16
 Sedgwick and Frank, p137. 
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of affects.’17  By this he refers to the visibility of affects; if I am angry, and you look at 
me you will see that I am angry, or more to the point, if I am embarrassed and you 
look at me you will see that I am embarrassed and I will be embarrassed to be seen 
in this state and being seen will escalate the emotion.  The third cause of avoidance  
of the look-look is expressly sexual in accord with a Freudian interpretation of 
looking as one of the earliest and primary contributors to the development of 
sexuality as a mix of pleasures and penalties.   
 
On the second restriction, that of looking away too visibly or of not returning the 
other’s look, not looking them in the eye, Tomkins says that this is either a matter of 
disrespect or, alternatively, a sign of a lack of self-esteem.  The avoidance of eye 
contact constitutes a judgment that either ‘you are not worth looking at’ or, ‘I am not 
worthy to look at you’.  The ethics of looking outlined here suggest that eye contact 
is a form of social contract, and to make eye contact is to take responsibility for both 
other and self.  To maintain eye contact whilst experiencing embarrassment is 
excruciatingly difficult, all impulses are to look away.   
 
               
                                   Franko B 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Sedgwick and Frank, pp144,145. 
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In Don’t Leave Me, the spectator is invited to look at the other who is strange in a 
way that draws attention to the ethics of looking.  The spectator is called on to 
consider their gaze, to return the gaze of the monster, if they can.  The spectator 
risks intimacy, risks feeling something in an emotional proximity where as 
Stallybrass and White say there may be an ‘inmixing’ in which self and other 
‘become enmeshed in an inclusive, heterogeneous, dangerously unstable zone’.  
The touristic gaze, on the other hand, is predicated on the maintenance of distance, 
and being unethical, demands no such self-reflexiveness.  On reflection, my look at 
Franko could not be a touristic gaze.  It was so intense, so proximate, and so 




EMBARRASSMENT & FREAKS    
In considering the potential embarrassments of the touristic gaze, there is a 
particular work of art that has been excessively exposed to just this.  In fact, it can 
hardly be mentioned without the adjunct of a look that is cosmopolitan and 
indiscriminate.  Alison Lapper Pregnant (2005) by Marc Quinn was displayed on the 
fourth plinth in Trafalgar Square from September 2005 to October 2007.  Nearly, but 
not quite concurrent with Don’t Leave Me in both time and place; a near 
coincidence.  It is as if they had just missed each other.  Quinn’s work is a 
monumental piece of marble that apart from being too clean, easily held its own 
amongst the lions and admirals.  But it is somehow ‘difficult’, or at least difficult to 
like with its vacuous whiteness, its expressionless eyes and its smoothed over and 
idealised representation of a real person as allegory.  It is wearily weighted by the 
inevitability of the arguments for celebrating diverse bodies versus celebrating the 
deeds of great men.  The work has generated a considerable amount of populist 
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controversy that negates the possibility of critical appraisal; it is difficult to say, for 
example that ‘I don’t like it’ because that is to risk appearing to dislike people who 
are physically disadvantaged.  Even to find words for the otherness of congenital 
deformity that do not speak from an ‘able-ist’ position is awkward, and so too is the 
phoniness of such able-bodied political-correctness that must sift through language 
to avoid some imagined offence. 
 
 
     
     Marc Quinn Alison Lapper Pregnant (2005) 
 
 
The site specificity of Alison Lapper guaranteed it as a tourist ‘attraction’; Trafalgar 
Square is ‘the centre of the polis – the navel of the political culture of the British 
nation.’18  Besides being a confluence of political, military and regal powers, the 
square is also a site of art-historical power; home to the National Gallery and the 
National Portrait Gallery.  Each of these various powerhouses of cultural and 
political tradition draws tourists; they flock to the site, to be there, to see for 
                                                 
18
 Cashell, p38. 
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themselves, to photograph, to be photographed, to take home a souvenir of having 
been there.  Will Self commented that the traditional powers of the site ensure that, 
‘a statue of Alison Lapper at that point on the fourth plinth becomes, to my way of 
thinking, deeply subversive.’19  Kieran Cashell, whose interest is in the compromised 
ethics of a disinterested aesthetic distance, extends this argument:  
Will Self’s admiration of the site-specificity of the sculpture fails to recognise 
that Trafalgar Square is now a locus of tourist appeal as much as it once was 
a nexus of imperial power.  Therefore, the context tends on this occasion to 
codify the figure as a public spectacle – something to be looked at.20  
 
They are of course both right, the work is subversive and a spectacle, and 
significantly, due to its subjection to, and provocation of, the touristic gaze, Alison 
Lapper Pregnant is an instance of spectacular freakery. 
 
The freak as spectacle defines its onlookers as tourists.  They look from a viewpoint 
that is naturalised as normative ‘where they come from’, and look at what is 
exotically ‘other’.  Looking at the freak confirms the spectatorial gaze, confirms my 
gaze, as touristic.  Looking at a representation of the freak, or indeed at the freak 
itself as art positions me as casually, without compassion, commitment or 
understanding, looking for my own entertainment.  I find this embarrassing: it does 
not meet my expectations of self.  I look with what Cashell makes no bones about 
labelling ‘the repulsive attitude of the cultural tourist’.  
 
Quinn’s sculpture is very conservative in form, made of fine Carrara marble and in 
the style of neo-classical Greco-Roman sculpture of gods and heroes; it appears to 
invite a disinterested gaze, a suspension of (base) everyday emotions and concerns 
in pursuit of aesthetic beauty.  The site of the work, which is excessively touristic, 
seems to be laid bare to an omnivorous, consuming gaze in pursuit of entertainment 
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without engagement.  But Alison Lapper Pregnant is actually a transgressive work of 
art and will not let us get away with either a disinterested aesthetic gaze or a 
disengaged touristic gaze.   
 
Despite its classical form, and despite its location, Alison Lapper, as Self noted, is 
‘subversive’, and is difficult to digest as ‘just’ a thing of beauty, or alternatively as an 
object of idle curiosity.  It actually solicits our engagement.  Cashell says of its 
ethical position: 
Because the sculpture is so public, so prominent and open  that it almost 
represents the idea of openness itself, the viewer is made to feel guilty for 
being tempted to adopt a disinterested (and therefore disrespectful) attitude 
towards the sculpture – and by extension Lapper and (by further extension) 
people with disabilities.21  
 
 
And this is the nub of the transgressiveness of Quinn’s work.  He knows this.  He 
knows, that a tourist like me will be wrongfooted; where we anticipated a long-dead 
and highly-decorated warmonger, we see a pregnant woman who is disabled. 
Disabled bodies articulated in classical formal conventions cannot be 
processed as anything other than striving to achieve but ultimately ‘falling 
short of’ the traditional aesthetic principles – a relationship that is dependent 
on the very canonical and conservative ideology it evidently subverts.22  
 
Quinn knows how difficult it is to maintain a distance.  The work is transgressive 
because we must consider it not aesthetically, but ethically, and transgressive 
because like propaganda or pornography it is too insistent that we are interested.  It 
calls for action.  As Cashell says, it works as a call to ‘put ethics, accessibility, 
tolerance and social inclusion into political practice.’23  And this too is a product of its 
site-specificity, ensuring hyper-visibility and socio-political exposure. 
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And because it calls on me to be interested, like pornography calls on me to be 
aroused, I find it embarrassing.  I am busy looking the other way, and don’t want to 
be called on, or interpellated like this.  How much easier it would be to discuss this 
work in terms of a pallid, disengaged, gutless aesthetics; a system of judgement I 
need take no responsibility for.  I don’t want to be just another repulsive tourist 
collecting snaps, but, on the other hand to engage ethically as the work demands, is 
embarrassing.  The work asks me to expose my beliefs, and principles.  But even 
that is perhaps not the true site of embarrassment; I am in favour of equality, 
accessibility and visibility, and I recognise the dubiousness of the ‘ableist’ position 
that considers physical normativity to be unquestionably desirable and any deviation 
a handicap to be overcome.  But these laudable principles I hold do not excuse my 
rude stare.  The truth is, I am driven to look by a mixture of desire and revulsion. 
 
In relation to The Complete Marbles, the series of sculptures of which Alison Lapper 
is part, Quinn suggests that; ‘To see different bodies reproduced in the material of 
beauty and heroism, marble, involved a celebration of a wider notion of beauty and 
humanity.’24  This is of course, admirable, but arguably, he overstates the capacity 
of the public gaze to transcend a deeply ingrained investment in normality, and the 
corresponding recoil from the not-normal as historically connected with evil, disaster, 
and suffering.  Ann Millet-Gallant in The Disabled Body in Contemporary Art, doubts 
our acceptance of ‘not-normal’, and she particularly doubts our capacity to escape 
the pervasive influence of the medicalization of ‘different bodies’, suggesting our 
investment is in correcting rather than celebrating difference.  Millet-Gallant writes; 
‘The culturally ubiquitous medical model views disability as a set of medical and 
corporeal “problems” and works to cure, fix or eliminate these “problems” and 
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consequently disabled people from the population.’25  We are so schooled in the 
‘breed standard’ of human beauty that we can only see ‘other’ bodies as deviating 
from, and failing to meet these standards, and perhaps some people would prefer 
not to see them at all. 
 
Bodies born with less or more than considered normal are always looked at as 
different, always differenced, always othered.  But it is rude to stare, and in paying 
lip service to equality, we are supposed to turn a blind eye, overlook the difference 
and pretend that we all look the same.  Is it not embarrassingly disingenuous to 
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I am embarrassed that actually I want to stare, like a child, like a tourist, to stare with 
an uninhibited consuming gaze at the freak.  It is an insatiable and sexualised 
curiosity that is symptomatic of what Russo terms ‘the pornography of disability’.26  
And I want to give free rein to the mixture of desire and revulsion that drives me to 
look, rather than politely, discretely look away.  Ultimately, there is no sidestepping 
responsibility for the embarrassing fact that differenced bodies are publicly 
overlooked and privately fetishized. 
 
In his analysis of Alison Lapper Pregnant, Cashell, despite scrupulous investigation 
of his own ethical position towards the work, betrays a small embarrassment when 
he says that the work should be considered to be collaborative.27  He is squeamish 
about Quinn’s authorship of the work being exploitative of Lapper, not because she 
is congenitally deformed, or female, or pregnant, but because of the other fact we 
know about her; because she is an artist.  He is embarrassed that although Lapper 
uses her body as subject in her own work, when Quinn uses her body, the work 
achieves greater critical acclaim and contributes to his career as a successful artist.  
It is almost as if he has stolen something, taken all the credit, when she is an artist 
too.  But she is not the artist, it is Quinn’s work.  Lapper was the model and became 
the spokesperson for the work, but this does not make it collaborative.  Cashell is 
using the suggestion of collaboration euphemistically to cover his embarrassment at 
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THE TRANSGRESSIONS OF FRANKO B 
Alison Lapper Pregnant is transgressive but its mode of transgression is subversive 
in that it masquerades as classical sculpture, a contemporary interloper in a space 
where art is used to commemorate ancient achievement or (privileged) greatness.  
Franko B on the other hand, wears his transgression on his sleeve.   
 
 
Franko B I Miss You (2003) Tate Modern,  
 
 
There is however, some slight awkwardness in discussing Don’t Leave Me as 
transgressive.  The difficulty arises from using such a strong term as ‘transgressive’ 
with all that it might potentially imply (wrongdoing, trespass, immorality, violation), to 
describe an insubstantial, fleeting encounter where so little was visible, and nothing 
was said.  Some of Franko’s previous performance works were grand, extravagant, 
public and dangerous.  When Franko showed I Miss You in the turbine hall of Tate 
Modern it excited some members of the audience to cry their eyes out in sadness, 
sympathy and love.  Doyle writes that she was moved to tears, overwhelmed by the 
intensity of the work.28  She felt intimacy, even in the midst of a capacity crowd.  In 
contrast, Don’t Leave Me as staged at the ICA was low-key, private, a little fumbling 
in the dark, and soon over.  And yet the work is transgressive; with no clear 
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purpose, it invites people to sit in close proximity with a naked man, who is both 
strange and stranger.   
 
As Roland Barthes has written, what exposes a person most, most damagingly, 
most embarrassingly, is exposure of le privé, the innermost self-image, not of our 
external identity but what we privately identify with.  Our identifications (and counter-
identifications and disidentifications) are responses to the doxas of ideology.  
Barthes, like many other thinkers, conceives of a spectrum of ideological doxas 
running from a radical left to a conservative right, with the individual facing in 
different directions at different moments and in differing circumstances.  The right-
wing doxa is subject to embarrassability, particularly over sexuality, whilst the left 
prides itself on being un-embarrassable, but in fact is disconcerted by failing to be 
sufficiently left.  It is what Barthes terms the ‘trivial actions, the traces of bourgeois 
ideology confessed by the subject’ that are the Achilles heel of the left.29  And the 
traces of bourgeois ideology that so often prove embarrassing include intimacy, 
sentimentality, and inaction, all of which Franko B exploits in Don’t Leave Me. 
 
The transgressiveness of Don’t Leave Me This Way is of low intensity but multiple 
and layered.  Firstly, it has transgressive pedigree.  Franko B’s previous 
performances with wounding, cutting, and the fetishization of pain and blood 
prefigure this in a sense of right-wing transgression and in Don’t Leave Me, the body 
of the artist and his nakedness, to only a very limited extent, sustain this and our 
expectation of this type of transgression.  Set counter to this, as a one-to-one 
performance, Don’t Leave Me requires the spectator to expose herself in a left-wing 
sense, to the risk of intimacy, even romance, to enter into a scenario of a despairing 
bid to avoid rejection, perhaps to hold on to love.   
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Don’t Leave Me is marked by a motif of denial or frustration and this also might be 
considered as a further element of transgression.  The denial and frustration of 
intent and understanding work to provoke the spectator, and establish conditions of 
spectatorial embarrassment, where the capacities to know and to act are restricted.  
The title alludes to an irredeemable situation of loss and sentimentally hopeless 
hope, and on several levels Franko works to deny the expectations (or hopes) of the 
spectator.  Franko B is best known for his blood works and the lack of physical harm 
in Don’t Leave Me denies the spectator their understanding of Franko as the man 





                  The man who bleeds for art 
 
Kamal Ackarie, who designed the lighting for the work suggests that the darkness of 
the piece is a counterintuitive move that is in itself transgressive.  Ackarie comments 
that most people want a lighting designer to make the show to be seen.  Franko 
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asked for the opposite; he wanted not to be seen, and he wanted to blind people.30  
The almost-dark of the piece, almost denies the spectator the sight of Franko, who 
they have come to see.  The marginality of the event as ‘something and nothing’ 
makes it difficult to be sure it is even worth mentioning, and this is also a form of 
transgression.  For me, the lack of a clear acknowledgement from Franko that he 
saw me, that he looked back and returned my look, was particularly frustrating 
leaving me with a sense of inadequacy.  My experience of Don’t Leave Me is also 
marked by the suspicion of a failure of gesture, or an evasion of intimacy.  The lack 
of clear purpose or meaning of the work denies the spectator any sense of closure; 
just who is leaving and who is left?  All that remains is a sense of loss, or perhaps 




EMBARRASSMENT & AFFECTIVE LABOUR 
Looking at Franko B for the duration of the performance, and given the dark, and my 
concerted effort to see, I might just as easily say, looking for Franko, I thought I felt 
no embarrassment.  Typically, the embarrassment was slight and slippery, 
unexpectedly catching me out, like a wrongfootedness.  The site of embarrassment 
was not in the looking, which is central to the experience of the work, but around the 
edges.  The site of embarrassment was in the desire to look; it was in my desire to 
look on the monster.  And embarrassment is also peripherally present in the residual 
feelings of uncertainty, failure, and in the lack of intensity.   
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 Kamal Ackerie interviewed in Don’t Leave Me This Way, Short film, Director, Victor 
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audience, who were lit with bright light, whilst Franko was in the dark, but in the one to one 
version as shown at the ICA the lighting was very subdued throughout until the blinding flash 
that signalled the end of the appointment. 
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Quite unexpectedly, I found that in participating in Don’t Leave Me This Way, I was 
also subjected to a slight economic embarrassment.  My embarrassment was not 
that alluded to euphemistically as ‘financial embarrassment’, or more obscurely as  
‘pecuniary difficulties’, when one finds oneself in receipt or need of goods or 
services for which one cannot pay.  But rather, it was the embarrassment was of 
having paid.  And come to think of it, as it was not a huge sum of money, I am 
embarrassed to mention it, embarrassed to give the impression that I couldn’t afford 
it, or I begrudge spending on ‘the arts’, or that it was poor value for money, or that I 
am some freeloader.  Money is in itself a source of embarrassment and perhaps a 
class-based source, rooted in traditional preconceptions of things such as old-
money, the nouveau riche, thrift, extravagance and the stolid prudence of the middle 
ground.  Both too much and too little can be awkward and there is a reticence and 
reserve in speaking of money; we are anxious not to expose ourselves as either 
flash and easily fleeced, or as a cheapskate.     
 
The cost of seeing Franko B in Don’t Leave Me This Way was £4.00 for a three 
minute one-to-one audience.  If I had paid for admission to a gallery and looked at 
pictures on the walls there would be no embarrassment.  The amount paid is not the 
issue, I even think I ‘got my money’s worth’, but the awkwardness remains in the 
explicitness of the contract, that I paid to look, and he was paid to be looked at.  
Furthermore, because Franko offers to love his audience, as Marina Abramovic 
said, ‘what really touches me deeply about Franko B’s live performances is [ . . . ] 
the unconditional love given to his audience’;31 that is uncomfortable.  And worse; he 
offers us intimacy.  Miglietti says; ‘He creates an intimate relationship of the 
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unexpressed with the spectator in a visual dimension’.32  And that is definitely a 
problem.  I seem to have paid for intimacy. 
 
Nicholas Ridout explores the economic ethics of embarrassment arising from the 
‘predicament of the audience’ of theatrical performance.  The problem, he suggests, 
arises from the ethics of eye contact.  Where Tomkins had posited the ethics of the 
look in terms of status and sexuality, Ridout sees status as economically grounded. 
In such moments; ‘at least part of the embarrassment may stem from a recognition 
that the intimacy into which I am being seduced has been paid for.’33  Intimacy and 
economics are strange bedfellows, they embarrass each other.  Having paid to look, 
my desire to look is outed, and I cannot ‘not look’; I cannot look away.  It would be, 
among other things, rude, disingenuous, and a waste of money.  ‘The phenomenon 
of embarrassment arising from eye contact seems to expose the consumer as 
consumer in her own mind’s eye, whether she looks away or not.’34  So, I am 
exposed; exposed as a ‘consumer’, exposed as someone who pays to look at 
another person who is paid to be looked at and perhaps to look back at me.  This 
uncomfortable transaction takes place within the economy of affective labour. 
 
Negri and Hardt define affective labour as the work ‘of human contact and 
interaction’.  Affective labour is the third type of immaterial labour that ‘drive[s] the 
post-modernization of the global economy’ with the first two being the production 
and communication of information, and cognitive or creative labour.  The production 
and transmission of emotion has perhaps the most substance of the three because 
of its quite literal embodied-ness, but it is, nevertheless, immaterial; ‘in the sense 
that its products are intangible, a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, 
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excitement, or passion.’35  Affective labour might not always produce comfortable 
emotions; it might also trade in grief, guilt or anger.  Affective labour would also 
include the healing of wounds, the provision of intimacy, the confession of secrets, 
the telling of jokes, service with a smile, counselling, forgiveness, mourning, and the 
care of the sad and the mad and the dead.   
 
Franco ‘Biffo’ Berardi offers a darker view of affective labour as we experience it 
within a capitalist economy; it eats away at our soul.  Where once, it was the time 
and energy of the worker’s body that was exploited in the production of value, now 
we are trading the cognitive and affective labour of our souls for the capacity to buy 
things.  Berardi writes; ‘The immaterial factory asks instead to place our very souls 
at its disposal: intelligence, sensibility, creativity and language.’36  This is not to say 
we should not value affective labour, but a call to reconsider what we understand by 
value.  For Franko B, the value of his work is relational. 
 
Franko B takes the emotional response of his spectators as a serious obligation.  It 
is not play, but work.  He said; 
It is very difficult to explain, but for me this is a very serious, very important 
aspect: feeling the responsibility of other people’s emotions requires one to 
imagine a great weight; for me its not an experiment or a game that I am 
playing with someone, it is not some clever little thing, because it would be 
too easy to play with the feelings and emotions of people.37  
 
He has at one time provided his audience with postcards to register their response 
to his work.  Though not specifically about Don’t Leave Me they give an indication of 
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the degree to which his audiences feel something worth expressing.  This is a 
selection of comments: 
‘I appreciate this provocation’ 
‘Looking your arts I think I can be owner of myself, and that it is possible to 
ribegin, better.  Anyway.’ (sic) 
‘My responses to Franko B’s work are almost always mixed’ 
‘I cried’ 
‘Thank you for all emotions I get’ 
‘I like your artwork . . . but your videos are that bad, cheap and without 
sense’ 
‘Everyone can now read you mind like an open book.  Was it that what you 
want?’ 
‘Lovely man, thank you 4 the goose-bumps’ 
‘You are someone who smells good!! You know?’ 
‘I can feel ‘Yes, I’m living’ in front of your work’38 
 
The final comment is very reminiscent of the condition advocated by Nicolas 
Bourriaud for relational aesthetics.  Bourriaud says that the first question we should 
ask ourselves when looking at art is; ‘Does it give me a chance to exist in front of it, 
or, on the contrary, does it deny me as a subject?’39  Like the respondent, I felt alive 
in front of Don’t Leave Me, doubtful and insecure, but alive with Barthes’ ‘alert 
fascination’ as a form of emotion that referred me back to myself. 
 
Whilst Franko offers his spectator love and intimacy; it comes at a price.  As I have 
already paid I cannot consider his love as a gift.40  If I disregard the possibility of a 
gift and consider the encounter as a contract, for after all, I paid to look at another 
person who was paid to be looked at, then I might consider, that according to 
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Barthes; ‘the model of the good contract is the model of Prostitution.’41  And that 
may be one of the oldest recognised forms of affective labour.   
 
 
Franko B,  Don’t Leave Me This Way (1-2-1) (2009) ICA, London,   
photo by Hugo Glendenning 
 
 
Barthes is ambivalent on the desirability of the contract.  It is, he cautions, a ‘bad 
object’ legitimating bourgeois values of value exchange, and yet, he admits, we 
desire to have our relations with others contractually regulated, thus eliminating the 
awkwardness of ‘the reluctance to receive without giving.’42  Not, you will note, the 
other way about, a reluctance to give and get nothing back.  For Barthes, the 
embarrassment would be in the discredit of taking, rather than the bourgeois 
expectancy of a return on outlay.  On the model of a ‘good contract’ offered by 
prostitution Barthes says: 
For this contract, declared immoral by all societies and by all systems 
(except the most archaic), liberates in fact from what might be called the 
imaginary embarrassments of the exchange: what am I to count on in the 
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other’s desire, in what I am for him?  The contract eliminates this 
confusion.43  
 
The embarrassments of the exchange, (whether or not we consider them to be 
imaginary) arise because, as already offered, intimacy and economics are an 
incongruous pairing, even if the intimacy is imaginary.  But within the structure of the 
contract, the proximity of intimacy and economics is legitimised and the 
embarrassment is held at bay.  It is as if Barthes had anticipated my predicament.  It 
is as if he knew I would want to ask of Franko, does he see me?  And ‘what I am for 
him?’  
 
Within the context of affective labour, it is hard to justify the work of Franko B as a 
gift.  Art is his profession; he makes a living.  But the contract between artist and 
spectator exceeds the exchange of affective labour for coin.  The relational value 
exceeds the admission price, and the cost of looking is an ethical exchange.  The 
intimacy of Franko’s work, even if it is refused by the spectator, cannot, due to the 
very nature of intimacy (or refusal), be one-sided.  The spectator is called on to 
engage in the intimacy; she exposes herself to the work by giving in to curiosity, or 
desire, or by her looking, by her tears, or by her embarrassment.  Alternatively, her 
refusal would also be relational; one refuses, the other is refused.  Her refusal would 
constitute an exposure of the private self revealing a lack of interest or desire.  Also  
to look away would breach the ethics of looking exposing the spectator as someone 
who would, or could look away.  To not engage in the intimacy of the situation would 
be to receive without giving, and this again is a form of exposure.   
 
Doyle makes the point that Franko’s work tends to go beyond the representation of 
emotion to its actual production.   
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He shifts questions about art and emotion to the audience, moving away 
from the self-reflexive representation of the artist's emotional state, to the 
production of feelings themselves.  It is a risky move if ever there was one, if 
only because he asks us directly if, and how, we plan to love him back.44  
 
In Don’t Leave Me, the feeling Franko produces, as the product of his (affective) 
labour is indeed risky.  It is complicated by the lack of clear purpose and by the lack 
of closure leaving only a sense of obligation, and inadequacy, and a stain of desire 
that discloses an embarrassing failure of intimacy.   
 
Like Berardi, who believes that affective labour erodes the soul, Carol Mavor has 
suggested that affective labour may ‘come at the cost of the loss of self’.45  I thought 
she meant that the cost was borne by the self who laboured.  But, somehow, whilst I 
assumed Franko to be the one who laboured, because I paid him to, the loss of self, 
or at least the loss of a coherent self seems to have been mine. 
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Chapter Four:    
Inside Out:  Confessions of sentimentality in the 




What undertaking could be more narcissistically exciting or more narcissistically 
dangerous than that of rereading, revising and consolidating one’s own ‘collected 






This chapter considers the self that spectatorial embarrassment exposes; a self that 
is fractured and faceted, a self that is the subject of an on-going narrative of identity 
and identifications; a self that is flawed.  In any given situation, when we are seen, 
including when we are ‘caught looking’, we would always prefer to be seen to be our 
‘best self’, both inside and out, we want to be the most appropriate and coherent 
self, a self we can admire, we want to be ‘good’.  But within our inventory of self is a 
quality of a ‘less-good’ self, one that as Lionel Trilling notes; ‘is less good in the 
public moral way’, and not despite, but exactly because of its failings, we are 
inclined to admit that this self is ‘most peculiarly’ our own.2  And this less-good self, 
which we cannot fully repress but must fully own, is the very quality of self that is 
inadvertently exposed by embarrassment.  The less-than-good-ness of the self may 
refer to either the inner self of self-image, or the outer face of the public-image; it is 
a quality that may be manifested in either – or both; both have aspects that can 
bring us into (our own) disrepute.  The unsettling experience of embarrassment is 
essentially a moment of self-recognition.  Adam Phillips (writing of the stronger 
feeling of shame) comments that such moments ‘ . . . confront one most vividly, that 
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is, most terribly with the picture of who one wants to be through the experience of 
failing to be it.  One is most essentially one’s self at such moments.’3 
 
The exposure of a less-good quality of self is examined here in the context of the 
performance work of Adrian Howells, and in particular, his one-to-one performance, 
The 14 Stations of the Life and History of Adrian Howells.  The exposure that is 
central to Howells’ work is considered firstly in terms of compromising the stability of 
innate concepts of inside and outside, private and public, and secondly, considered 
as an exposure of a particular condition of self that is potentially embarrassing; an 
exposure of sentimentality.  Valued once as a sensitivity to ‘finer feelings’, 
sentimentality has suffered a change in status and is now in some quarters reviled 
and ridiculed as a cloying and tasteless sweetness.   
 
Through examination of Howells’ staged scenarios of intimacy and confession, this 
chapter also considers the ‘other’ to whom that self might be exposed, as differing 
‘publics’ to which we, as individuals might belong, even if only temporarily, or 
provisionally and with varying degrees of commitment.   Two particular ‘publics’ are 
considered; Michael Warner’s politically engaged ‘counterpublic’, and Lauren 
Berlant’s ‘intimate public’, notable for a tendency towards complaint and optimism.  
In particular I am concerned with the terms of belonging and the instances where 
those terms are in conflict with le privé, that is, with our private identifications, of 
who we think we are.  In terms of identification, sentimentality is particularly a point 
of embarrassability for a hard-nosed, left-facing ideological doxa that inclines 
towards a view of sentimentality as an excessive and uncontrolled mawkish 
emotion.  But an ‘intimate public’, invested in the value of emotional intelligence is 
more likely to incline towards sympathy.  The intimate public will tend to embrace 
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both sentiment and the embarrassment of sentimentality as constituent in a 
narrative identity as ‘romance’ in the sense of both amorousness and storytelling. 
 
Underpinning this move from ‘exposure’ (which threatens the stability of 
private/public) to ‘sentimentality’ is Sedgwick’s observation of Captain Vere in 
Melville’s Billy Budd; that he is both subject and object of sentimentality.  In the 
character of Captain Vere, Melville dramatized the contiguous existence of an 
explicit, performative, public exterior and an equally convincing though always 
implicit private interior.  Sedgwick comments that Vere is ‘a sentimentalizing subject, 
an active wielder of the ruses of sentimentality for the satisfaction and needs that 
can be stably defined neither as public nor as private.’4  Then she asks; must we not 
also read Captain Vere, in his embrace with Billy, as a ‘sentimentalized object’?  In 
this chapter, I want to consider the possibility that in his manipulation of interior 
spaces of privacy and le privé, and the public spaces of performance and address, 
we might also read Adrian Howells as a sentimentalizing subject and a 
sentimentalized object.  The reversibility of sentimentalizing/sentimentalized and 
subject/object that the audience risks engaging in might arguably  produce 
conditions of embarrassability due to the potential to be the object (and thus judged) 
and through participation (as the subject) in sentimentality as a category that is 
‘discreditable or devalued’.5 
 
 
The extent to which sentimentality might be found to be embarrassing is configured 
here as dependent upon le privé; who we think we are, and thus subject to 
ideological doxas of left and right.   Whilst either left or right-facing doxas might be 
recognised as figuring in emotional experience, it is particularly the left, that 
according to Barthes, is vulnerable to embarrassments relating to; ‘trivial actions, 
                                                 
4
 Sedgwick, Epistemology, p121. 
5
 Ibid. p143. 
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the traces of bourgeois ideology confessed by the subject . . .  friendship, 
tenderness, sentimentality, delight in writing’.6  And to these we might add 
domesticity, banality, nostalgia, and whimsy.  For Barthes the exposure of these 
attachments is damaging in that it gives the other, to whom we are exposed, 
advantage over us, because they are private identifications.  He writes; ‘It is 
certainly when I divulge my private life that I expose myself most; not by the risk of 
‘scandal’, but because then I present my image-system in its strongest 
consistency.’7  
 
The self is not immutably fixed but might face sometimes this way, and now that, 
depending on the context, and at each turn, we are vulnerable to unscripted 
exposures of our image-system so that sentimentality might be an undesirable, 
indeed embarrassing attribute in only certain situations.  Or more broadly, a person 
might have a general tendency towards sentimentality or alternatively towards 
cynicism; Bourdieu characterises the difference between right and left in quite 
pervasive terms as an attitude towards the world: 
It is also an opposition between two world views, two philosophies of life, . . 
the centres of two constellations of choices, la vie en rose and la vie en noir, 
rose-coloured spectacles and dark thoughts, boulevard theatre and avant-
garde theatre, the social optimism of people without problems and the anti-
bourgeois pessimism of people with problems8 
 
This division is very much at odds with Berlant on the final point; she would say that 
rose-coloured spectacles are not worn (only) by those without problems, but 
particularly, they are worn by those who in spite of their problems, keep faith with 
the promise of the happy-ever-after.  They are our intimate public. 
 
                                                 
6
 Barthes, Roland Barthes, pp82,83. 
7
 Ibid. pp82,83.  
8
 Bourdieu, p292.  
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The mind-set of the vie en noir is not unemotional, but prides itself on being rational; 
it is embarrassed by (displays of) uncontrolled emotion and particularly the sweeter 
sentiments.  In his essay, ‘In Defense of Sentimentality’, Robert C. Solomon writes: 
Philosophers have long felt uncomfortable with emotions and passion in 
general, but the attack on sentimentality, though an obvious symptom of this 
discomfort, is not an attack on emotion as such (angry indignation and bitter 
resentment have never gone out of style in Western intellectual life), so 
much as it is an attack on the ‘sweet’ sentiments that are so easily evoked in 
all of us and so embarrassing to the hard-headed.9  
 
Sentimentality, according to Solomon, is generally denigrated by the hard-boiled 
and radical left-facing doxa of ‘intellectual life’, that values the capacity to maintain a 
critical distance, or as Rancière has it, a left-wing irony.10  As I have already argued; 
whilst the exposures that concern a right-facing doxa are more easily 
sensationalised, or as Barthes says, present a risk of ‘scandal’, the exposures of le 
privé that may trouble a left-facing doxa, of banality, domesticity and tenderness are 
the stuff of minor embarrassments.  The intimacy of the one-to-one encounter of 
performance art particularly has the capacity to foreclose the critical distance that 
gives protection from having feelings, showing feelings; it gets right under our skin. 
 
One of the feelings that the performance work of Adrian Howells foregrounds, and 
which is absolutely central to embarrassment, is the feeling of exposure.  His work 
explores issues of risk and intimacy, staging circumstances in which the spectator 
will be consensually exposed, and that exposure might be taking off her or his 
shoes and socks or it may take the form of a sharing of a secret.11  Within the public 
arena of performance art, Howells creates spaces and places of banality and 
                                                 
9
 Mette   Hjort and Sue Laver eds., Emotion and the Arts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997)., p243. 
10
 Rancière, p33. 
11
 Footwashing for the Sole:  Howells notes that many people feel that feet are particularly 
vulnerable to exposure.   www.utube.com  Adrian Howells Interview/Footwashing for the 
Sole/ Kilkenny Arts Festival 14.08.10 (accessed 12.11.11) 
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domesticity, and of sentimental attachments, places where intimacy might be sought 
and found, places where he can employ a sustained strategy of disclosure which is 
intended to give rise to a degree of reciprocity from the audience.  The domesticity 
of the environments, the confidences of either Adrian or his feminine side-kick, 
Adrienne, the atmosphere of trust, intimacy, privacy, and discretion are all 
calculated to elicit from the audience the exposures of confession, spoken or 
unspoken, as an unburdening catharsis.  It is for our own good that we are 
encouraged to show ourselves.  Whilst his exploration of risk and even intimacy 
might appeal to an intellectual, radical, left-facing doxa, the contexts of domesticity 
and familiarity, confession and catharsis are potentially embarrassing.  They are 
exactly the ‘traces of bourgeois ideology’ that ‘we’ are uncomfortable with.   
 
 
                           







INSIDE/OUTSIDE   
Inside and outside are more than mere topographical locations; they are loaded with 
cultural significance.  Inside, at least in western modernity, is socioculturally coded 
as a sphere of privacy and of feminine influence, associated with domesticity, with 
hearth and home, and with the family.  In contrast, the outside is a world of politics 
and commerce it is a public sphere; a man’s world.  Inside is the domain of 
modesty; outside is a space of exhibition.  Inside is a curtailed space; outside is a 
vast expanse.  Warner comments on the emotional implications of the gendering of 
public and private; he says; ‘masculinity, at least in Western cultures, is felt partly in 
a way of occupying public space; femininity, in a language of private feeling.’12  
Private signifies the insideness of feeling to public’s outsideness of reason.  Thus 
the domain of emotion is private; the things we feel are not for public consumption, 
they should be ‘kept in’, hence the embarrassment of an emotional outburst.   
 
What is at stake in the exposure of self that embarrassment causes is felt as the 
opposition between outside and inside, between public and private.  Even 
embarrassment as loss of face, a discrediting of our public image still feels like the 
exposure of something inside.  Embarrassment feels like being naked.  The private 
self is exposed to some sort of public, the inner self is put out; the blush of 
embarrassment is a public expression of private feeling.  The dislocation of private 
and public, of private self and the publics we are exposed to is very much part of the 
risk inherent in the exposures of Howells’ work in which he creates what Sedgwick 
might call ‘the privacy effect’; an illusion of privacy; a privacy in public.13  In his 
performance art, Howells appears to risk the contamination or even collapse of the 
borders between the outside of public and the inside of private.  This can give rise to 
feelings of inappropriateness, of being out of place, of a lack of coherence, even 
                                                 
12
 Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics (New York: Zone Books, 2002)., p24.    
13
 See Sedgwick: ‘Vere suffers in private in public.’ Epistemology, p116. 
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perhaps an unsettling nod towards Mary Douglas’s definition of dirt as matter out of 
place.14  Audiences, in their response, are culturally conditioned to resist the 
collapse of public/private boundaries and to be emotionally invested in the process 
of challenge and defence.  As Michael Warner explains, our understanding of their 
difference is completely absorbed into our sense of being: 
Like those of gender, the orientations of public and private are rooted in what 
anthropologists call habitus: the conventions by which we experience, as 
though naturally, our own bodies and movement in the space of the world.  
Public and private are learned along with terms such as ‘active’ and 
‘passive’, ‘front’ and ‘back’, and ‘top’ and ‘bottom’.  They can seem quasi-
natural, visceral, fraught with perils of abjection and degradation or, 
alternatively, of cleanliness and self-mastery.  They are the very scene of 
selfhood and scarcely distinguishable from the experience of gender and 
sexuality.15  
 
As Warner says, the naturalness of these divisions makes them difficult to 
challenge, easy to feel, not so easy to rationalise, or to refuse.   The embodied 
understanding of this is woven into our sense of ‘self’. 
 
The privacy of inside is the locus of the scenes and scenarios Howells employs in 
his work, for example, Held was performed in a series of domestic locations; at the 
kitchen table, on the sofa, and in bed.16  But the privacy he invents is always already 
contradicted, or even violated by the conflicting connotations of a public 
performance.  However intimate the theatre of a small salon of twenty guests, or 
even the exclusivity of a one-to one performance, the domesticity, the intimacy, 
privacy, the very insideness is manifested as artifice.  This is not private, this is 
performance art, and everything is on show.  Howells’ stock in trade is exposing his 
‘privates’; he shows family photos, little keepsakes, private correspondence; he 
shows letters he has written, and letters to him from others.  In telling his story, he 
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 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (London: Routledge, 2006 (first published 1966)). 
15
 Warner. Publics and Counterpublics, p24 
16
 Howells, A. Held, Performance Piece, various venues, various dates 
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breaches the privacy of others who populate his history.  Whilst this is not a feature 
of all of Howells’ works, where it does occur, it is ethically problematic, and a 
potential source of embarrassment.  Where Howells breaches the privacy of others, 
the spectator is framed as complicit in the violation, and voyeuristically as an 
accessory to the exposure of a third party, not actually present, and unable to 
protest their exposure.  This may, and perhaps should, make the audience uneasy 
on their own account, and in consideration of their own privacy.  Even as we are 
being seduced into exposing ourselves we are cautioned that discretion may not be 
our host’s forte.  Howells is a man who will kiss-and-tell.   
 
 
              
               Adrian Howells Held 
 
 
And sometimes his exposure is embarrassing for his audience.  Spectatorial 
embarrassment may be a second-hand emotion; embarrassment for him, 
empathetically felt.  It might be embarrassing that he has put himself in such a 
compromising position, embarrassing that he is exposed, vulnerable to evaluation, 
disparagement or ridicule.  Alternatively it might be embarrassing that he exposes 
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himself.  We live in a confessional society and are accustomed to the conventions of 
public forums for revealing all, but Springer-style or Oprah-esque disclosure frames 
the disclosing self as debased, thus allowing the audience a feeling of moral 
superiority.  Too much confession is artistically and socially suspect.  Public censure 
also falls on excessive self-promotion; where the autobiographical fails to interest its 
audience, it will be subject to the accusation of narcissism, and furthermore, tropes 
of confession/autobiography beg the question; is this just a case of dirty laundry 
being washed in public?   
 
 
          
           Adrian Howells as ‘Adrienne’ in Salon Adrienne 
 
 
These embarrassments, for and of Howells would apply and be genuinely felt even 
if Howells himself felt no embarrassment whatsoever.  In fact his total immunity to 
the embarrassability of the situations he engineers would prove exceptionally 
embarrassing for his audience.  Showing embarrassment is a public 
acknowledgement of private feelings of failure, lack, or inadequacy, and, according 
to Goffman, this acknowledgement is the precondition for the promise of a ‘next 
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time’, the opportunity to ‘prove worthy at another time’.17  To show embarrassment 
is to demonstrate that we want to be seen to be ‘good’, and that we understand 
what ‘good’ looks like.  Socially we are reassured by the appropriate 
embarrassment of other people, it indicates that they too value being ‘good’.  Un-
embarrassment conversely, is somehow less human.  If Howells shows no 
embarrassment, his audience would be embarrassed by his lack of sensitivity or his 
lack of modesty.  If he feels no shame, we are embarrassed by his shamelessness; 




THE 14 STATIONS OF THE LIFE AND HISTORY OF ADRIAN HOWELLS 
The 14 Stations is an autobiographical performance narrating episodes of suffering 
and disgrace from his past, attempting to show the darker, baser aspect of Adrian 
Howells that is his less-good self.  In Howells’ previous performances as his alter 
ego, Adrienne, he admits that some of his confessions and anecdotes were not 
strictly accurate and presented him in a good light, with ‘a bit too much gloss’, 
because he wanted to be liked.18  The 14 Stations is, ostensibly at least, a move to 
redress this, presenting instead the worst of Adrian Howells.  He reveals how he 
has been a callous, manipulative, self-obsessed, bitchy, little drama queen, addicted 
to ‘patterns of suffering and self-punishment’.19  The multiple perspectives of the 
stations builds a narrative of ‘Adrian’ that is episodic progressing from childhood, 
through awkward adolescence to young manhood.  The cumulative self is very 
much relational to others.  Throughout the narrative Howells tries to show not only 
                                                 
17
 The embarrassed individual finds that; ‘His role in the current interaction may be 
sacrificed, and even the encounter itself, but he demonstrates that, while he cannot present 
a sustainable and coherent self  on this occasion, he is at least disturbed by the fact and 
may prove worthy at another time.  Goffman Interaction Ritual, p111.   
18
 Performance notes; The 14 Stations of the Life and History of Adrian Howells, BURST 
Festival, Battersea Arts Centre, May 2008 
19
 Ibid.  
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the Adrian he ‘sees’ subjectively from the inside, but tries to reconstruct objectively 
the ‘Adrian’ that has been seen by others, which is precisely the work of 
embarrassment, in which we see the self as if seen by the other. 
 
Whilst Howells seems to suffer no embarrassment over the blatant narcissism he 
displays, it is a central premise of the work that retrospectively at least, Howells 
evidently is embarrassed by some episodes of his narrative, and in some more 
serious cases, he is ashamed of the suffering he has inflicted on others.  There is  
obviously a strong confessional element to the work and Howells works hard to 
show what a nasty piece of work he is.  But ultimately, in spite of his self-
abasement, the Adrian we take our leave of is flawed but human.  Definitely not a 
monster, just a warm, generous boy who loves his mum and has crap taste in men.  
The performance is perhaps an act of atonement; by showing, or perhaps even 
embracing his darkest self, by subjecting himself to the humiliation and punishments 
of the stations there is a promise of redemption.   
 
My journey with Adrian Howells began in the cafe of Battersea Arts Centre during 
the BURST festival.  He took me on a pilgrimage through the bowels of the building, 
taking as our map the Via Dolorosa of the 14 Stations of the Cross which tells the 
story of The Passion, of Christ’s agonies and torments on his journey to the place of 
crucifixion but rewritten as the Life and History of Adrian Howells.  Pretentious?  
Blasphemous? Yes, yes, and intimate, risky, confessional, affirmative, cathartic, and 
strange.   
 
The journey of Adrian’s 14 stations includes stories of his school days, of adultery 
glimpsed on a caravan holiday, of stalking and infatuation, the ecstasies of 
unrequited love, and of the agonies of making a complete and utter fool of himself.  
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We must be more or less the same age and he feels the same bittersweet nostalgia 
for caravan holidays that I do.  At one station I read his letters, it feels like prying.    
At another I stop to look at a rogue’s gallery of all the women in his life.  At other 
stations he dresses up, he strips off, he is punished; trial by ice; death by karaoke.  
He cries; I eat cake.  On the stairs we stop and light a candle for his mum.  Finally 
we end up in bed in a room filled with light, lying like spoons and I feel at peace with 
the world. 
 
                     




I went to see The 14 Stations anticipating embarrassment; it was billed as a work of 
intimacy and risk, both physically and emotionally, and whilst there was intimacy 
and risk, and the risk was reciprocal, and intimacy, unless it is imaginary is always 
already reciprocal, but yet, for this particular audience-person, the embarrassment 
was marginal.  The work is provocative and emotionally complex, but for the most 
part, barely embarrassing.  In spite of this, The 14 Stations is central to this chapter, 
and I offer the following reasons.  Firstly, I am interested in how and why the work 
failed to embarrass; can this ‘failure’ actually be productive in generating knowledge 
about embarrassment?  Secondly, as I have previously argued, the most marginal 
embarrassment, though hard to describe or analyse, particularly in a scholarly 
context can be the most interesting because it is the most unexpectedly revealing.  
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There were some embarrassing bits, but the most marginal embarrassment was the 
sentimentality of the work that affected me after the performance.   
 
           








Embarrassment is a very narcissistic emotion.  It causes us to be the centre of our 
own attention and there is some pleasure in that.  However minor, however fleeting, 
it returns us to our self, but seen from a strange and uncomfortable perspective, 
through the eyes of the other.  And what is seen, the object of its own attention is 
always self.  In The 14 Stations however, there is little room for spectatorial 
narcissism, you might as well check it in like a coat and collect it later.  For the one 
hour duration of the performance, it is all about Adrian; you must give your self up to 
him, his life, his suffering his angst, grief, pain, guilt, piety, shame, lust, and on and 
on, from station to station.  And it is a credit to him that he is able to induce an 
audience to maintain a suspension of self, like a suspension of disbelief, almost 
throughout the performance.  (The moments when a reflexive self-awareness 
returned were the moments of momentary embarrassment and will be discussed 
further).  As Adrian’s audience-person, I found that I was mostly required to put my 
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own self on hold, and I feel sure that this effectively precluded some 
embarrassments.  He was the focus of our attention.  But the spectatorial position 
was not a passive one; during the performance I was required to fulfil a number of 
roles; witness, assistant, confessor, judge, executioner, confidante.  It is in that 
sense a very reciprocal work.  Fulfilling the various roles required of me was also a 
factor in mitigating embarrassment.  To do and to be what is required in any given 
situation is to meet expectations and to affirm the normative, however queer that 
norm might be in other contexts. 
 
In The 14 Stations, because the audience-person attends to Adrian, and is required 
to supress her self for the duration, ‘performing’ a variety of other roles, it is perhaps 
inevitable that in the aftermath there is an emotional return to self.  Vikki Hill 
describes her experience, after the show, in this manner: 
I was crying.  I felt completely overwhelmed and shocked that I could be 
caught off guard by a sudden flood of emotion.  My usual barriers had 
breached and I was doing my best to repair them, with soggy tissues and 
embarrassed laughter.20 
 
In the eventual return to self, there was for me, a wave of nostalgia, not a flood of 
emotion, but a ripple of sweet sentimentality as I reconsidered my history and the 
tensions between queer adolescence and family values played out against a  
backdrop of dressing-up games, those caravan holidays, school bullies and in-
crowds, and most of all, the ordinary and aspirational commodities of the 1970s, 
once valued, long since devalued.  And the sentimentality of personal histories will 
bear further consideration. 
 
A further factor in the preservation of spectatorial composure is the performative 
care that Howells takes of his audience-person which is very much at odds with the 
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callous and manipulative ‘Adrian’ he narrates.  This is a cause of some ambivalence 
which could be said to undermine the integrity of the work, but, actually reinforces 
the multiplicity and sometimes duplicity of the narrative self.  The care taken (of me) 
in the structure and execution of the work was calculated to put me at my ease, and 
as Barthes says, ease is an antonym of embarrassment.21  During his tenure at the 
University of Glasgow as an AHRC creative fellow, all Howells’ work, including this, 
was vetted by an ethics committee.  He comments: 
It has made me even more aware that you have to make work that is 
transparent, and if you are going to lock the door and lie down on a bed with 
people, you have to get their permission.  But it can be a double-edged 
sword.  There have been times when I’ve bent over so far to comply with the 
ethics committee that it has made me overly cautious, and the work hasn’t 
been as challenging as it should be.22 
 
So whilst there is a degree of risk in the work, that risk has been risk-assessed and 
through a duty of care, rendered safe.  For example, at the fourteenth station, where 
I lay on a bed with Adrian; he spooned me, but first he asked if I would mind, and if I 




THE EMBARRASSING BITS 
The bit that was embarrassing?  That was when Adrian cried.  At Station 6; ‘Jordan 
Makes Him Weep’ we went down to the basement where a loop of film was 
projected onto the wall.  I stood facing Adrian able to see both him and the film of a 
boy he used to be in love with who was smiling and beautiful in a cock-sure kind of 
way.  Adrian stood against the wall so that he couldn’t see the film, but he was 
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listening to something on headphones and right away I could see that it was 
upsetting him.  His face began to crumple, his lip trembled, he was sweating.  My 
eyes flickered between the film of the cock-sure, pretty-boy and Adrian’s face, 
blubbering.  I didn’t know where to look.  I took my hands out of my pockets but 
didn’t know what to do with them.  I had been told where to stand, but I didn’t know 
how to stand, or what facial expression I should try to approximate.  Should I, could 
I comfort him?  I felt the most basic form of embarrassment; an ‘aversive self-
consciousness’.  Just for a few moments I felt far too much of me.  
 
Jon Cairns makes the point that what happened at this station was ‘less reciprocal’ 
than other parts of the performance and this is very true.23  While Jordan made him 
weep, I was on my own.  Adrian was not at that moment ‘taking care’ of me.  I could 
not hear what Adrian heard and he could not see what I saw.  We were isolated by 
our senses, or lack.  Where at other stations there was interaction and collaboration, 
here, for me, there was only spectatorial passivity.  My capacities to know and to act 
were restricted.  I just stood and watched him crying, and I felt at a loss.  Nothing 
was explained and no comfort was given. 
 
The other embarrassing moment was similarly less reciprocal.  Having given Adrian 
poison to drink, watched him strip, and poured ice and water over his shivering, 
naked body as he crouched in an inflatable paddling pool, he then led me to a small 
chamber strewn with rubbish and proceeded to sing, or I might say murder, the 
mawkishly sentimental song ‘All By Myself’ played on a small karaoke machine.   
All by myself 
Don't wanna be 
All by myself 
Anymore 
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 Jon Cairns, "Ambivalent Intimacies: Performance and Domestic Photography in the Work 
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All by myself 
Don't wanna live 
Oh 
Don't wanna live 





All by myself 
Don't wanna live 
I never, never, never 
Needed anyone24 
 
It was embarrassing to bear witness to a small, cold, wet, and miserable Howells 
crouched amongst the debris, humbly but doggedly warbling his way through the 
tune.  I wanted it to stop, but I was restricted.  I had to hear him out.  All I could do 




COUNTERPUBLICS & INTIMATE PUBLICS 
Howells’ performance work is strongly autobiographical in content, but includes an 
invitation to reciprocate.  His stories are the catalyst for other stories of other lives.  
His audience is encouraged to trade reminiscence, anecdote, and confession.  His 
stories are the starting point for our unfinished business.  In The 14 Stations, 
Howells talks about his school friends; I think about mine.  He confesses his first 
crush; I remember mine.  He tells me about his mum; I tell him about mine.  The 
process that takes place is that through Howells’ strategy of disclosure, as his 
spectator I feel subject to exposure and what I must show is myself, the innermost 
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private self and all its less-good qualities that are ‘peculiarly mine’.  In The 14 
Stations, when Howells exposes himself to me, and indeed I expose myself to him, 
we are exposed in private.  This may seem like a contradiction in terms, but, I mean 
that we are exposed privately as one self to another.  And additionally we are 
exposed as fellow constituents of a public that the work addresses, and so we are 
also exposed in public.  The nature of the public addressed by Howells’ work is 
subject to interpretation.  It could be read as a generalised ‘general public’, but more 
critically productive is the reading of either a politically engaged counterpublic, or 
alternatively an emotionally engaged ‘intimate public’.   
 
Michael Warner defines a public as a relation among strangers existing ‘by virtue of 
being addressed.’25 A public does not require its members to be physically present 
as for example, an audience, which denotes a real-time co-presence.  The relation 
between the strangers of a public is predicated on each being addressed by the 
same texts, and as contributors to the same, specific, on-going discourse.  A 
counterpublic is a subset of a wider public, distinguished as ‘counter’ by its political 
motivation that takes the form of a challenge to the established norms of the wider 
public and the substitution of its own ‘normative’ values.  Counterpublics, according 
to Warner, are ‘defined by their tension with a larger public’ and are notable for their 
position of criticality towards the hegemony of the larger and dominant public.   
 
Lauren Berlant defines an ‘intimate public’ as one populated by individuals who 
though strangers, share an experience of life that is already shaped by a 
commonality of emotion.  The intimate public she examines in detail is addressed by 
‘women’s culture’ and is notable for the way individual lives are collectively shaped 
by the emotions related to the suffering of the subaltern and the trajectory of 
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romance; anticipation, fulfilment, disappointment, and hope.  The conventions of 
belonging are framed in terms of the desire to belong. 
 Even when people speak out against the terms the intimate public sets out 
 as normative, they are still participating in the promise of belonging that it 
 represents insofar as they are trying to recalibrate whose experience it can 
 absorb so that they can feel included in the mass intimacy that has promised 
 to include them.26  
 
 Berlant’s intimate public is notable for two other elements; firstly, it is a consuming 
public; its members are consumers of commodities and texts that reiterate and so 
reinforce the emotions it is predicated on.  Secondly it is not particularly politically 
motivated.   
 
Berlant uses the term ‘juxtapolitical’ to indicate that though politically aware, an 
intimate public is relatively inert and sees the political sphere as ‘a field of threat, 
chaos, degradation, or retraumatization’ rather than ‘a condition of possibility’.27 
Whilst an intimate public is defined by the particularity of its emotional repertoire, the 
value placed on commodity culture, and political inertia, it is specifically the political 
inertia that differentiates Berlant’s ‘intimate public’ from Michael Warner’s concept of  
a ‘counterpublic’.  The discursive practices of a counterpublic are; ‘understood to 
contravene the rules obtaining in the world at large, being structured by alternative 
dispositions or protocols, making different assumptions about what can be said or 
what goes without saying.’28  In contrast to this, an intimate public plays by the rules.  
Its members look for ways of being within the dominant protocols, and aspire to 
versions of emotional satisfaction that are associated with the pre-existing normalcy, 
and as a result they are driven to constantly accept compromise as a condition of 
belonging.  An intimate public, exists in, or at least in proximity to the political 
dimension, but does not engage, so that although the intimate public may desire 
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change, it is more likely to hope for it than to risk the chaos of taking action to bring 
it about.  According to Berlant, members of an intimate public seek to align their 
individual stories with the dominant ideological plot; the trajectory of romance.  The 
utopia they pursue is not one of differentiation but ‘normativity itself’.29 
 
If Howells’ 14 Stations were to be read as addressing a politically motivated 
counterpublic (a reading entirely devoid of sentimentality) it could be argued that he 
aims to challenge existing ideas of normalcy, specifically, he aims to effect a 
transformation of ossified concepts of inside/outside, private/public, and a re-
valuation of exposure as inherently negative or damaging.  In short the work might 
be read as a challenge to the politics of exposure.  Warner offers the following 
argument. 
  It is often thought, especially by outsiders [of the counterpublic], that the 
 public display of private matters is a debased narcissism, a collapse of 
 decorum, expressivity gone amok, the erosion of any distinction between 
 public and private.  But in a counterpublic setting, such display often has the 
 aim of transformation.  Styles of embodiment are learned and cultivated, and 
 the effects of shame and disgust that surround them can be tested, in some 
 cases revalued.  Visceral private meaning [such as inside/outside] is not 
 easy to alter by oneself, by a free act of will.  It can only be altered through 
 exchanges that go beyond self-expression to the making of a collective 
 scene of disclosure.30  
 
However, whilst this argument is compelling, and I do believe that the overarching 
aim of Howells work is one of transformation, in the specific context of my response 
to The 14 Stations, I believe that my exposure was one of emotional rather than 
political engagement.  It may in fact be that the emotional response of sentimentality 
acts as a blockage to political engagement.  If, as I have conjectured, the ‘Adrian 
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Howells’ of The 14 Stations bears some resemblance to Billy Budd’s Captain Vere, 
who according to Sedgwick, is a sentimentalizing subject and a sentimentalized 
object, it can then be argued that if ‘I’ take it personally, that is enter into a 
relationship with Howells and his history, then ‘I’, the audience-person am also 
sentimentalized/sentimentalizing as the two are reciprocal and interchanging.    
 
Whilst in theory, I might be addressed by The 14 Stations as a member of a 
counterpublic, open to the transformative aims of Howells’ work, that is, to challenge 
innate concepts of inside/outside, private/public, in practice, I found myself relating 
instead to subject matter, as something that mattered to me.  Although I approached 
the work intending to be critically engaged and to observe the opportunities for 
embarrassment that the work offered, in the event, I found instead, and to my 
surprise, that I was emotionally engaged by the sentimentality of ‘narratives and 
things’, by the histories and the romance of a ‘precarious’ life and by the investment 
in the precious and commonplace objects that are place-holders for affective 
experience.  In short, The 14 Stations addressed me as one of Berlant’s intimate 
public, and I responded in terms of recognition and negotiation of terms of belonging 
(reciprocating in the theatrical sentimentalized/sentimentalizing structure of the 
work), and thus I was not challenging but countenancing the innate concepts of 
‘normal’ that frame exposure as embarrassing.   
 
 
THE SENTIMENTALITY OF ONE’S OWN ‘COLLECTED WORKS’  
The salient experience that I recognise in The 14 Stations is the narration of a life 
marked by a pattern of chapters that Berlant would describe as ‘disaffirming 
scenarios of necessity and optimism’.31  The risk Howells invites us to take, is to 
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take it personally; to undertake a critical re-examination of the ‘self’ we narrate in the 
chapters of our own lives.  Hill comments on the tendency of The 14 Stations to,  
‘. . . mobilize the spectator/participants histories’ and produce “unexpected, 
empathetic recollections that directly relate to one’s own experience of 
precariousness”’32  Here Butler’s ‘precariousness’ is used as a marker of 
experience, but we could instead say ‘vulnerability’ or ‘contingency’, an experience 
that is indicative of the relation between private and public and how the inside of self 
is acted upon by the outside of event.  Precariousness or contingency is also 
manifested as a relation to the past; to what has happened.  And future; the promise 
of next time.  There is a sense of on-going narrative and both the past and future of 
this narrative are made possible by the present-ness of the experience, a present-
ness that is repeated in the experience of embarrassment.   
 
There is also a degree of pedagogy inherent in The 14 Stations and its pattern of 
chapters, in which Howells makes of himself and his story an exemplar to be 
followed.  At the second station Howells played at ‘dressing-up’, retrospectively 
attributing a knowing significance to childhood role-play.  I was stirred to reconsider 
the contents of my dressing-up box.  Much of the embarrassment I felt was 
subsequent to the performance when I followed in his footsteps, reflecting on the 
inglorious self of my history, and how this replicates what Sedgwick calls the 
‘narcissism/shame circuit’ in which I gaze back at myself in dismal, rapturous, erotic, 
appalling fascination; drowning in the image.   
 
There is a certain strain of embarrassment that surfaces around nostalgia for the 
self that is quite particular in its dependence on the subject/object construction of 
embarrassment as a momentary objectivity felt by the subject.  Whilst the aging 
                                                 
32
 http://vikkihill.blogspot.com  (accessed 08.12.11)   See also Judith Butler, Precarious Life: 
The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2006). 
207 
 
process might induce nostalgia for the younger body as we recall a smoother, 
firmer, more energetic self, this does not seem to extend to the self as identity or its 
identifications.  We like to think we have improved with age.  The self is not (yet?) 
numbered among the things, like summers that we remember as being better than 
they are today.  The prevailing tendency is to define maturation as teleological, a 
process, or perhaps a project of self-improvement.  So the self of previous chapters 
is necessarily a less preferred version than the current model, but yet, one we can 
be fond about.  The embarrassment of self-nostalgia is of unavoidable immaturity, 
ignorance, and of forgivable lapses of taste; an embarrassing attachment to the 
mores of yesterday; a youthful enthusiasm for things now quite déclassé.   
 
Sedgwick notes a particular instance when Henry James confronts his younger self 
in writing a preface for a new publication of his own much earlier work.  The young 
James is figured as potentially embarrassing or shaming to the older James and 
their relationship figures as a relationship, intersubjective and, according to 
Sedgwick, homoerotic.   
The speaking self of the prefaces does not attempt to merge with the 
potentially shaming or shamed figurations of its younger self, younger 
fictions, younger heroes; its attempt is to love them.  That love is shown to 
occur both in spite of shame and, more remarkably, through it.33 
 
I think the same relation of narcissism/shame can be seen at work between the 
speaking Howells of the 14 Stations and the younger ‘Adrian’ that he narrates. 
Although he tries to show the worst of his younger self, the story is a romance.  
There is a narcissistic fascination with his younger self, a fascination with the image 
and the ‘image-system’ of that self that he offers to share with his audience.  
Towards the end of the story, Adrian pinned a photograph of himself to me; a 
keepsake.  It is an idealised image, selected for its beauty rather than truth.  
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Although he presents (in narrative) a flawed ‘warts and all’ Adrian, he is still asking 
not only to be forgiven, but to be loved.  The older ‘speaking’ Howells asks his 
public to corroborate the love he feels for the embarrassing younger self, love in 
spite of the embarrassment, because of the embarrassment. 
   
 
 
                 Adrian Howells – publicity photo for The 14 Stations 
 
 
The embarrassment that arises in the intersubjective relation between the speaking 
self and its previous self, though particular, is small, because what is exposed is not 
me, but yester-me; I have been perfecting myself since then.  And it is the distance 
between that mitigates embarrassment and makes room for love.  My 
embarrassment enfolds a certain rueful, perhaps amorous pleasure in recollecting a 
previous self; naive, bullish, foolish, and gauche.  A previous self who despite being 
very image-conscious went out dressed in crimplene, corduroy, cheesecloth, stone-
wash denim, plastic and rubber, velveteen and faux-fur.  What did I think I looked 







THE SENTIMENTALITY OF ‘NARRATIVES AND THINGS’ 
An intimate public, according to Berlant, is marked by ‘a certain circularity’ in which 
recognizable patterns emotional experience are replicated in commodities and 
commodified texts which are consumed by those who already recognise (and value) 
the emotional patterns. 
 Its consumer participants are perceived to be marked by a commonly lived 
 history; its narratives and things are deemed expressive of that history while 
 also shaping its conventions of belonging; and, expressing the sensational, 
 embodied experience of living as a certain kind of being in the world.34  
 
The commodification of emotion in ‘narratives and things’ provides a sub-text to The 
14 Stations and is where we might locate the sentimentality of the work.  Howells’ 
history is told in anecdote, in song, in performance, and also through things.  The 
stories told, and indeed the narrative construction of self builds on artefacts.  The 
story is told by photographs, which exist as tangible things rather than merely as 
images of something else, and letters which are similarly things rather than merely 
words.  Keepsakes, mementos and ephemera, artefacts and commodities, along 
with the sentiments they invoke are incorporated as part of the identity of a lived 
past.   
 
The intimate public addressed by Adrian’s ‘narratives and things’ is one to which 
both he and I (apparently) belong.  It is not defined by gender or sexuality, or 
politics, but, as Berlant says, by the terms of belonging, by our own negotiations of 
proximity to a utopic okayness, and materially by a shared experience of, and value 
of, certain cultural commodities that are expressive of our lived histories.  Perhaps 
inevitably, such experiences of histories and commodities expose an undercurrent 
of similitudes and differences by which we mark and locate ourselves as ‘coming 
from’, from a family, a community; a class.  These narratives and things are 
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expressive of habitus and of taste, and in the case of middle-class-ness with a 
pervasive concern for taste and legitimacy.  And within the contexts of the scenarios 
of The 14 Stations they are mostly inside things; intimate and domestic. 
 
Identity and belonging, in this material sense, are expressed by Madame Merle in 
Henry James’s The Portrait of a Lady who says that what we call our ‘self’ includes 
our ‘shell’. 
 By the shell I mean the whole envelope of circumstances.  There’s no such 
 thing as an isolated man or woman; we’re each of us made up of some 
 cluster of appurtenances.  What shall we call our ‘self’?  Where does it 
 begin?  Where does it end?  It overflows into everything that belongs to us – 
 and then flows back again.  I  know a large part of myself is in the clothes I 
 choose to wear.  I’ve a great  respect for things!  One’s self – for other 
 people – is one’s expression of one’s self; and one’s house, one’s furniture, 
 one’s garments, the books one reads, the company one keeps – these 
 things are all expressive.35 
 
 
The things that belong to us, that in this sense are us, besides being objects, are 
our facticity, our history, our future and our very way of being.  In The 14 Stations, 
Howells tells his story by showing us his things.  He offers his audience glimpses of 
that ‘shell’ and asks us to form an attachment; to remember him.  For an intimate 
public, attachment to these narratives and things (already) carries the emotional 
weight of experience, and is markedly sentimental. 
 
As I tried to re-view my catastrophes, to imagine my own Stations of the Cross, I 
was continually side-tracked by moments of reverie, by ‘narratives and things’, by 
old fashions, the caravan curtains, by a repertoire of sea-side holidays, school 
photographs, family get-togethers, eavesdropping on adult conversations, casual 
lies, boredom, and a longing for something to happen, even if it was something bad.  
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The more I indulge in this nostalgia the more my criticality is eroded by keepsakes, 
mementos and ephemera that invoke a lived history rich in banality and domesticity; 
Berlant might say ‘ordinariness’.  From a psychoanalytic perspective, the banality of  
memory is significant.  Seminal event memories of childhood are subconsciously 
omitted from our self-stories but are represented by ‘the inessential elements’ that 
texture and authenticate the narrative.  According to Adam Phillips, ‘the banal is a 
cover story’ and so is one of our ordinary strategies for concealing what Howells 
performatively flaunts.36 
 
A number of minor objects from Howells’ 14 Stations slyly suggest I might read 
them as kitsch and thus take refuge in an ironic distance from the embarrassment of 
sentimentality; these objects include fairy lights, a portable television, the inflatable 
paddling pool, the Celine Dion song, and the childhood trash-sweet delight of ‘flying 
saucers’ that Adrian offered me at Station 15: The Resurrection.  But to imbue these 
objects with kitsch-ness would be a betrayal of my own ordinary history where my 
less-good self was less-than-good against a background of woodchip wallpaper.  To 
render kitsch the memorabilia of my history would be to deny the sometimes-sweet 
sentiments I feel for things of the past.  To render these things kitsch would be to 
reject a touching proximity and adopt instead the distance of irony.   
 
Another artist who ‘values’ embarrassment is Gary Hume, who says; ‘When I gave 
irony up, I took on embarrassment.  And I preferred embarrassment.  I thought I 
could hide, and I didn’t want to hide.37  Irony as a strategy for creating or 
maintaining distance functions as a prophylactic against the embarrassment of 
exposure.  It is a way of hiding le privé.  Irony conceals.  Embarrassment exposes.  
So, to render these ‘things’ kitsch with a left-wing irony would be a tactic to ward off 
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the embarrassment of ‘traces of bourgeois ideology confessed by the subject’, the 
greatest of which is sentimentality.   
 
In his essay, ‘In Defense of Sentimentality’, Solomon writes of contemporary 
antipathy towards sentiment: 
To be called ‘sentimental’ is to be ridiculed, or simply to be dismissed.  
Sentimentality is a weakness, a personality flaw.  It suggests hypocrisy, or at 
any rate, an exaggerated, distorted sensibility.  Or perhaps it is the fact that 
sentimental people are so . . . embarrassing.38  
 
Solomon identifies four counts on which sentimentality is reviled; sentimentality 
suggests weakness, it is excessive, it is self-indulgent and it appears to be 
somehow false, and these form the basis of a left-wing ideology’s aversion to 
sentimentality as embarrassing.39  In fact, these charges also apply to 
embarrassment, which can also be disparaged as weak, excessive, self-indulgent, 
but not false; if Gilbert & George are right, embarrassment is ‘true’.   
 
Howells’ 14 Stations addresses me as one of Berlant’s ‘intimate public’ and my 
belonging is in itself a source of embarrassment; I didn’t want to belong, or to admit 
belonging.  But Adrian’s confessions are the spur to mine; and I am called on to 
admit that my attachment to the ‘narratives and things’ of my history, is in fact, the 
very bones of my self-image.  And so I must own the embarrassment of being 
sentimental, I must own it as ‘true’. 
 
Whilst it is easy to see how a hard-nosed, intellectually adventurous, radical left 
would want to distance itself from the fault of sentimentality, Solomon’s opinion is 
that a left-facing ideology is fundamentally uncomfortable with sentimentality, not 
only for its faults but also for its sweetness.  Sentimentality, as the capacity to be 
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moved by the ‘tender emotions’, is the sign of our soft underbelly.  It is the bane and 
downfall of our composed and critical, left-facing self.  Sentiment is something that 
must be held in check, vigorously repressed and denied if we are to avoid the 
embarrassing charges of weakness, excess, and self-indulgence.  And it is the fault 
of sentimentality that Howells most embarrassingly exposes in The 14 Stations 
(both his own and the reciprocal sentimentality of his audience person).  But to 
disown this sentimentality would be a denial of the power ascribed by an intimate 
public, ascribed by Madame Merle, to ‘things’; that is, the power to define the ‘self’.  
To disown this sentimentality would be also to deny the love that the self, as the 




SENTMENTALITY AS UNFINISHED BUSINESS 
The minor but most interesting embarrassment of The 14 Stations is then, way the 
fragile self is exposed by sentimentality, and particularly by ‘the unfinished business 
of sentimentality’.  Berlant defines this as an impulse that; ‘keeps people attached to 
disaffirming scenarios of necessity and optimism in their personal and political 
lives.’40  This is manifested as both an attachment to the past and faith in the future, 
and also a tendency towards repetition, restaging previous scenarios and repeating 
(embarrassing) mistakes.   In some sense, the reiteration and blind optimism of 
sentimentality as unfinished business is an inability to let go; and so it can be 
understood as a kind of proximity, a kind of ‘touching’.  As unfinished business, 
sentimentality is the comfort that however unsatisfactory today has been, there is 
always the promise of a next time; that, ‘tomorrow is another day in which fantasies 
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of the good life can be lived’.41  And ‘we’ of the intimate public believe that it is 
possible to live a ‘happily ever after’ life in a world where emotion is valued as 
intelligence.   
 
Sentimentality in this sense, as unfinished business tends to romanticise both past 
and future whilst accepting the lack of control of the contingency of the present, 
where ‘shit happens’.  There is a parallel here with embarrassment which also has a 
time-line of a hapless present but leavened by the promise of a next time, the 
potential to acquit oneself better tomorrow, (if only . . . ).  Phillips advises that the 
promise of a better tomorrow requires the following: 
Firstly, an object of desire, an ideal, a state of the world or of oneself 
sufficiently separate from oneself to aspire to.  So one needs to have 
perceived a lack, of sorts, in oneself.  Secondly, one needs a belief in Time 
as a promising medium to do things in; one needs to be able to suffer the 
pains and pleasures of anticipation and deferral.42 
 
Of the self as contingent, susceptible to the sometimes-cruel vagaries of the 
present, Phillips says that we experience all emotions as ‘new at every moment’, 
each feeling is experienced as unprecedented and singular, and so the emotions 
that we have felt in the past will always be insufficient preparation for the immediate 
present.  The only knowledge we can gain from past emotion is ‘weak’, that is 
limited in its domain, or according to Phillips, is ‘redundant and ironic.’43  And this is 
perhaps why an intimate public is trapped in cycles of ‘disaffirming scenarios’, and 
for example why Howells feels he is addicted to ‘patterns of suffering and self-
punishment’. There may be, as the intimate public hopes, ‘an intelligence in what we 
feel,’ but sentimentality is evidently a poor preparation for next time.44 
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In his famously radical essay ‘Is The Rectum a Grave?’ Leo Bersani makes an 
unguarded admission of embarrassment.  Writing about Michel Foucault’s work, he 
comments that ‘in spite of his radical intentions’ Foucault’s theories are ultimately 
tame (and that is to say, normative, ordinary, and in proximity to okayness).  Bersani 
recounts that when Foucault was interviewed for Salmagundi, he said he would not 
use the interview as a platform ‘to traffic in opinions’, but then goes on to do exactly 
that, declaring that, ‘for a homosexual, the best moment of love is likely to be when 
the lover leaves in the taxi’.45   
 
Bersani admits that he finds Foucault’s pronouncement ‘somewhat embarrassing’.  
He is troubled by the declaration that the homosexual imagination is captured by the 
sentimental and backward view.  He is embarrassed by the inclusivity of the claim to 
be captivated by nostalgia for the sexual act in preference to a physical engagement 
in the present tense.  As Bersani puts it, this sentimental re-view diverts the focus.  
[It] turns our attention away from the body - from the acts in which it 
engages, from the pain it inflicts and begs for – and directs our attention to 
the romances of memory and the idealizations of the presexual, the courting 
imagination.46  
 
Bersani’s embarrassment is small, and he marginalises it, saying he is somewhat 
embarrassed.  He is embarrassed, that Foucault should arbitrarily attribute to all 
homosexuals a nostalgic and overly sentimental attachment to love rather than to its 
embodied physicality.  This is without doubt an embarrassment of a left-facing 
ideology.  It is difficult to imagine Bersani finding any aspect of sex or sexuality 
embarrassing, so I was intrigued to stumble upon this embarrassment, perhaps 
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particularly because I don’t share it.  I actually think Foucault is right, but my 
reasons for valuing that particular moment (with or without a taxi) are different.47   
 
The lover leaving in a taxi is not, of course, the end of his story, or the end of the 
story of the one he leaves.  In the sentimental re-view that Bersani dismisses as ‘the 
romance of memory’, there is, paradoxically, a future orientation in the promise of a 
next time, which is to say that the sentimentality is manifested as ‘unfinished 
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 For me, it is a blissful moment of re-establishing singularity after a brief excursion into 




Chapter Five:    
Singled Out: On being interpellated by indecency and 




 . . . every ideology has its apostates; even sacred cows find their butchers.   







One of the ideas mooted in the previous chapter is that members of an intimate 
public are in pursuit of a utopia of normativity to which ‘we’ might belong, and that 
we cleave to the promissory normal and the intimacy it proffers.  Central to this is a 
romantic trajectory of hope, impediment, and teleological fulfilment that Lauren 
Berlant calls ‘love’s plot’.  The ultimate goal, the rainbow we chase is the ‘happy 
ever after’, and to achieve this we must find love, or perhaps more accurately, we 
must be found by love; we must love and be loved in return.  The cultural dogma of 
life as subject to love’s plot, as a progress towards a better self, one that becomes 
loved, or at least coupled is extensively critiqued by Berlant: 
The narrative of women’s culture thus shows us something about the operation 
of mass-mediated identity – that is, how it manages to sublimate singularity on 
behalf of maintaining proximity to a vague prospect of social belonging via the 
generic or conventional plot that isolates an identity as the desired relay from 
weakness to strength, aloneness to sociability, abandonment to recognition, and 
solitary agency to reciprocity.2  
 
What is particularly striking in this passage is Berlant’s identification of identity as a 
form of progress; a ‘desired relay’ moving from outside, in towards the social 
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belonging that will confirm approval on us as persons.  And this progress of social 
inclusion is at the expense of our singularity.  Such is the desire for inclusion in this 
utopia that the compromises made in our attempt to fit can amount to nothing short 
of ‘self amputation’.3  But what if an individual can’t or won’t make the cut?  What if 
they still fail to meet the criteria for inclusion?  What if they are left out?  What if 
once in they wanted out?  What if they didn’t ask to be included in the first place?   
 
This chapter explores the embarrassment of being single, of being singled out and 
the possibilities of singularity.  It explores the difficulties of being a singleton against 
a prevailing wind of coupledom; and of being hailed by ideology; the ideology of an 
intimate public.  The embarrassment felt, is of course, an unwelcome exposure and 
an unfavourable evaluation that draws attention to the self as a stranger; one who 
fails to fit.  Finally, this chapter addresses the challenge of singularity and how this 
relates to the embarrassment of being single and of being singled out but is also a 
mode of feeling.  Embarrassment is proposed as a feeling that ensingles us, almost 
like love.   
 
The starting point for an exploration of the embarrassment of singleness revisits the 
work of Gilbert & George, focusing on one particular piece; Sodom, from the series 
‘The Testamental Pictures’ of 1997.  In the mid-nineties there was a change evident 
in their work.  Breaking temporarily with the usual mass observation project that 
chronicles their urban cosmos, the focus turned inwards and Gilbert and George 
subjected themselves, their bodies and their bodily fluids to an unflinching scrutiny.4  
Whilst I am normally wary of a certain insincerity, or lack of integrity in their work (it  
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could after all be an elaborate hoax) the introspection of some works from this 
period seems genuine, and I am genuinely moved.  These works seem to speak of 
something ‘true’.   
 
Gilbert & George have said of their output from this period that they were the most 
complex works they had so far produced and that romantically, psychologically, and 
sexually they found them disturbing:  
To take those things from inside ourselves - those thoughts and feelings - 
and to put them into the pictures, that is at the very least exhausting and at 
worst slightly damaging, I’m sure.  Yes, to tear something very truthful from 
our whole life so far – all the thoughts and feelings that we ever had or might 
have – and get that out into the pictures to the viewer.  It is a very struggling 
difficult thing.5 
 
Some of these works are, for the spectator also, a very struggling difficult thing.  
Because they are so personal, they seem to challenge the spectator; they ask me to 
take it personally.  Some of the works talk dirty.  Their subject matters are matters 
that matter, and matter out of place.  They are ‘about’ filth in its vaguest and most 
double entendre sense, at which Gilbert & George excel, testing spectatorial 
embarrassability, walking the line between rudeness and respectability.  The subject 
matter of the works from this period is confrontational; nakedness, flying turds, 
bodily fluids, ‘deviant’ sexualities and religious fundamentalism.  But something 






                                                 
5




Sodom is a large photopiece in fifteen panels; it is over three meters long and two 
meters high; it dominates the wall and dwarfs the spectator.  The first thing that 
strikes me about Sodom is that it is a deposition.6  Central to the work is an image of 
Gilbert supporting George’s dead weight.  I am captivated by the tenderness and 
respectfulness between the two central figures, reinforced by the iconography of 
deposition, a serious act of respect.  Traditionally the dead body of Christ is brought 
down from the cross by Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimethea.  George has Gilbert 
to perform this devotional act.  The ‘dead weight’ of George gives weight to the 
image.  Death is no light matter and the care of the dead is a duty of care requiring 
intimacy and detachment; a case of being two selves at once; two good selves with 
no scope for a narcissistic embarrassment.  On the subject of the death of lovers 
Barthes writes; ‘We die together from loving each other: an open death, by dilution 
into the ether, a closed death of the shared grave.’7  But George is not dead and the 
image besides being a deposition is also one of tenderness between two lovers.  It 
is a tenderness that appears private, as private as death might be.  This is 
something I find hard to see; I feel I am intruding.  And George looks at me; he looks 
straight at me and I know that I have been caught looking. 
 
The central figures of Gilbert and George are flanked on either side by text from The 
Poor Man’s Catechism, ‘Of The Sin Of Sodom’.   
What is the sin of Sodom?  It is a carnal sin against nature; or lust with an 
undue sex or kind.  This is another sin that cries to Heaven for vengeance,     
[. . . ]  The cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is multiplied, and their sin is 
aggravated exceedingly.  [ . . . ]  Oh divine vengeance on the sin of Sodom!  
Fire and Brimstone!  [ . . . ]   and now we must avoid its consequences, but 
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by following, with Lot, the advice of the angels, not to look back, viz., on the 
fascinating pleasures of the world . . .8  
 
 




Do not look back.  Do not look.  Do not.  I feel as if my looking were in some way 
proscribed, I am breaking some commandment.  If I look long enough, on this 
fascinating, dreadful pleasure, will I turn into a pillar of salt?  Below the deposition, in  
the central section is the familiar rear-view; the pseudo-provocative Gilbert & 
George bum holes.9  If they were meant to shock, they don’t; they are totally 
upstaged by the intimacy above.  Apart from the lurid, tabloid red of the title, the only 
                                                 
8
 From The Poor Man’s Catechism as reproduced on Sodom 
9
 I might be taken to task over the term ‘bum holes’ which glosses over the image and fails 
to provide anatomical specificity, carelessly confusing arse cheeks with anuses.  However, 
this section of Sodom forms part of a series of rear-end images that recur throughout ‘The 
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colour of Sodom is the tinted flesh of the naked bodies.  The hue is a little too pink, 
like pornography.  The colouring of the bodies is a little too consistent, like a 
whitewash but in reverse, a fleshwash which un-cleanses and draws attention to the 
frailties of the flesh, the sins of the flesh.  Gilbert’s arms around George press into 
the flesh of George’s chest as he takes the weight.  The points of contact are firm 
and effective. The embrace connotes solidity and reality.  George is wearing his 
glasses, both wear wristwatches.  These small details are the sous rature erasing 
the faint possibility that this image could be read ‘safely’ within the trope of the nude, 
or arthistorical tradition of religious paintings.  The dangerous details ensure that I 
am denied any such comfort; these bodies are secular, contemporary, and naked. 
 
Looking at this work, the embarrassment I feel is not immediate but it ambushes me.   
According to Barthes, the punctum is an attribute belonging only to photographs, but 
I believe that this artwork, which is a mediated photograph (a ‘photopiece’), contains 
a splinter of a past-present and a future-past, but is also something that I, as 
spectator bring to it, and it attracts and distresses in unequal measure, and it 
bruises me; in short, there is a punctum.  Any other image of Gilbert in close 
proximity to George would not have the same effect.  Another image might be 
tender or sentimental, its ordinary studium might be the coupledom of Gilbert and 
George, but the bruising of the punctum is specific to this image and to my 
spectatorship of this image.   
 
The punctum is unspeakable, but arguably, to pinpoint what we find spectatorially 
disturbing is difficult, a very struggling difficult thing, but perhaps only unspeakable 
insofar as there a blockage; an embaras, the blockage of embarrassment.  It is 
embarrassing to speak of because it entails disclosing something of our own image-
repertoire, our secret identifications; we ‘give our self away’.  The punctum has no 
respect for taste, morals or decorum, and to say exactly what it is about a seemingly 
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insignificant detail of the image that touches in such a hurtful way compounds the 
hurt.  If I admit what it is about this image that gets under my skin, am I saying too 
much?  Am I declaring a taste or a perversion?10  I am torn between looking and 
looking away, but if I am bold enough or perverse enough to court exposure, I can 
know and say what pricks and bruises.  To overcome the blockage, is to admit that 
the cause of my embarrassment is not (only) that Sodom is confrontational or 
transgressive, but that it evokes tenderness; it is an image of remarkable intimacy 
between two aging queers, and how, on many levels, that intimacy excludes me.    
 
The spectatorial embarrassment of the Gilbert & George exhibition that was the 
subject of Chapter One brought to mind Cleland’s Fanny Hill, a woman in pursuit of 
pleasure, a good witness, worldly-wise and yet still shockable.  Like Fanny, spying 
on the two young sparks in the adjoining room at an inn, my spectatorial position is 
one of exclusion.  I am excluded from the coupledom of Gilbert & George in every 
possible way, but driven to look by an insatiable and prurient curiosity.  And I am 
‘without’; without intimacy.  My exclusion from their intimacy marks me as female, as 
heterosexual, and also as obstinately single.  This ‘marking’ is a kind of outing, a 
putting of the self on the outside, in the same way that a blush advertises 
embarrassment, puts it right out there on the face.  Looking at Sodom, I feel at first 
like a tourist, detached, unaccountable, snooping about the homoeroticism and 
homophobia of their work; like Fanny, I am driven by curiosity.  Fanny was not 
exactly censorious of the pleasures of sodomy, but of that pleasure having been 
quite literally, misplaced as is evident in her account of an encounter with an eager 
seaman.  
He leads me to a table, and with a master-hand, lays my head down on the 
edge of it, and with the other canting up my petticoat and shift, bared my 
naked posteriors to his blind and furious guide.  It forces its way between  
                                                 
10
 ‘I am less exposed in declaring a perversion than in uttering a taste:’ Barthes, Roland 
Barthes, pp82,83. 
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them, and I feeling pretty sensibly that it was not going by the right door and 
knocking desperately at the wrong one, I told him of it: ‘Pooh,’ says he, ‘my 
dear, any port in a storm.11 
 
And like Fanny, my position is precarious.  The vicarious pleasure I take is one of 
both recognition and misrecognition.   
 
The embarrassment that Sodom causes me is one of exposure; I am caught looking 
at something that I presume excludes me, I am ‘without’.  But as I look, I am drawn 
in.  I begin with some comfortable distance from the sodomitical scene; it is not, I 
think, ‘about me’ but, as I look, I find myself thoroughly implicated.  Sodom, as I will 
discuss, interpellates me as a subject, it hails me, and my response is personal and 
quite literally embodied; a gut reaction.  And to acknowledge what disturbs me is to 
admit my embarrassability, to show where I am vulnerable.  Looking at Sodom I 
suffer a right-facing embarrassment of the exposure of sexuality, and a left-facing 
embarrassment of the coupledom of the image.  I feel caught, trapped between two 
embarrassments, neither of which do me any credit.  They say far too much about 
me.  My doxa is showing like a petticoat. 
 
Sexual ‘deviation’ and its sociocultural condemnation, signalled by the title and the 
fragments of the catechism functions, I would say, as the studium of the image; that 
is, as its obvious denoted content and it unsettles my ‘bourgeois’ self, whilst my 
more ‘radical’ self is embarrassed by the intimacy which is the punctum of the 
image.  For me, the bruise of the image is an excess that goes beyond the intended 
meaning of the work, and it is the tenderness evident between Gilbert and George.  
This tenderness, this intimacy has a quality of sweet-slime, cloying and visceral.  
This is my very struggling difficult thing.  It is embarrassing to speak of as if it were 
sexual, as if I was admitting to a taste for necrophilia, coprophilia, or incest.  The 
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 Cleland, p178. 
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words sit in my mouth like a stone, like a piece of human flesh.  It is experienced 
bodily like a touch or a taste, the salty/metallic taste of body fluids.  It is too close, 
too private, and with all the perverse pleasure of the rank smell of a lover’s armpit.   
As a spectator, this work is for me difficult in precisely this respect; it is too near the 
knuckle.  And as always with Gilbert & George it raises doubts.  As discussed in 
Chapter One, there is a pervasive ambiguity about their merit and integrity as artists, 
about their status as a gay couple, about the viability of their claim to be a living 
sculpture, having no life at all outside art.  Are they sincere?  Is the whole thing a 
conceptual scam, or sham?  These doubts destabilise my response to the work.  
David Sylvester commented, ‘There is something deeply equivocal about what is 
expected of us.’12  And this is so.  I equivocate.  Are they just leading me on, letting 
me make a fool of myself?  I question not only, should I be seeing intimacy?  But 
also, should I be seeing intimacy when this was meant to be just straightforward 





And what is to be said about the studium of the image?  The ordinarily, explicit 
meaning.  What can be said about the embarrassments of a reference to ‘deviant’ 
sexuality, or perhaps more specifically, religious ideology’s strict condemnation of 
so-called deviance?  Here too there is an unspeakableness in the form of a doubt 
about what may be safely said without complicity.  Sodom, in the terms discussed 
by Adam Philips, is excessive, and as such it excites spectatorial disapprobation. 
the thrill of righteous indignation, the moral superiority of our disgust – is 
more complex and more interesting than it at first seems.  If other people’s 
excesses reveal the bigot in us, they also reveal how intriguing and subtle 
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 Sylvester, p316. 
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the bigot is.  There is nothing more telling, nothing more revealing of one’s 
own character and history and taste, than one’s reaction to other people’s 
excesses.  Tell me which kinds of excess fascinate you, tell me which kinds 
of excess appal you, and I will tell you who you are.13 
 
The sodomitical is evoked as occupying a territory of imaginable jeopardy and 
excessive, fascinating pleasures.  It may be unspeakable, but its susceptibility to 
unruly imagination is the source of its danger and contamination.  Sodom is an 
imaginary place of excess and of violence; of violent desires and violent 
satisfactions.   
 
Michel Foucault famously asserts that the term ‘sodomy’ labels an ‘utterly confused 
category’.14  And that confusion extends to the spectatorial response to Sodom and 
to what is said or sayable about it.  Sodomy, writes Lee Edelman; ‘has come to be 
construed, that is, as a behaviour marked by a transgressive force reproduced, not 
merely designated by naming or discussing it.’15  It is in that sense a very ‘sticky’ 
term, and Gilbert & George harness that stickiness to entrap the spectator, 
thoroughly implicating them in the transgression of the work, which is then 
reproduced rather than merely and passively looked at.  Sodom invites a look that 
feels transgressive.  The stickiness is responsible for what Edelman identifies as the 
impossibility of ever viewing the sodomitical scene from a position that allows 
spectatorial distance, and thus avoids contamination. 
 
The sometimes-implied, narrowest definition of sodomy might be penetrative anal 
sex between men.  This is the definition the Poor Man’s Catechism takes, and the 
Gilbert & George arseholes might also be read as a gesture towards this definition, 
or a comment on it.  With all the curiosity and disobedience of Lot’s wife, I am drawn  
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 Adam Phillips, On Balance (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2010). pp7,8. 
14
 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality 1 (London: Penguin 
Books, 1976). 
15
 Edelman, Homographesis, p175. 
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to the image.  As a woman, I might by some narrow reasoning feel my looking is 
from a safe spectatorial distance.  I might feel insulated by Fanny’s ‘without-ness’.  
This is not, after all, about me.  But sodomy is frequently taken as metonymically  
standing for homosexuality, and that is meant as male homosexuality.  And that in 
turn is implied to be a passive and abject ‘bottom’.  And thus, by a circuitous route I 
have in mind the unmanly, and that does apply to me.  So perhaps it is as much 
about me as about anyone, it is about abjection, no, it is about the desire for the 
abjection of being absolutely fucked.  Leo Bersani refers to such desire as ‘an 
unquenchable appetite for destruction’.16  And just by looking, fascinated or appalled 
by this excess, I give myself away.   
 
A narrow definition of sodomy is however, culturally and affectively totally 
inadequate.  It fails to account for the conflation of perversion and pleasure, and its 
political bent.  Sodomy stands as a deliberate subversion of the hegemonic, the 
potential to invert values, the breaching of boundaries; social, legal, and moral, and 
the confusion of public and private spaces.17  It is, quite simply, ‘not normal’.  It is a 
deliberate and perverse refusal of ‘normal’ as a proscriptive and coercive limitation.  
The category of the sodomitical is in fact, essential to the hygienic maintenance of 
sociocultural norms which depend on the continued potency of the sodomitical as 
the exemplary, perverse ‘other’ against which normalcy can comfortably define and 
defend itself.  Goldberg comments on; ‘the productive role that sodomy has played 
and can play as a site of pleasures that are also refusals of normative categories.’18  
And Klossowski makes a similar point; as a gesture, he writes, sodomy is inherently 
political, it is construed as; ‘a specific gesture of countergenerality . . . which strikes 
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 Bersani, ‘Is The Rectum a Grave?’ in Goldberg, p251. 
17
 Edelman: ‘Confounding the distinction between coming in and going out, between 
compulsion and expulsion, between the public and the private, and thereby transgressing 
definitional boundaries that underwrite social identities, sodomy figures in the political 
imaginary precisely as a public and not a private concern’  Homographesis, p132.   
18
 Goldberg, p1. 
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precisely at the law of the propagation of the species.’19  Sodomy is for Klossowski, 
an ‘intrinsic perversion’ that perverts the laws of family and state; laws ensuring the 
survival of the species and the patriarchal laws of property and inheritance.  In these 
terms, the sodomitical is an inherently political category and as such, somewhat of 
an anathema to Berlant’s intimate public, who would avoid the trauma of political 
action, and are at best, ‘juxtapolitical’.20 
 
But this interpretation of the explicit meaning of the work as sexual and political is 
still inadequate.  Sodom is not just an embarrassment to a right-facing doxa, an 
embarrassment of the exposure of sexuality and so-called ‘deviance’, nor a 
hoarding-sized advertisement for the potentials of sodomy as a counter-normative 
trope.  Sodom manages to embarrass both a bourgeois and a radical self.  It gets us 
coming and going.  Addressing a left-ish, gallery-going public, the stickiness of 
Sodom cannot be just about sodomy as kinky sex.  Its studium is also a comment on 
religious ideology’s narrow and prescriptive morality as handed down in The Poor 
Man’s Catechism.  It is about prejudice and the circumscription of liberties and 
specifically that we cannot, or do not speak in defence of those liberties.  According 
to Gilbert; ‘Everything hinges on the question of liberties.  Those we are entitled to 
and those we are not.’21  The crux of the studium of Sodom might be seen then as a 
shift between the literal reading of biblical condemnation and the wider social 
significance it implies.  So Sodom is about homosexuality, yes, and sodomy, yes, 
and it is about bigotry, and intolerance.  And it is about how embarrassing it is to 
belong to a society, which still curtails liberties and authorises one ‘straight 
arsefucker’ to pass judgment on another.22  Sodom, potentially explores the feelings 
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 Pierre Klossowski, "The Philosopher Villain," in Reclaiming Sodom, ed. Jonathan 
Goldberg(New York: Routledge, 1995). p223. 
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 Berlant, The female Complaint, pp10,11. 
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 Jonquet, p155. 
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 Derek Jarman wrote somewhat prosaically in his autobiography; ‘Sodomy is straight.  
Sarah [Graham] says forty percent of women have practiced anal sex; statistically there are 
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we might have about being ‘normal’, about belonging, or not belonging to the utopia 
of normativity.  And so besides all the ‘struggling difficult things’ that entrap the 
spectator, making it personal, Sodom, more broadly is about the systemic and 




PUNCTUM    
It is odd, perhaps, or perhaps not, that such a confrontational work ostensibly about 
sexual ‘deviance’ should be so much ‘about’ tenderness.  George said: 
Someone was saying to us recently that, in art criticism, no one talks about the 
tenderness in our work.  And I think that’s true.  They never speak about 
gentleness, delicacy.  They all think our art is aggressive, yet some of our works 
are gentle and extremely sentimental.23 
 
The punctum of Sodom, which I am trying both to avoid and to articulate, because it 
is embarrassing is in the firmness of the touch, the grasp of flesh upon flesh, 
Gilbert’s arms around George, and in naming this I must ‘give myself up’.  In Sodom, 
I find the tenderness, the sentiment more embarrassing than the reference to so-
called deviant sexuality.  The tenderness in Sodom, evident in the relation between 
the two figures, proved to be ‘true’ in the solidification of that clasp is expressive of a 
remarkable intimacy.   
 
There is something embarrassingly indecent about intimacy.  It is a breach of 
boundaries between one self and another.  And the embarrassment it causes is 
twofold; one folded within the other.  One strand is sexual, the other is social.  They  
                                                                                                                                          
more straight arsefuckers than queers.  Kinky sodomy as subversion, it transgresses all 
notions of Judeo-Christian family values; pleasure without responsibility.’  Derek Jarman, 
Smiling in Slow Motion (London: Vintage, 2001). p169. 
23
 Jonquet, p343. 
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are not equal, but equally subject to the ideology of love’s plot.  It is difficult to 
separate them because the social legitimacy of coupledom authorises the sexual, 
sheltering it and creating a private space for it, even in public.  The fact that the 
image I am staring at is of a couple of (probably) gay men admittedly complicates 
matters, but, does not entirely deny them the public privacy to be legitimately 
intimate, though it makes them a curiosity.24  What it also does of course, is to 
underscore the really legitimate legitimacy of the ‘normal’ heterocouple. 
 
I am bruised by Gilbert’s arms around George.  Bruised by the intimate physicality of 
their touch.  Bruised by the breach of boundaries.  Bruised by the indecency of their 
touch.  Ricks crystallises the sexual strand of the embarrassment of intimacy:   
It is hard, when contemplating the loving physicality of others, to let the 
inevitable sense of a possibility of the distasteful be accommodated within a 
full magnanimity.  The ambivalence of such physicality (ambivalent within 
oneself, and ambivalent because others are not oneself) involves a 
recognition of the need for such generosity.25   
 
To acknowledge what I witness and how I feel about it does indeed require ‘such 
generosity’ for it puts me in a compromising position.  It requires me to tolerate the 
‘possibility of the distasteful’ of the physical display of intimacy, and yet I cannot just 
turn away from it; I am required to respond to the image by acknowledging my 
exclusion from it.   
 
I am bruised by Gilbert’s arms around George.  He supports him; he will not let him 
drop.  The trust between them is palpable; Gilbert looks up and away into an infinite 
and amorous coupledom.  They are joined by their touch, and their joining is 
legitimated.  The ampersand is a sign that within their coupledom they are safe, 
accepted and acceptable.  The rupture of this work, for me at least, is the accidental 
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 Gilbert and George have always spoken in favour of a multiple sexuality that requires no 
divisions.  They have declared themselves to be ‘post-gay’. Bourner.   
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 Ricks, p93. 
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glimpse of tenderness between two middle-aged persons who have each other, who 
each have his ‘other’.  And I cannot just turn away from this either; I am required to 
respond to the image by acknowledging my exclusion from it.  I am required to admit 
that I am without intimacy, without the intimacy of coupledom.  And here, within the 
fold of coupledom, the embarrassment that was about a physical intimacy becomes 
social, and public; it is about belonging and not belonging, safety and exposure.   
 
The intimacy publicly expressed here, large on the gallery wall, points out that 
however satisfied I may privately be with my choices in life, with the way things 
turned out, there are times when being single, being one rather than half of two, is to 
be disadvantaged; practically, socially, and perhaps emotionally, and furthermore, 
and most importantly it is publicly perceived as disadvantaged.  I am embarrassed 





The singleton is peripheral, side-lined, a wall-flower, not dancing, but yet hyper-
visible, subject to comment, speculation, ridicule, or worst of all, encouragement.  I 
don’t want to hear that there is someone special for everyone, plenty of pebbles on 
the beach, or fish in the sea.  I am not looking for Mr Right, or Mr Good-Enough or 
even Mr Goodbar.26  But a single person’s single status seems to be public property; 
it is a problem to be solved.  I am a cliché, and until I grow old enough to be 
considered ‘past it’ I am assumed to be in need of an ‘other half’.  And so the most 
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 Mr Good-Enough is something like the vernacular, i.e. non-clinical understanding of 
Winnicott’s ‘good-enough mother’.  He is the husband who is not perfect but he is the one on 
offer and the one with whom we could have a good marriage if we are prepared to work at it. 
And he is real; he actually exists in contrast to Mr Right who is a figment of our imagination, 
and so he is the better of the two.  See Lori Gottlieb Mr Good Enough: The case for 
choosing a Real Man over holding out for Mr Perfect (2010) 
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embarrassing thing about being single is the (perhaps paranoid) knowledge that 
other people think, believe, assume, know that I feel incomplete.  They pity me. 
 
The point raised by a number of writers, including Berlant, Cobb, and Kipnis, is that 
such pity is founded upon a cultural assumption that a single life is no life at all, that 
we should ‘get a life’.  There is an assumption that without love we are incomplete, 
and lonely, lacking, desperate, failed, and sad.   It is unthinkable that a single life 
should be a matter of preference.  According to Laura Kipnis; ‘Saying “no” to love 
isn’t just heresy, it’s tragedy: for our sort the failure to achieve what is most 
essentially human.  And not just tragic, but abnormal.’27  To choose to be single, to 
refuse to subscribe to the intimacy of coupledom is associated with a jack-the-lad 
freedom that we are supposed to grow out of, not in to.  Freedom should be 
replaced by respectability, and pleasure by responsibility.  These moves constitute 
proof of maturity and of worth to our community.  They guarantee that we observe 
the rules, that we are useful and safe.   
 
And the expectation that we will be useful and safe seems to apply particularly to 
women.28  Women have no business being jack-the-lad.  Denise Riley explores the 
censure of the single female in her essay, ‘The Right to be Lonely’.   
Such common solitariness may be willed and decidedly preferred by its 
bearer, or it may be barely tolerated, enforced: yet a taint of vice always 
clouds it. [ . . . ] And does to live alone render a woman not only wicked, but 
desexed; need everyone be descriptively drawn into the meshes of the 
social, especially women, as if these owned a naturally greater emotional 
existentiality, had more tentacles?29 
 
The single female, she says, is framed as in some way unnatural or blameworthy.   
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Her solitariness is detected as subversive, undermining the hegemony of 
coupledom, potentially eroding the governance of love.  As Riley indicates, it is the 
habitual association of women with emotion that is the root of the social demand that 
we women must love and be loved; especially women. 
 
Berlant blames love for the cultural hegemony of the couple, which has now 
replaced the family as the foundational unit of society.  Where once the solidity of 
family structure was evident across all social classes and provided our sense of 
belonging; indeed of ‘normative personhood,’ in the twentieth-century this was 
supplanted by a new story, a love story, placing the couple at the heart of social 
structure and thus ‘at the heart of social being’.30  And Adam Philips makes the point 
that the narrative of love is systemic; ‘the whole of Western literature is about what 
people do for love; for love of something or someone.  For love of love.’31  And to 
accept a role in love’s plot, to seek and find the norm of coupledom, to become 
useful and safe cocoons us giving protection from the embarrassment of being 
single, of being singled out.  As Barthes writes: ‘To want to be pigeonholed is to 
want to obtain for life a docile reception.’32  And so the story of love, of coupledom is 
a move towards okayness.  The couple is enfolded within a protective normalcy, free 
from the embarrassment of being single. 
 
The intimacy of coupledom in the image of Gilbert and George, for me, triggers 
thoughts of the enduring stability of marriages and other relationships within my 
family.  In fact, Gilbert & George remind me most, and most peculiarly of my 
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grandparents, an odd couple if ever there was one, often at odds, but a set, like salt 
and pepper, who were referred to by my brothers as ‘G&G’.  They were 
unimaginable, one without the other, and were together for over fifty years.  My 
parents were, and my brothers are, the marrying kind, the kind that stays married, 





         My grandparents; G&G.   Lyn & Agnes Jones 
 
 
Sodom points its finger at me.  It requires that I give an account of myself and of my 
obstinate singleness (which is not so exhilarating as singularity).  It refers me to my 
own back-story.  As Butler writes: 
I am interrupted by my own social origin, and so have to find a way to take 
stock of who I am in a way that makes clear that I am authored by what 
precedes and exceeds me, and that this in no way exonerates me from 
having to give an account of myself.33 
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 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005). 
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There is a sense in which Butler’s ‘social origin’ might, perhaps ought to be read as 
pertaining to class, and within this enquiry to the lived experience of middle-class-
ness that shapes the art encounter with its concern for legitimacy and taste.  But 
whilst such social origins have indeed authored who I am, in this instance, class is 
merely background information to the event-driven biography as ‘an account of 
myself’.   In public, in the large, quiet, airy space of the gallery, feels like no place to 
have to give this account.  I am embarrassed by what the image asks of me.  It asks 
me to account for how I turned out not to be a swan after all.   
 
There is an old joke that marriage is an institution, and who wants to live in an 
institution anyway?  Berlant proposes that coupledom is institutional and specifically, 
that it is an institution of privacy.  Coupledom safeguards the social acceptance of 
our private lives.  Inside the framework is a protected space; a safety zone, a 
comfort zone.  Inside is under cover, outside is out in the open, a place of exposure; 
dangerous and uncomfortable.  Berlant proposes the public intimacy of coupledom 
as a place of safety; ‘safe from the world, in the world and for the world’.34  That 
coupledom protects us, ‘against the spectre of utter exposure that is experienced by 
those who live their lives in public, outside of an institution of privacy.’35  Berlant 
enumerates those who live outside the institutions of privacy: 
The failure to achieve privacy is still a charge that defines gays and lesbians, 
as well as single people, adulterers, and the stereotypical family on  
state welfare.  People who are unhinged or unhitched, who live outside the 
normative loops of property and reproduction.36  
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It is evident that I too fall into the categories of those who fail to qualify for 
institutional privacy.  We ‘outsiders’ are the ones who not only decline to perpetuate 
normative loops of property and reproduction, but also, in Althussarian terms, are 
not reproducing the conditions of (re)production.  We are rejecting an ideology of 
love that is culturally systemic, and is also endorsed and underpinned by the state, 
the church, the law, and the economy.  By not properly constituting the subjects 
addressed by the ideology of institutional love, we fail to qualify for the privacy 
accorded to those who do.  Those who meet the criteria, by becoming coupled 
achieve privacy in public.  Those who don’t are exposed; open to scrutiny and thus 
vulnerable to embarrassability. 
 
Berlant’s generalisation that ‘gays and lesbians’ fail to qualify for the institutional 
privacy of coupledom perhaps glosses over a more complex reality.  Sometimes it is 
true.  However, some gay couples are amongst the most married people I know.  
They are so deliberately and emphatically a couple that they are ambassadors for 
coupledom, and the term ‘heteronormative’ has been used to express their 
conservative assimilation into mainstream-normal.37  They perform a coupledom 
that, though to some extent counter-normative, reinforces coupledom per se with all 
the zeal of a convert.  So that, although still an object of curiosity (and perhaps 
worse), they are in the process of vigorously negotiating their inclusion in the utopia 
of normal.  As Warner says; ‘In the right social quarters, if you behave yourself, you 
can have a decent life as a normal homo – at least up to a point.’38  From the 
admittedly limited horizon of my family, they pass as normal. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
parents, those below the age of  consent – in short, all those who become, for the purposes 
of marriage law, queer.’ The Trouble with Normal, p89. 
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Gilbert and George somehow pass as normal eccentrics; they readily admit that 
being two-as-one enables ‘being normal and being weird at the same time’.39  They 
have developed a bizarre life together that is both utterly exposed and quite 
inscrutable.  Adhering to the principles of being a living sculpture and ‘art for all’, 
Gilbert & George are accessible; their address is well known and they are in the 
phone book.  Unless they are abroad setting up an exhibition, they are to be 
observed going to a local café for breakfast, walking to their favourite restaurant for 
dinner, sometimes George takes the bus.  If their claim that they have no life outside 
art is to be believed, then this is all there is.  There is no secret, nothing hidden, 
nothing to be exposed, or everything is always already exposed.   
 
                             






As a living sculpture, Gilbert and George are always matching, always in step.  They 
are in this way, despite standing out as ‘not normal’, paradigmatic of coupledom. 
                                                 
39
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Their coupledom is explicit; singly they are unthinkable.  In his study on monogamy 
Phillips writes: 
Coupledom is a performance art.  But how does one learn what to do 
together?  How to be, once again, two bodies in public, consistently together, 
guardians of each other’s shame, looking the part?  Where do the steps 
come from?40    
 
               
                 In step 
 
 
Gilbert & George live like Bakhtin’s rogue, clown and fool, out ‘on the square’ where 
all deeds and discourse are in the public domain.41  And yet they remain 
unknowable.  Because of their synchronicity, their strict coupledom, always in step, 
always in agreement, neither George nor Gilbert is exposed or exposable.  They are 
in this way also paradigmatic of coupledom as an institution of privacy.  Their very 
mode of being is a paradox notable for what Sedgwick calls ‘the privilege of 
unknowing’.  It is as if they are visible, but only to a blind eye.  For psychoanalyst 
Erich Fromm, love itself is a source of paradox. ‘In love the paradox occurs that two 
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beings become one and yet remain two.’42  This paradox is evident each time Gilbert 
& George are interviewed.  What everyone wants to know is; do they ever argue, 
either professionally or on a personal level?  The answer is always the same; ‘Oh no 
we never argue.  And if we did we wouldn’t tell you.’43 
 
Returning to Berlant’s account of those who fail to achieve the institutional privacy of 
coupledom, I am immediately struck by how the condition of those subject to 
exposure as ‘outside the normative loops of property and reproduction’ exactly 
mirrors Goldberg’s description of the countergenerality of sodomy’s refusal of 
normative categories and Klossowski’s account of the sodomitical refusal of 
patriarchal institutions of property and reproduction.  This notable parallel between  
singledom and the sodomitical is indicative of the social stigma of being ‘without’ 
intimacy; ‘without’ as lack, without ‘the other half’, and without as outside; beyond 
the pale.  This reflection returns me to my initial reaction to Sodom; ‘I begin with 
some comfortable distance from the sodomitical scene; it is not, I think, about me.’  
But I am mistaken.  It is very much about me, and my comfortable distance 
collapses into an embarrassing proximity.  Too close.  Too near the knuckle.  And 
like Cobb, I reflect that being single sometimes feels like ‘one of the most despised 
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BEING SINGLED OUT  
Within the context of an intimate public, avoidance of embarrassment is often less 
violent than might be imagined.  It is often just about not standing out, not drawing 
attention to oneself.  It is, according to Berlant, about passing for normal:  
To desire belonging to the normal world, the world as it appears, is at root a 
fantasy of a sense of continuity, a sense of being generally okay; it is a 
desire to be in proximity to okayness, without passing some test to prove it.45  
 
Sodom is all about abnormality, aberration, anomaly, deviation, and to devote to it 
enough time to read the text, to work out the word endings obscured by George’s 
knee, Gilbert’s elbow, is to stray too far from okayness.  Like Lot’s wife, I should be 
looking away.  The safest thing to do would be to glance at it, a non-committal look 
of brief duration and then move on.  But something, something sticky holds and 
even returns my gaze.  I am embarrassed to invest in this work, but too late, it has 
buttonholed me with its excess, its deviance, its abjection, its tenderness, its 
intimacy.  And it asks me to account for myself, to account for my ambivalence; to 
account for my generalised desire for okayness and my distance from it.  Sodom 
requires me to own my interest in it. 
 
Art, it is widely agreed, communicates.  But there is something faintly ridiculous 
about the idea that this artwork, Sodom, singles me out and embarrasses me in this 
way.  Jeanette Winterson embraces the ridiculousness of conversations with art.  
She says that we should spend time with artworks, to get to know one another; 
‘supposing we made a pact with a painting and agree to sit down and look at it, on 
our own, with no distractions for one hour. . . What would we find?  Increasing 
discomfort.’46  She suggests that besides feeling uncomfortable, we might find 
ourselves to be increasingly distracted, inventive or irritated.  Winterson allows for 
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the relation between artwork and spectator to be reciprocal when she writes of one 
such exchange; ‘He still has not discovered anything about the painting but the 
painting has discovered a lot about him.  He is inadequate and the painting has told 
him so.’47  What Sodom seems to have discovered about me is that I am interested 
in its intimacy.  Although, or because I am without, I am fascinated, appalled by the 
excessive intimacy of the image.  Just as Edelman has written that it is a tricky thing 
to maintain any sort of spectatorial distance from the sodomitical scene, so too the 
work as a scene of intimacy entraps me.  Doyle has written about the effect of 
intimacy and how it sometimes conscripts the spectator, demanding that they take it 
personally.  She says of her response to Tracey Emin’s work; ‘I found myself 
interpolated by the work, as a spectator, in a manner that was both uncomfortable 
and exhilarating’.48  And it is uncomfortable; the embarrassment of being singled 
out, the exposure of declaring a taste or a perversion, the strangeness of the self.  
And it is exhilarating; it is not the shock of the new, but the thrill of recognition, the 
rush of affirmation.  As Gilbert & George have said; ‘When it hurts then its true for 
us.’   
 
It is perhaps a question of address.  The image as a text can address a public, or 
perhaps a counterpublic, or even an intimate public, but it would address us all.  My 
encounter with Sodom feels less general, more direct; it is personal, because I take 
it personally.  Warner says that a public address has a ‘necessary element of 
impersonality’, and that even a direct address; ‘in singling us out it does so not on 
the basis of concrete identity but by virtue of our participation in the discourse alone 
and therefore in common with strangers.’49  But Sodom’s address doesn’t feel as if it 
addresses me as a stranger.  I feel as if it recognises me, it knows that I am 
interested, so it must know something about me; I am exposed to the image, or 
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perhaps more fundamentally to the ideology of the image that addresses me, not as 
a stranger, but as an individual.  And although Warner argues that as an individual, 
my singularity, in common with others, must always retain a trace of strangerhood, 
yet I feel sure that Sodom addresses me.  Or, as Althusser might put it, really me.  I 
am interpellated. 
 
In ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, Louis Althusser uses the term 
interpellation to describe how ideology effects the conversion of individuals into 
subjects.  He explains this by way of an almost anecdotal example; the individual is 
walking down the street and ideology calls out ‘Hey, you there!’  Althusser describes 
this incident as being ‘along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or 
other) hailing’.50  He notes that this form of communication is effective because the 
subject is expecting the call; because he recognises that the hail was addressed to 
him; and most people apparently do.  Althusser admits this is a strange 
phenomenon that lacks adequate explanation.  He offers that in part it may be due 
to ‘guilt feelings’, that most of us have something on our conscience and so expect 
to be hailed.  But besides, or in place of, the guilt of this encounter, might it be that 
the individual also feels embarrassment?  She may feel embarrassed at being so 
peremptorily addressed; embarrassed that the other of ideology sees and judges 
her.  Perhaps our feelings of guilt or embarrassment relate not to something we 
have done, but to our very being, to something that we are, or alternatively, to 
something that we are not.  The individual might quite simply embarrassed at being, 
and at being singled out. 
 
When Sodom asks me to account for myself, to account for not being a swan, I 
know it is speaking to me.  This is not a public address, although it addresses me in 
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public.  This is private because it is personal; because I take it personally.  When the 
image of Sodom interpellates me, as an individual, I know that the call is precisely 
for me, and I turn around, embarrassed, subjected, and always already aware that I 
misrecognise the hailing and know that as one of the ‘unhinged and unhitched’, I 
don’t quite ‘fit’.  And here, Warner’s ‘trace of strangerhood’ is important, I am strange 
to myself.  In that moment of the one-hundred-and-eighty degree turn, as I turn to 
face the ideology that has stopped me in my tracks, shouting ‘Hey, you there!’, I ask, 
instinctively; ‘who me?’  And just for a moment, I am a stranger to myself in the 
idiom of, ‘it takes one to know one’, and this stranger-me, is an identity I have to 
account for, I have to say ‘yes, she is who you think she is’, or, ‘I am she’.  
Alternatively, I could deny this identification, I could disown it, perhaps disown 
myself, saying; ‘no, that’s not me’.  Warner touches on the feelings of disconcertion 
that arise when we are addressed, he writes; ‘It isn’t just that we are addressed in 
public as certain kinds of persons or that we might not want to identify as that 
person.  We haven’t been misidentified exactly.’51  But yet, in being interpellated, 
there may be a feeling of misfit, or perhaps a reluctance to foreclose the possibilities 
of other selves or other versions of self.  In my case, despite making a choice to be 
single, I am still susceptible to the desire for at least proximity to okayness, to be 
safe in the utopia of normal.  I still entertain the idea of intimacy. 
 
In responding, ‘yes, that’s me’, the individual accepts the identification and is, in 
Althusser’s terms, a ‘good subject’, who is; ‘a subjected being, who submits to a 
higher authority, and is therefore stripped of all freedom except that of freely 
accepting his submission’.52  A ‘bad subject’ on the other hand, resists the call of the 
ideological apparatuses and turns against the hegemony.  The bad subject denies 
the identification and the subjectivity it calls for.  In the case of the hegemony of 
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coupledom, the good subject either is already coupled, or alternatively desires to be 
part of a couple.  The good subject feels drawn by love’s plot and subscribes to a 
belief in the happy-ever-after.  The bad subject is obstinately single, rejecting the 
promise of the happy-ever-after.  The bad subject is the restless one, the one who 
won’t settle down, or the one with the itch, the one who strays, like an alley cat, or 
the one who is too lazy to work at it, or perhaps, the one who right from the start has 
no intention of being a significant other to anyone. 
 
There is a possible third subject.  Whilst good subjects choose the path of 
identification and bad subjects reject it outright, the third possibility is one of 
disidentification.  A position of disidentification would be one in which the individual 
recognises the hailing as being for them, really them, but cannot, or will not freely 
submit to subjectification, yet neither will they reject outright the ideology that hails 
them.  According to Muñoz, disidentification is a way of negotiation a provisional 
inclusion in a public that has not only not promised to include us, but that is also 
disparaging or condemnatory about people ‘like us’, who may be, for example, 
outside ‘the normative loops of property and reproduction’. 
 Disidentification is meant to be descriptive of the survival strategies the 
 minority subject practices in order to negotiate a phobic majoritarian public 
 sphere that continuously elides or punishes the existence of subjects who do 
 not conform to the phantasm of normative citizenship.53 
 
 Disidentification might then be practiced by an individual who negotiates a place 
within an ideology that for them, is a bad fit.  It is a means of mitigating the 
embarrassment, or even shame of failing to be ‘good’, a means of accepting 
‘normal’ as something desirable whilst not embodying it.  And the cost of such 
disidentification is an ambivalence about belonging.  It is a feeling of discomfort; a 
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prickliness that is endured for the sake of appearing to fit in.  It is a prevarication; the 
ideology is entertained, but not adopted, or not yet adopted.   
 
Disidentification is also a way of avoiding the political implications of counter-
identification that are the responsibility of the bad subject.  Judith Butler explores the 
potential of disidentification and asks; ‘What are the possibilities of politicising 
disidentification, this experience of misrecognition, this uneasy sense of standing 
under a sign to which one does and does not belong?’54  Butler’s questioning of the 
political potential of this discomfortable state, suggests that it is a state that is not, or 
not yet political.  But for an intimate public, no more than ‘juxtapolitical’, this question 
is mere rhetoric.  Disidentification is not a call to arms but an acknowledgement that 
we don’t quite meet the terms of inclusion.  It is a means of being in proximity to 
okayness, though not actually okay.  For the singleton navigating the world of 
couples and coupling, it is a way of avoiding the embarrassment of other people’s 
interest in our difference.  The embarrassment of being singled out by an ideology 
that we live within but do not identify with is a feeling of restricted political agency, so 
disidentification may be a feeling of subversion, but it remains covert rather than 
seditious.   
 
Butler’s account of an ‘uneasy sense of standing under a sign to which one does 
and does not belong’ effectively describes the relationship of the ambivalent 
singleton to love’s ideology and to how that ideology legitimates the visibility of 
intimacy.  I am aware that don’t belong in a personal and literal sense but I do 
belong in a general, cultural sense.  So yes it is personal, and yes it is general.  The 
intimacy of Gilbert and George in Sodom excludes me; me personally.  I am 
excluded from the intimacy of two, neither of whom are me, excluded from the 
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intimacy of two men, from the intimacy of two gay men, from an intimacy between 
old people, from an intimacy that endures, from an intimacy of two who are figments, 
an intimacy that may exist only in my imaginary relationship to it (but perhaps all 
relationships are imaginary?)   
 
And yet the intimacy of two is something to which I am culturally conditioned to 
aspire.  My swan family extols the virtues of two-ness, of coupledom.  Fairy tales, 
and other such romantic cant has preconditioned me to accept the teleological tow 
towards the happy ending as normal and desirable, and conversely, its rejection as 
abnormal, undesirable, perverse even.  In the intimate public sphere, lies the 
general rule that in the trajectory of life (particularly for women) there should be what 
Berlant calls ‘a plot of love’s unfolding’.  Intimacy should be the teleological end, the 
happy-ever-after that makes us safe; ‘safe from the world, in the world, for the 
world’, no longer a ‘threat to the general happiness’.55  To reject the happy-ever-





In a short story, ‘A Family Man’, the writer V S Pritchett says of his female 
protagonist, Berenice, that, ‘among the married she felt her singularity’.56  This is a 
particularly rich use of the term singularity that sustains the exposed and singled-out 
singularity of embarrassment, drawing together a number of threads running through 
this, and other chapters of this thesis.  Pritchett’s use of the term ‘singularity’ is 
readable as multiple layers of meaning beginning with the prosaic ‘quality, state, or 
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fact of being singular’ as a unique but yet substitutable being (OED).   It reduces 
singularity to a condition of being, held in common with all other beings.   
The uniqueness of the other is exposed to me, but mine is also exposed to 
her.  This does not mean that we are the same, but only that we are bound 
to one another by what differentiates us, namely our singularity.  The notion 
of singularity is very often bound up with existential romanticism and with a 
claim of authenticity, but I gather that, precisely because it is without content, 
my singularity has some properties in common with yours and so is, to some 
extent, a substitutable term.57  
 
 
We might furthermore ascribe to Pritchett’s use of singularity the properties of 
eccentricity; ‘an exceptional or unusual trait; a peculiarity’ (OED). This is a 
singularity that is exemplified by Gilbert & George who are notable for their 
eccentricity.  There is an awkwardness about singularity that is not framed as 
admirable exactly.  It is redolent of square pegs in round holes and sticking out like a 
sore thumb with an assumption that what it sticks out from is a harmonious norm, 
complete in itself; congruent, regular, faultless.  Gilbert and George have studiously 
practiced singularity but from within their coupledom; always matching, always in 
step, and always peculiar.  For them, singularity is a praxis. 
 
In the context of Pritchett’s narrative, singularity also brings into play the sense of 
being single, of being (as yet) unmarried, as Berenice’s single singularity is made to 
stand in direct opposition to the married status of her friends and acquaintances. 
The two conditions of being unmarried and being peculiar are entwined in 
‘singularity’, as if being single were a caprice or perversion.  As one who stands 
apart from the norm, the norm of coupledom, Berenice is an oddity.  Her friends are 
entertained by her but feel it would be better all-round if she settled down.  They 
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seek to normalise her by enfolding her in love’s plot.  Her friend, Mrs Brewster says; 
'She's getting old. She ought to get married, [ . . . ] I wish she wouldn't swoosh her 
hair around like that. She'd look better if she put it up.'58  As Berlant notes, the single 
woman is considered to be a threat because her perverse and wilful singleness has 
the capacity to unsettle the social equilibrium.  Berlant suggests of deliberately 
single persons: 
[They] are frequently seen both as symptoms of personal failure and as 
threats to the general happiness, which seems to require, among other 
things, the positioning of any person’s core life story in a plot of love’s 
unfolding, especially if that person is a woman.59  
 
So, there is something singular about being female that marks being single as the 
refusal of love’s plot, and as particularly reprehensible.   
 
But Berenice doesn’t want to settle down, she doesn’t want to be enfolded in love’s 
plot.  She feels resentment towards ‘the slapdash egotism of young men trying to 
bring her peculiarity to an end.’60  She is defensive of her peculiarity and holds 
herself apart from ‘the married’.  They interest her, she spends her time with them 
and she likes to listen to their endearments and their bickerings, but they also appal 
her; ‘How awful married people are, she thought. So public, sprawling over everyone 
and everything,’61  She is appalled by their sense of entitlement; to carry on their 
marriages in public, whilst in contrast, for her to ‘carry on’ must be a matter of 
discretion.  She refers to herself as a secret, ‘a necessary secret’ and this gives to 
her singularity a faint sense of the unknown, of something that could be exposed in 
contrast to the publicity of coupledom, as an institution of privacy that protects or 
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covers up what it endorses, or alternatively has no need of covering because 
paradoxically it is always already exposed as a privacy that goes on in public.62 
 
We might also read into Pritchett’s singularity a sense of self as both embodied and 
lived, such as Judith Butler might use the term.   
This exposure that I am constitutes, as it were, my singularity.  I cannot will it 
away, for it is a feature of my very corporeality and, in this sense, of my life.  
Yet it is not that over which I can have control.63 
 
This singularity is cultivated by Berenice as her identity and that is most evident in 
the relational.  In her dealings with others, her singularity is the outward face, the 
image of self, as shown to the other, as a mask, but at the same time it is the self-
image of her inner self.  And there is a certain incongruity between the two; between  
the self-image and the image of self with the outer only ever an approximation of the 
inner and the slip between the two is a space of embarrassment. 
 
But furthermore, and most tellingly, when Pritchett writes that Berenice ‘felt her 
singularity’, there is a sense in which the reader must understand singularity as a 
mode of feeling.  And as a mode of feeling, singularity is the initial prickling 
sensation of embarrassment as an aversive self-consciousness, and whilst 
singularity is intrinsic to the embarrassment of exposure, it is not yet an 
embarrassment of evaluation.  At this point the self is exposed, ‘singled out’ and 
thus presented for evaluation; it anticipates evaluation, it is on the brink of 
evaluation.  Singularity is, in this sense, an exceptional feeling of an exceptional self.   
And this is exhilarating.  But the anticipation of evaluation must inevitably also 
include a feeling of self as not normal and thus not good-enough, for the terms of 
‘normal’ and ‘good’ (or at least good-enough) are indivisible.  Ahmed describes the 
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‘queer feelings’ that are the uneasy sensation of being not normal; in her case, from 
perspectives of race and sexuality. 
Discomfort is a feeling of disorientation: one’s body feels out of place, 
awkward, unsettled.  I know that feeling too well, the sense of out-of place-
ness and estrangement involves an acute awareness of the surface of one’s 
body, which appears as a surface, when one cannot inhabit the social skin 
which is shaped by some bodies and not others.64 
 
 
Singularity, as an acute awareness of self, exposed to the other who has the power 
to judge, is a momentary sensation, a transient feeling of potential.  But it is also a 
feeling of being on the brink of being engulfed.  Roland Barthes gives a description 
of the feeling of love as an amorous subjectivity.  This is also the feeling of  
singularity, and of embarrassment.  Barthes writes of a kind of panic which is like a 
blush; the whole body is engaged in an insistent present that encompasses 
predictions and precedents, the whole body is a ‘space of reverberation’, rationality 
is abandoned and the body, at this very instant is both trivial and necessary.   
 The space of reverberation is the body – that imaginary body, so ‘coherent’ 
 (coalescent) that I can experience it only in the form of a generalized pang.  
 This pang (analogous to a blush which reddens the face, with shame or 
 emotion) is a sudden panic. In the usual kind of panic – stage fright which 
 precedes some sort of performance – I see myself in the future in a condition 
 of failure, imposture, scandal.  In amorous panic, I am afraid of my own 
 destruction, which I suddenly glimpse, inevitable, clearly formed, in the flash 
 of a word, an image. 65 
 
 
And in this feeling of reverberation, my singularity embarrasses me and the 
embarrassment in turn, ensingles me, almost like love. 
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Sodom, in the final analysis, is a contradiction.  It says one thing and means quite 
another.  The work is ‘about’ abnormality, countergenerality, and the fire and 
brimstone consequences of such outright refusal of normality.  And yet in the 
accidental glimpse of tenderness between the figures, is the sign of a remarkable, 
and remarkably conventional intimacy; an ordinary, everyday intimacy of being at 
ease; one with an other.  Sodom’s public airing of private intimacies is an unsettling 
mӧbius loop of indivisible ideological insides and outsides, inclusions and exclusions 
that are perhaps best understood in terms of Edelman’s definition of sodomy as ‘a 
disturbing emblem of dis-closure’.66  The embarrassment of Sodom dis-closes far 
more about the spectator than about the artist.  In the end, Sodom exposes and 
embarrasses most, not through its tabloidesque staging of ‘perverse’ sexuality, but 
through inversion, through the substitutability of indecency and intimacy.  The 
representation of intimacy interpellates precisely because it draws attention to me as 
single, excluded from its institutions.  The intimacy of Gilbert and George points me 
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out as ‘unhinged and unhitched’. And I am embarrassed, not because I am single, 
but because I am defensive about being single.   
 
Do I envy them?  In A Lover’s Discourse, Barthes describes the congregation of 
coupledom as the sistemati, meaning that they are pigeonholed, and asks, from his 
perspective of just outside, as one who loves but is unhitched (and perhaps in his 
love for X even a little unhinged). In his singularity, Barthes asks; 
How is it that the sistemati around me can inspire me with envy?  From  
what, seeing them am I excluded?  Certainly not from a ‘dream’, an ‘idyll’, a 
‘union’: there are too many complaints from the ‘pigeonholed’ about the 
system, and the dream of union forms another figure.  No, what I fantasize in 
the system is quite modest: I want, I desire, quite simply, a structure (. . . ).  
Of course there is not a happiness of structure; but every structure is 
habitable, indeed that may be its best definition.67 
 
The point Barthes makes is, that for those of us who are outwith the institutional 
privacy of coupledom, what we lack is not intimacy, or even love, but structure.  We 
have no habitable structure, no place of comfort, of ease and privacy, no space to 
be intimate, or not.68  Or as Ahmed says, we have no ‘social skin’.  We have no skin 
or structure to cover us, giving protection from the exposure and evaluation of 
embarrassment, to escape the opinions and optimism of those others who think it is 
time we settled down.  And yet, we must live within the ideology of love’s plot.   
The emotional cathexes and trigger images of soap opera, romantic comedies, fairy 
tales, and a million love songs all follow the well-worn trajectory of love overcoming 
obstacles, advancing towards the promised happy-ever-after.  And love’s plot is 
assumed to apply particularly to women.  It is posited as ‘what women want’.   
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The modern love plot requires that, if you are a woman, you must at least 
entertain believing in love’s capacity both to rescue you from your life and to 
give you a new one, a fantasy that romantic love’s narratives constantly 
invest with beauty and utopian power.69 
 
Those who think they don’t require rescuing are an anathema.  To perversely, 
sodomitically reject the norm of coupledom and all it promises is to be singled out; to 
be ‘the odd man out’.  Though frequently, the odd man out is a woman. 
                                                 
69
 Berlant, The Female Complaint, p171   
 
 254 
Chapter  Six:    





 One of the reasons I was interested in the feminine was that I wasn’t successful.     
                           Sarah Lucas1  
In her disappointment with herself she displaced her wishes onto objects who she 







Is embarrassment gendered?  Does the genderedness of looking and being looked 
at also apply to exposure and evaluation, and to contexts of display and 
spectatorship that might engender embarrassability?  This chapter explores the 
contention that embarrassment is gendered and that it is female.  The femaleness of 
embarrassment does not in any way preclude men from being embarrassed, but 
rather, when a man does feel embarrassed, he is in some sense, unmanned.  
Embarrassment does not in the same way disturb my sense of femaleness.  When I 
am exposed, awkward, disprised, and feel that I am on the back foot, my 
femaleness is not denied, but on the contrary, is confirmed and corroborated by this 
foolish feeling. 
 
Emotion generally, is culturally coded as female.  Women, who are allocated a 
position that is closer to nature and further from God are assumed to have the 
greater affinity with emotion, whilst reason, as emotion’s binary opposite, is the  
province of men.  Berlant comments on the correlation of women and emotion: 
                                                 
1
 Mathew Collings, Sarah Lucas, Modern Artists (London: Tate Publishing, 2002). p22. 
2
 Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, Anna Freud: A Biography (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2008). p129. 
 255 
The identification of women with affect and emotion is a complex thing, not 
just a projection of the view that women feel more powerfully than they think, 
a cliché that can make women seem both trivial and magnificent.  In the 
intimate sphere of public femininity the passionate irrational attachments of 
affect and the normative transactions of emotionality shape women’s psychic 
and social lives and their responsibility to other people’s lives.3  
 
Emotion is inextricably bound with concepts of femaleness in intricate shades of 
duty and capriciousness, strength and weakness, but all too often, trivial manages 
to trump the magnificent.  And besides this, there is a hierarchical differentiation 
within the spectrum of emotions, and some are calibrated as more female than 
others.  Envy for example, is categorised by both Freud and Ngai as female, whilst 
paranoia, according to Ngai is a male feeling, but Sedgwick makes a reasonable 
case for it being female, or more narrowly feminist.4  Broadly speaking, the stronger 
and more dignified emotions such as anger and pride are the most male, and the 
more trivial the feeling, the more it is likely to be a woman thing. 
 
Embarrassment as a weak or minor emotion figures as particularly female.  It is a 
silly, superficial emotion.  It has no weight, stature, gravitas or nobility.  It is not one 
of the grand passions and it lacks moral depth.  It is the emotion of small failures, 
incompetence, accident, and inadvertency.  It is a passive emotion, a temporary 
paralysis; the embarrassed one, according to Goffman, is ‘out of play’.  Whilst it  
lacks an active dynamic, embarrassment is often accompanied by little apologetic 
gestures, an ineffectual fluttering of the hands, touching the face, averting the gaze.  
It often results from matters of modesty which is popularly a female province.  It is 
concerned with appearances; yet another female province. 
 
                                                 
3
 Berlant, the Female Complaint, p170. 
4
 See Ngai, pp298-331.  And Sedgwick, Touching Feeling. 
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Mary Russo captures a particularly negative evaluation of women by women.  She 
evokes a commonly felt embarrassment that is also an embarrassment in common, 
as if through inadvertent exposure of an unheroic femaleness, we are all 
disadvantaged.   
There is a phrase that still resonates from childhood . . . . It is a harsh 
matronizing phrase, directed towards the behaviour of other women: 
“She” [the other woman] is making a spectacle out of herself.   
Making a spectacle out of oneself seemed a specifically feminine danger.  
The danger was of exposure.  Men, I learned somewhat later in life, 
“exposed themselves,” but that operation was quite deliberate and 
circumscribed.  For a woman, making a spectacle out of herself had more to 
do with a kind of inadvertency and loss of boundaries: the possessors of 
large, ageing, and dimpled thighs displayed at the public beach, of overly 
rouged cheeks, of a voice shrill in laughter, or of a sliding bra strap – a loose 
dingy bra strap especially – were at once caught out by fate and 
blameworthy.5 
 
The embarrassment conjured up by Russo is coextensively of exposure – of being 
a spectacle – and of evaluation; the woman suffers an ‘inadvertency’ but it is one 
she should have guarded against.  She has not just become a spectacle but has 
made a spectacle of herself; she is ‘blameworthy’.  This chapter advances 
embarrassment as a particularly female feeling, and also, refocuses on 
embarrassment as composed of two strands; of exposure and evaluation.   In 
particular, this chapter is concerned with the way that exposure and evaluation are 
difficult to read separately, and most particularly, that in the lived experience of 
femaleness, the two are tightly knotted.   
 
There are a number of truisms that have a bearing on the evaluations we make and 
are made of us; despite being urged not to, we judge a book by its cover, and this is 
true especially when the person being judged is a woman.  A man’s value is more 
                                                 
5
 Russo, p53.  
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likely to be connected with achievement whereas a woman’s value is immediately 
exposed, that is; open to evaluation, simply by being seen.  It is sometimes said of a 
beautiful woman that her face is her fortune.  Women, (at least in Western 
modernity) are in some essential way considered to be on display; as Mulvey has it, 
woman connotes ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’.   
 
In the film Gentlemen Prefer Blondes, Lorelei Lee, the dumb blonde with a sharp 
mind, played by Marilyn Monroe expresses this disparity perfectly.  She is accused 
by her prospective father-in-law of being a gold-digger, but  puts him straight saying 
that wealth is a desirable attribute for a man much in the way that being pretty is a 
desirable attribute for a woman, and surely he would prefer his son to marry well, 
that is, marry a woman with desirable attributes.   
Lorelei Lee:    Don’t you know that a man being rich is like a girl being 
pretty?  You might not marry a girl just because she’s pretty, but my 
goodness, doesn’t it help?  And if you had a daughter, wouldn’t you rather 
she didn’t marry a poor man?  
 
Mr Esmonde:   Say, they told me you were stupid.  You don’t sound stupid to 
me.6 
 
The scene is still funny and still relevant, we, women, try to look our best; to make 
the most of our assets.  And we are still far too often taken at face value.   
 
A preliminary task of this chapter is then to restate the twofold nature of 
embarrassment, giving particular attention to the problematic of the coextensivity of  
its parts.  A theory of embarrassment as twofold, consisting of exposure and 
evaluation is expounded by Lewis who uses evidence gathered in studies of child 
development to define the distinct and separate emergence of the two types.7  The 
                                                 
6
 Howard Hawks, "Gentlemen Prefer Blondes,"  (Twentieth Century Fox, 1953). 
7
 Lewis, p198-218. Other researchers have concluded that the capacity for embarrassment 
develops considerably later; perhaps around five years of age and is still developing in early 
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first, exposure embarrassment, is the feeling of an aversive self-consciousness.  It 
is a feeling of visibility, of being seen, and causes us to experience quite literally too 
much of ourselves.  The second is a feeling of inadequacy, of having failed to meet 
expectations; not only failing to meet the expectations of the other who sees but 
also a failing of self, a failure to be a good or good-enough self.  Evaluation 
embarrassment is perhaps best understood as a minor shame, a shame about 
something of only minor importance.   
 
Lewis acknowledges that as adults we are acutely aware of, and sensitive to 
evaluations; ‘Because adults utilize evaluation in all of their actions, the belief that 
embarrassment has to be related to some failure of the self is widespread.’8 Once 
both strands of embarrassment are fully developed in adulthood it is difficult, if not 
impossible to separate the two; we imagine that the other who sees us also judges 
us.  Lewis suggests that as adults we tend to attribute a disproportionate part of our 
embarrassment to evaluation.  In our narcissistic investment in self we overestimate 
our interest to the other.  In our paranoia, we imagine ourselves to be judged, 
forgetting that that other is busy with her own narcissism and paranoia; too busy to 
judge. 
 
Lewis is able to give a full account of the primary embarrassment of exposure, but 
when it comes to evaluation he is less forthright.  He comments that evaluation is 
not only second but also secondary to the role played by exposure.  Once the 
capacity to experience both exposure and evaluation embarrassments are fully 
developed the two are inextricably linked and interdependent.  It is never simply an 
embarrassment of ‘some failure of the self’ but of that failure being seen by some 
                                                                                                                                          
adolescence.  For an overview of several studies on the development of embarrassment, 
see chapter 6 in Robert J. Edelman, The Psychology of Embarrassment (Chichester: John 
Wiley & Sons 1987). 
8
 Lewis, p214. 
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other even if the other is imagined.  In Being and Nothingness, Sartre theorised 
exactly this; the judgement of the other is embedded in the context of being seen.  
He wrote; ‘To be looked at is to apprehend oneself as the unknown object of 
unknowable appraisals – in particular of value judgements.’9 Sartre argues that 
being seen is contiguous with being judged.  In his explanation, the other who sees 
me has the advantage; he is the subject.  When he looks at me I am, for him, an 
object, and he has the freedom to judge.  His look and his freedom to judge enslave 
me and I am embarrassed to be objectified.  
 
The evaluation embarrassment that is the subject of this chapter is not predicated 
upon normative, masculine criteria of worth that we might fleetingly fail to meet, or 
believe the other has seen that we fail to meet.  The focus here is on the  
discrediting of one’s image and in conjunction with this, an ambivalence towards 
being (seen to be) female, and thus so exposed, so vulnerable to evaluation.  This 
is deliberately superficial, placing the value of evaluation not in being good, but in 
giving good face.  Superficiality is not here indexical of importance; in the context of 
embarrassment, surface matters and there is nothing more deeply important to the 
self-image than its image.   
 
The image of self that I will explore here in relation to the secondary embarrassment 
of evaluation is the deliberate and paradigmatic image of self of the self-portrait.   
Taking a self-portrait as the subject enables a reading of the self as quite explicitly 
and always already exposed, and so, in theory at least, allowing a more narrow 
focus on the embarrassment of evaluation.  Looking at Sarah Lucas’s self-portrait, 
Got a Salmon On # 3, I will explore how her work mitigates exposure and also might 
                                                 
9
 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p291.  Sartre contends that shame-embarrassment results 
fundamentally from the objectification itself rather than the real or imagined negative 
evaluation of the other’s actual judgement. 
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displace embarrassment by frustrating the immediate evaluation of her image in 
hackneyed terms of femininity.   
 
The image Lucas projects in her self-portraits is generally described in terms of its 
‘mannishness’.  In some respects this is a gun-jumping response to what is there, or 
more accurately, to what is not there.  Lucas actually declines to portray herself as 
‘womanish’.  There is nothing much in her self-portraiture that can be read in terms 
of culturally constructed femininity, essential femaleness, or even womanliness as a 
masquerade, but poverty of language and imagination forces an either/or reading of 
‘not-woman’ as man, mannish, or at least ‘man-ish’.  I would define ‘man-ish’ as an 
approximation of man, without the burden of cultural masculinity or essential 
maleness, and hardly troubled at all by anything seriously phallic.10   
 
Lucas’s ‘mannishness’ is, I will argue, both symptomatic of embarrassment about 
femaleness as always already exposed and available for evaluation, and a strategy 
to mitigate that embarrassment by wrong-footing the spectator, calling into question  
orthodox criteria for seeing and sexing.  Lucas is also questioning the extent to 
which we might rely on the authenticity of the normative categories ‘woman’ and 
‘man’ as displayed in the image of self.  This brings to mind the work of Joan 
Riviere; ‘Womanliness as Masquerade’, and adds a further level of uncertainty.  
Riviere theorised a super-womanliness that women project in order to compensate 
                                                 
10
 If embarrassment can be considered to be essentially ‘a woman thing’, perhaps the 
weightier feeling of shame is male.  See Steven Connor on male shame:  
Still, I am though.  I am ashamed of being a man. . . . I am ashamed, for example, of the 
advantage of having been a man, and of its arrogant privilege and prospects.  I am ashamed 
of the will-to-manhood involved in being a man.  I am ashamed of the stupidity and 
selfishness and certitude and pettiness of being a man . . . I am  ashamed of the things men 
carry on agreeing to want and ashamed as well of what  men have done, and what I believe 
being a man continues to entail doing, to women and to other men, and not just accidentally 
but systematically, as part of the long, and now almost comprehensively rumbled, plot of 
patriarchy.  Steven Connor, "The Shame of Being a Man," (2000) (accessed 11.12.2011).  
http://www.stevenconnor.com/shame/ (accessed 11.12.2011) 
In the context of male shame, I would suggest that if being a man can be a cause of shame, 
then being ‘man-ish’ causes not shame but embarrassment.  ‘Man-ish’ is manly-lite in the 
same way that embarrassment is sometimes understood as shame-lite.   
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for their ‘manliness’; that is, for their competence, strength and success, and the 
compensatory ‘womanliness’ although ‘put on’ is no less real than actual 
womanliness; both are cultural constructs. 
 Womanliness therefore could be assumed and worn as a mask, both to hide 
 the possession of masculinity and to avert the reprisals expected if she were 
 found to possess it [. . . ] The reader may now ask how I define 
 womanliness or where I draw the line between genuine womanliness and 
 the ‘masquerade’.  My suggestion is not, however, that there is any such 
 difference; whether radical or superficial, they are the same thing.11  
 
Lucas does not put on a mask of womanliness.  In fact, as her appearance in the 
self-portraits is most often read as ‘mannish’, we are left quite unsure whether this is 
a cover-up for ‘genuine’ womanliness or a refusal to masquerade as woman in order 
to soothe male anxieties, and if as Riviere says, there is no difference, then is Lucas 
in fact masquerading at all?  I would argue that she is; that she is seeming to be 
not-woman, or not woman-ish, not womanly.  But this is not the same as 
masquerading as a man in a serious inversion of gender codes.  It is more like a 
game of hide-and-seek.  As Riviere puts it; ‘she has to treat the situation of 
displaying her masculinity to men as a ‘game’, as something not real as a ‘joke’.’12  
Not like a man, exactly, but manish. 
 
Lucas is by no means the first female artist to complicate gender categories.  She 
and others before her have sought to negotiate the term ‘woman artist’, which is 
almost an oxymoron.  Previous gender strategies employed by women artists 
(Hesse, Krasner, O’Keefe) are explored by Anne Wagner who details the extent to 
which these artist have worked within a cultural assumption that the term ‘artist’ as 
creative genius, is coded as male.  Wagner notes that although a female artist may 
not take a feminist stance in her work, she nevertheless is an agent for the 
                                                 
11
 Athol Hughes, ed. The Inner World and Joan Riviere: Collected Papers 1920-1958 
(London: Karnac Books, 1991). p94. 
12
 Ibid. p96. 
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feminisms of her time.  She too sees ‘woman’ as a negotiable cultural construct; 
‘Femininity can be assigned as well as claimed, avoided as well as celebrated, with 
an act of negation potentially as eloquent as affirmation.  Or an individual’s relation 
to feminine gender may definitively escape her control.’13 
 
In particular, Wagner’s account of Lee Krasner’s projection of self as an ambivalent 
relation to gender prefigures the avoidance of womanliness that I read in the self-
portraiture of Sarah Lucas.  Professionally Krasner quite abjures womanliness, as if 
it were incommensurate with being an artist, or being successful.  Or perhaps, as 
totally irrelevant, or as a quality that made her vulnerable to evaluation in terms she 
didn’t accept as pertinent to her work.  Wagner comments: 
 Although Krasner’s art is ‘that of a woman,’ the autobiography it inscribes 
 invents its subject (its ‘self’) as the bearer of a fictional masculinity.  Or at 
 least that’s what Krasner hoped to imply.  The invention is strategic, meant 
 to master the feminine, since for Krasner femininity was the more complex 
 and threatening term.   In trying to circumvent that oppressive fiction, she 
 embraced its opposite as a kind of antidote to a social condition.14  
 
Wagner suggests that Krasner saw being female as ‘an oppressive fiction’, as a 
masquerade she was expected to collude with, and attempted to escape that 
through a ‘fictional masculinity’.  This strategy, in its approach to gender as 
something that might be stage-managed has been reinvented by Lucas, but where  
Krasner’s gender congealed in her social and canonical persona of Mrs Jackson 
Pollock, Lucas’s gender as far as it does appear in her work, is displaced onto 
objects. 
 
For an artist, even a ‘woman artist’, there can be an advantage in being seen.  
Greater visibility, building a brand, is advantageous commercially, if not critically.  
                                                 
13
 Anne Middleton Wagner, Three Artists (Three Women): Modernism and the Art of Hesse, 
Krasner, and O'keeffe (Berkley CA: University of California Press, 1998). p27. 
14
 Ibid. p189. 
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The artist is now frequently operating in a celebrity culture where she or he is 
exposed and evaluated alongside those who are famous for achievement, and 
those who are famous only for exposure.  Lucas has made herself visible by 
producing a number of photographic self-portraits which have been exhibited as a 
series and published as a set of prints.  The self-portraits have been widely used for 
publicity and promotion of the brand, ‘Sarah Lucas’ and in the same way that the 
use of beautiful women in advertising is so often vacuous, so too these images are 
empty of real subjectivity.  In making her image available in this way, Lucas 
deliberately offers that image up for evaluation, and the response of critics and 
commentators is as much the subject of this chapter as is the critique of the image 
itself.  What is said, and what is unsaid is intrinsic to the embarrassment inherent in 
Lucas’s work. 
 
        
        Sarah Lucas, Self-Portraits 1990-1998 (installation view) 
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Each image in the series has about it a certain blankness, and an ambivalence 
about gender, gestures that seem to be rooted in embarrassment.  The series of 
images show Lucas in a variety of poses and situations.  They have a self-
referential, almost tautological quality, referring only to the cliché of ‘Sarah Lucas’ 
that they create.  It may be that embarrassment is, in some circumstances, 
connected to a withdrawal of the personal.  At the point where the subject feels that 
too much of her self is exposed or given, her embarrassment will effectively derail 
the situation.  The embarrassed self is ‘out of play’, and marks time with small 
ineffectual gestures and an averted gaze.  Yet at the same time, the display of 
embarrassment is not an effective withdrawal.  Although the embarrassed person 
may dearly wish to be protected from exposure by a show of impersonality, in fact, 
the public display of embarrassment reveals a remarkably private aspect of the 
person.  In the intimacy of the blush, the person inescapably gives themselves away 
to the ‘other’ who can see something of their image-repertoire and see what it is that 
they find embarrassing.  Perhaps the most that can be said is that embarrassment 
signals a desire for the withdrawal of the personal and simultaneously, the public 
thwarting of that desire. 
 
 
 Billboard commissioned for Chanel 4, London 1999 
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Lucas’s self-portraits suggest an acute awareness of what Russo has termed the 
‘specifically feminine danger’ of being subject to exposure and evaluation.  Lucas 
asks:  How to avoid this exposure?  How to avoid being pejoratively seen?  How to 
avoid being flesh, having a size, being of a certain age, being female?  Her self-
portraits suggest a dread of evaluation, a dread of the loss of agency, a dread of 
the loss of boundaries that are implicit in displays of her own sexuality; not the 
erotic fantasy kind of sexuality, but the everyday biological reality of it, of being 
woman, of being magnificent and trivial at the same time, of being excessive.  Her  
images of self could then be said to express refusal, or perhaps wilful confusion of  
conventional signs of femaleness, or womanliness and certainly of the more dainty 
notion of femininity.  In Lucas’s self-portraits, the refusal of conventional signs of 
womanliness might be understood to offer some protection from ‘to-be-looked-at-
ness’.   
 
More generally, Lucas’s work is not an outright rejection of femaleness, but 
establishes a pattern of the displacement of femaleness from Lucas herself and 
images of Lucas, on to other objects.  This might be interpreted as a form of 
disidentification, such as Muñoz identifies as a survival strategy enacted by 
minoritarian identities.  The previous chapter discussed disidentification as 
applicable to the dilemma of the single woman negotiating social institutions of 
intimacy, here ‘woman’ is posited as minoritarian, and the specious category 
‘woman artist’ certainly is.  Muñoz defines disidentification thus: 
Disidentification is about recycling, and rethinking encoded meaning.   
The process of disidentification scrambles and reconstructs the encoded 
meaning of a cultural text in a fashion that both exposes the encoded 
message’s universalising and exclusionary machinations and recruits its 
workings to account for, include and empower minority identities and 
identifications.15  
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 Muñoz, p31. 
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Lucas’s avoidance of womanliness in her own image is a disidentificatory double 
move of acknowledgement of and resistance to the ideological norms of self-image 
‘as a woman’.  Her images suggest an elusion of femaleness as a defensive move 
to avoid it; to avoid being caught out, to avoid being embarrassed.  But if elusion is 
the act of deluding someone; then who?  The embarrassment she shrugs off loiters 




GOT A SALMON ON 
Got a Salmon On # 3 is like a joke that I don’t quite get.  It invites ridicule, but it also 
makes the spectator feel slightly ridiculous.  In this self-portrait, Lucas appears to 
usurp the masculine; standing outside a men’s public toilet, in a man’s jacket (the 
sleeves are too long, the shoulders too broad).16  This gives rise to a spectatorial 
ambivalence; to what Judith Halberstam identifies as a widespread indifference to 
female masculinity and even that ‘ . . . this culture generally evinces considerable 
anxiety about even the prospect of manly women.’17  Lucas poses as fisherman with  
her ‘catch’.  There is no feminine category; fisherwoman, but only fishwife.  She 
further usurps a masculine position in suggesting a blokish jokiness about sexuality.  
Fisherman’s tales always involve estimations of size, bragging and exaggeration 
                                                 
16
 The toilet is customarily referred to as ‘men’s’ and the sign ‘men’ can actually be seen on 
other photographs taken at the same time (e.g. Got a Salmon On # 1).  However, the sign 
directly above Lucas’s head in # 3 refers to a disabled toilet which is not specifically gender 
designated and so is both male and female.  The sign reads:  
 ‘DISABLED PERSON’S CONVENIENCE The key for the Convenience can be 
 obtained from the Park Attendant in the play area at the rear of the Convenience.’ 
This is, without doubt an interesting point.  Foucault, and then Garber are among those 
writers who have commented on the fact that we are offered a limited choice of facilities; we 
must be ‘men’ or ‘women’ and need to choose which toilet door to enter.  Having made a 
choice, there is still the question of the extent of our accommodation within.  The fact that 
the disabled toilet is not gender specific could be read as relevant to Lucas’s work, and 
indeed to this thesis, as embarrassment could be read as a disabling condition.  Restrictions 
of time and space have prevented me from following this curious point. 
17
 Judith Halberstam, Female Masculinity (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1998). pxi. 
 267 
that are equally applicable to sexual equipment and exploits.  Whilst the salmon 
may be considered to reference female genitalia, it is also symbolically and formally 




                         Fishwife?  Sarah Lucas Got a Salmon On # 3 (1997)  from  





The unassuming image of Lucas and the fish is a site of conflict between a sexless 
neutrality and an alternative reading of a ridiculously overdetermined reference to 
sex and gender that resists clarity and is trapped in the nudge and the wink of 
innuendo.  The fish, plus the punning title seems to be the cause of some 
embarrassment among commentators.  For Got a Salmon On # 3 Lucas has 
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recycled the title of an earlier work; Got a Salmon on (Prawn) a work that is 
completely unambiguous about gender and refers explicitly to a male erection and 
ejaculation.  ‘Salmon on prawn’ is, apparently, rhyming slang for ‘on the horn’.  The 
syntax and the rhyming slang lend to the titles a salt-of-the-earth working class 
sentiment, but without the prawn, it seems that the manliness becomes suspect.   
 
Unusually for Lucas’s work there is consternation over the clarity of the signs of 
gender, but it is obviously a sexual reference; that much is abundantly clear.  The 
eponymous salmon, like Lucas, reads as both male and female, and also as just 
sexual.  Comments made on Got a Salmon on # 3  tend to be brief; Amna Malik 
notes its maleness.18  For her, the salmon is ‘ . . . evoking a sexual innuendo 
through the image of an erect penis’ and Mathew Collings relates it to a previous 
Lucas fish, the notoriously smelly (and much more working-class) kipper used in 
Bitch (1995) which, in the place of genitalia, hangs from the table-body of a big 




                                    
   Sarah Lucas Bitch (1995) 
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 Malik, p35. 
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Yet another commentator thinks the salmon is ‘a pun on the idea of a female 
erection’.19  Robecchi, who genders by smell, offers the following peculiarity;  
The viewer is not asked to dwell at length on the oddity of a young woman 
strolling with a salmon past a men’s public lavatory . . . It is the combination 
of smells that brings out the artist’s true objective. . . Fish had already made 
a number of appearances in Lucas’s work, but in Got a Salmon On # 3 its 
visual function is subordinated to the olfactory.  It is an intelligent 
provocation.20 
 
For Gordon Burn, the fish is just ugly; ‘Sarah is carrying a heavy ugly grey fish, its 
tail on her shoulder, its slack mouth suckling her finger.’21  His comment seems both 
to transfer the ugliness of the salmon to Lucas and to establish a peculiar and 
unsettling physical intimacy between the artist and the fish. 
 
Salmon arguably reads as over-sexed but also elite, raising questions of value.  The 
exclusivity of salmon in terms of quality and cost stands apart from the working-
class culture sentimentally referenced in much of Lucas’s work.22  Salmon has a 
prowess and a flashiness that is quite different from, for example, the proletarian 
hum-drummery of kippers or fried eggs.  Natural history programmes have made a 
convincing case for the virility and fecundity of salmon as creatures who are 
intensely energetic and single-minded about the need to spawn.  For me, this 
National Geographic image of indomitable fish driven by a deadly sexuality leaping 
upstream to their spawning grounds overlaps a childhood perception of salmon as 
something costly that came in tins that were only opened if we had visitors. 
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 Manchester, E., www.londonfoodfilmfiesta.co.uk also on www.tate.org.uk  
(accessed 31.08.11) 
20
 Michele Robecchi, Sarah Lucas, ed. Francesco Bonami, Supercontemporary (Milan: 
Electa, 2007). p57.   
21
 Burn, p368. 
22
 See Malik’s comments on ‘Lucas’s engagement with a certain moment of post-War 
English society that was nostalgic for a by-then obsolete working-class culture.’ p3. 
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Lucas looks determined not to spawn.  Her expression is not quite blank, she looks 
a little fierce, a little quizzical.  As Collings says, she puts on ‘a look of abstracted 
anxiety, or frowning blankness instead of looking fluffy or glossy or pleasing.’23 
Her clothes are not just masculine but rather ugly, and unnecessarily thrift-shop 
utilitarian, without being chic.  Gordon Burn writes of the first time he met Lucas: 
She was the most concentratedly, even obsessively, dressed-down person 
there.  Not un-fashion or non-fashion or junior bohemian or just fashionably 
grungy, like many of the others surging around us, but aggressively anti any 
notion that clothes might do more than provide a cover in which to walk out 
in public.24  
 
But he was entirely wrong in this; clothes for Lucas are not merely a serviceable 
covering of the naked body, but a sign system, a language that expresses 
subjectivity.  Her clothes are, as Burn later realized; ‘. . .  part of her armour – part of 
the personal mythology she was in the process of constructing for herself’.25  
 
Lucas is well aware of the power of dressing and has discussed this in a number of 
interviews: 
Everyone makes his or her appearance into a bit of a language.  You know 
what you mean and you know what you’re avoiding.  I’ve always been quite 
tomboyish.  And I’ve always been quite squeamish about what’s intentional 
and what’s not intentional, with the way clothes are worn, and the potential 
embarrassment in what you’re saying with them – especially sexy clothes.  
But even things like shirt-collars and ties – I used to have an aversion to 
collars and I still don’t wear them much.26 
 
In the salmon self-portrait, Lucas’s oversized jacket and polo neck block all signs of 
femaleness; she is swamped by a drab blokish practicality that in contrast to the 
                                                 
23
 Collings, p66. 
24
 Burn, p367. 
25
 Ibid. p367. 
26
 Collings, p66.  See also Burn who quotes Lucas saying: ‘I’ve always had this idea about 
what people mean by how they dress.  I mean, in the detail, men included – like whether 
they have their shirts done up or not done up, how their collars are, how their tie is in relation 
to their shirt, and all the nuances about how anybody’s dressed, and what they’re trying to 
say about themselves.’  Burn, pp378,379.   
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salmon, is totally sexless (but also like the salmon, is ugly).  This image deliberately 
avoids the gender-bending lad/ladette suggestive appeal of other self-portraits such 
as the iconic Fighting Fire With Fire (1991), which quite knowingly, has a kind of 




                     




The confusion of gender signage evident in Got a Salmon On # 3 is not unique.  
Another of the self-portraits Self-Portrait with Skull (1999), for example, has also 
caused confusion.  Lucas has referred to the skull between her open legs as a 
symbol of female sexuality, Malik and Collings however, read the two eye sockets 
as testicles.  It is particularly telling that her self-portraits can be misread in terms of 
gender when so much of Lucas’s other work is about signs of gender, signs that are 
often hilariously crude but certainly not open to misinterpretation.  Lucas explores  
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 Ibid.  p370. 
 272 
the difference of sex not as a subjective experience of maleness or of femaleness 
as a lived condition, not as a performative practice, but rather of the outward signs, 
that express us in terms of the restrictive either/or gender binary as either ‘man’ or 
‘woman’.  This has all the subtlety of toilet door pictograms, yet because of their 
economy, her signs also have the practical elegance, precision and purposefulness 




      
 Sarah Lucas The Old Couple (1992)           Sarah Lucas Au Natural (1994) 
 
 
Paradigmatic of Lucas’s clear gender signage are works such as Au Natural and 
The Old Couple.  Lucas uses a selection of natural and man-made items to sex the 
assemblages in a way that manages to fuse poignancy and black comedy, 
producing a depiction of the enduring ordinariness of being clearly and definitively 
gendered.  The Old Couple is a couple of old chairs, not a matching pair but similar.  
On the seat of one chair is an erect penis object, actually a wax model of a dildo.  
This chair is male.  Its companion has a pair of false teeth on its seat, and as the 
‘other’ of the couple, the false teeth, open and pink gummed, represent female 
genitalia.  It is impossible to not think ‘vagina dentata’, even as we mentally cross off 
the anxiety this represents; for these are the teeth of a toothless old woman.  And in 
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the ordinariness of the objects, gender seems stripped of eroticism; it fails to be 
sexy.  It hardly even tries.  Its sexuality is of routine and mechanical couplings, 
redolent of long-stale relationships that are the reality of much of our lives. 
 
Au Naturel slumps against the wall.  It consists of an old mattress picked out from 
bed-sit land, or a junk shop, or even found discarded in the street.  ‘He’ is two 
oranges and a cucumber, ‘she’, two melons and an old bucket.  There is no room 
for misinterpretation.  Malik comments on the un-sexiness of the sex we read in Au 
Naturel and its refusal to depict a ‘natural’ sexed body.   
The absence of any ‘self’ or ‘selves’ in Au Naturel, . . . destroys any 
emotional or sentimental connection to the body.  The mirroring of a ‘self’ 
frequently determines the representation of the body, forging an 
unconscious identification in the spectator, who sees a distorted image of 
him or herself in it.  Au Naturel forces the spectator into a condition of seeing 
‘sex’ only to refuse it, to collapse the categories under which sex, sexuality 
or gender might be placed.28 
 
In ‘refusing’ sex, or more bluntly refusing the arousal that sexual imagery so often 
expects of its spectators, the gender signage of works such as Au Naturel is almost 
without emotional weight.  Malik finds this troubling, she resists the objectification of 
the image, declining to find any ‘self’ in the work, refusing the misogynistic jibe that 
she has ‘a fanny like a bucket’.  In her refusal to be represented she conflates 
morality and feeling; for her, both are absent from this work. 
Perhaps what is troubling about Lucas’s work, and particularly Au Naturel, is 
that it inserts us into a position of spectatorship that makes us see ‘sex’ and 
suggests a chauvinistic objectification of the sex act that lacks any moral 
opprobrium,  There is no implication of guilt or shame, or even 
embarrassment.29 
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 Malik, p7. 
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 Ibid. p23 
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In this work, the embarrassment, which I would argue is far from entirely absent, is a 
mild and quite comfortable chagrin.  Softened by the humour of the image, 
embarrassment comes from the all too clear representation of gender as functional; 
pragmatic rather than erotic. 
 
Why then, given her erstwhile bluntness, are Lucas’s images of herself so 
ambivalent about gender?  She has said; ‘I never liked being in photographs and I 
avoided it if at all possible.  I thought I looked masculine in a way I didn’t always find 
palatable.’30  Given Lucas’s acknowledged discomfiture with her self-image, the self-
portraits are all the more interesting.  Discomfiture notwithstanding, she exposes her 
image (which is quite different from exposing herself) and her expression is primarily 
one of defiance.  She declines to be fluffy, or glossy, or pleasing.  She declines to 
‘give good face’.  In this series of images, Lucas acknowledges but also resists the 
evaluation that is predicated on her exposure, and in this gesture of resistance she 
resists evaluation not only of self-image, as a woman, but also evaluation of the 
self-portrait; that is, she resists the evaluation of her work, and in so doing, resists 
the spurious category, ‘woman artist’. 
 
Another comment made by Lucas is provocative when considered in the context of 
the self-portraits: ‘One of the reasons I was interested in the feminine was that I 
wasn’t successful.’31  Do these images of self explore a particular failure; a 
correlation of failure and femaleness?  The biographical back-story to this comment 
relates to a period when her then partner Gary Hume’s career was flourishing while 
Lucas’s was faltering, and her reading matter at the time was hard-core feminism, 
notably Andrea Dworkin.  Feminism is certainly relevant to her work, but importantly 
does not drive it.  Lucas has said that she did not want to be the one on the  
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soapbox.32  As Malik notes, Lucas’s work is hard to read in terms of a feminist 
canon; it just doesn’t slot in.33  Whilst her images of self disidentify with 
womanliness or femininity, her body of work as a whole appears to disidentify with a 
recognisably feminist position.  Her work, particularly in its larky laddishness 
appears to turn its back on feminism as if refusing to take it seriously, but 
nevertheless, her work is certainly informed by feminist discourse.  Lucas has 
commented: 
I quite like insinuating myself into blokiness, definitely [ . . . ]  I do love it.  I 
love all the banter.  That’s why I would say something spurious, like ‘I’m a 
better bloke than most blokes.’  But it adds so much to the work that I do that 
I’m a woman doing it.  And that fascinates me, why it should be so much 
more powerful because I’m gender-bending, in a way.  But it is.34 
 
Malik comments that Lucas’s assumed ‘blokiness’, brings ‘a self-reflexivity to a 
masculine working-class culture that is unreflectively enacted by her male 
counterparts.’35  If (some of) her works were produced by a man, they might be 
derided as crass, but her gender adds a layer of ambiguity to the sexism that reads 
as displaced meaning, even if that meaning is not entirely clear.  It is perhaps left to 
the critic or the spectator to supply a feminist reading of their own.  Lucas herself, 
and by proxy the female parts of her sculptures seem to decline to take the feminist 
position, preferring instead to revel in their own dirty jokes. 
 
Lucas’s work has always exploited the tendency to anthropomorphise both natural 
and man-made objects; she imbues them with life, personality, sexuality, and 
humour.  Some of it is rather sad; it has the tawdry abjection of misogynism, but 
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 ‘Lucas read all the standard feminist texts . . . and then believing that they could be 
restricting, or at least overly prescriptive for an artist, abandoned them.  ‘I’ve decided I don’t 
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it to be me.’ Burn, p383. 
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some of the sexuality is very funny in a sea-side postcard way.  Lucas commented 
on the humour aroused by vegetables; 
Yeah, that’s the way I think most people think a lot of the time.  If I go down 
the Chapel market one day and buy a cucumber, the guy I’m buying it off 
winks when I’m buying it.  Life’s imbued with this continual innuendo, 
especially here.  If you’re walking along with this bloody great marrow, 
especially in the summer, people will be winking left right and centre, 
nudging the person they’re with.36 
 
The humour of Lucas’s work is easy, it exists in the vernacular, and being ‘small-
time and low-brow,’ as if from a music hall heritage, it resists intellectualisation.37  It 
also refuses to take the moral high ground on the objectification of women.  Her 
female figures are at times as abject as the archetypal butt of a dirty joke or locker-
room jibe.  However, in Lucas’s oeuvre; misogyny is recycled just as lightly as old 
tights.   
 
The spectator, historian or critic is of course free to be upset or outraged.  Malik, 
writing ‘as a feminist’ is uncomfortable with some of Lucas’s ‘negative’ images of 
women and tries hard to argue a case that her works ‘complicate how we 
understand both cultural and intellectual shame’.38  She struggles with her own 
spectatorial embarrassment, and finds that she cannot look without evaluation from 
a feminist and intellectual standpoint.  She asks: 
How can I write about these images [the tabloid works] without appearing 
condescending and patronising towards the readers of the newspapers from 
which they come, and exposing my prejudices about what being a woman 
means? [ . . . ]  In acknowledging my prejudices I must admit to my shame at 
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Malik’s discomfort exemplifies how Lucas successfully displaces evaluation 
embarrassment onto the spectator.  Unless we are able to shrug-off the larky-
misogyny the seeming-shallowness of meaning goads the spectator or critic into a 
more political, more feminist, more moralistic standpoint that seems to miss the 
humour of her work 
  
James Putnam asked Lucas in interview: 
JP:  Do you think that the way that people appreciate your work is linked to 
that slight embarrassment or repression about open sexuality? 
SL:  Yeah, I do definitely. 
JP:  ‘Do you see people’s embarrassed reactions to some of the sexual 
references in your work as also having a humorous element?40 
 
Her answer is that yes, she sees both embarrassment and humour in the making of 
her work and then in other people’s reactions to it.  Her account of the 
embarrassment of artistic production, the self-doubt, the hesitation and the 
misgivings about artistic integrity echo the comments made by Gilbert & George on 
their work.  They are sometimes embarrassed by its daftness and pointlessness, but 
they do it anyway, and once done, it is art and the embarrassment dissipates.41   
 
Lucas recounted her feelings of being watched at work at an art fair where she was 
making sculptures using vegetables.  She felt self-conscious at being observed, and 
filled with doubt about whether or not the work was ‘any good’, and also 
disconcerted by the vulgarity of the vegetables.  She said: 
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 James Putnam, "The Freud Museum: Sarah Lucas in Conversation with Curator James 
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doing the New Horny Pictures (2000) or drinking sculptures, if you think about it for four or 
five minutes, you’ll reject the work because it’s awkward, silly or embarrassing.  But if you do 
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then they’re being exhibited, suddenly they become the most normal things in the world.’ 
Obrist, pp72-74. 
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Just the rudeness of it became excruciatingly embarrassing for me.  But then 
I observed some of these people’s, particularly women’s, immediate 
reactions to the finished works.  They just laughed their heads off, with both 
embarrassment and enjoyment.  So my reaction is just the same as anyone 
else’s.42 
 
This comment is unexpectedly revealing.  I have argued that Lucas’s 
disidentification with the ideological category of woman is evident in her self-
portraits.  And that in refusing the category ‘woman’, she also refuses the dubious 
label of ‘woman artist’.  And, that her ‘blokiness’ manifests as a refusal to occupy a 
feminist position.  And that, cumulatively, these refusals are a strategy of self-
protection, of making herself unreadable, and thus impervious to evaluation and 
evaluation embarrassment.  However, in the comment quoted above, Lucas 
registers that her reaction to the embarrassment sometimes generated by her work 
is on a par with the response of others, and particularly other women.  In the ability 
to mitigate (and even take pleasure in) embarrassment through a shared sense of 
humour, there is a form of female solidarity, perhaps even of feminism in evidence.  
But it is a feminism that relies on neither politics, nor militancy, nor intellectual 
credentials to establish its position.  Despite Lucas herself being knowledgeable on 
feminist discourse, her work appears to reject the feminism of the well-read, white, 
middle-classes in favour of a more proletarian solidarity.  In its uncomplicated 
pleasure it is perhaps the mother of laddish humour.   
 
In the way that Lucas portrays femaleness, displaced on to objects which are self-
deprecating, sometimes abject, sometimes ‘game for a laugh’ she totally reverses 
the defensive position of the self-portraits and the elusion of gender they project.  
Works such as Bitch and Au Naturel are unequivocal; here there is no masquerade, 
no mask, no hide and seek.  Her portrayal of femaleness in the objects is 
                                                 
42
 Putnam. (accessed 01.09.11) 
 279 
unguarded, without glamour, apology, or explanation, and has nothing to do with 
what Malik terms ‘cultural and intellectual shame’.43  For Lucas ‘female’ may be a 
site of embarrassment, but not of shame.   
 
          
          Sarah Lucas Fat, Forty and Flab-ulous (1990) 
 
 
This is particularly evident in the case of her tabloid works, such as Sod You Gits 
and Fat, Forty and Flab-ulous, where she exhibits enlargements of pages from low-
rent red-top the Sport.  Whole pages are reproduced by photocopying, without 
intercession or mediation, resulting in works that are deceptively cheap and lazy.  
The ‘only’ things Lucas changes are size and context.  The articles are frequently 
about women; the women are objectified, and commodified, and yet they also 
joyously, defiantly, outlandishly, shamelessly celebrate female sexuality.  Lucas’s 
intentions are obscure; comment, critique and interpretation of these works are the 
province of the spectator.  The only thing certainly up for evaluation is spectatorial 
response, and Lucas, unlike Freud, never spoils her jokes by explaining them. 
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CODPIECE 
The gender ambivalence of Lucas’s self-portraiture has some correspondence with 
cross-dressing as an overlaying of one sign on another, thus compromising 
legibility.  In Vested Interests, Marjorie Garber writes on clothing as a system of 
signification, which declares associations and affiliations to certain groupings of 
gender, class, occupation, taste, and political allegiance.  They can of course just as 
well proclaim disassociation.   Some ‘vestimentary codes’ are easily legible, some 
are self-consciously discrete; a matter of being in the know.  Garber is largely 
concerned with cross-dressing as part of a gay or lesbian identity, but as she 
acknowledges, some instances ‘seem to belong to quite different lexicons of self-
definition and political and cultural display.’44  In Lucas’s case, this is straight but far 
from straightforward.  Her mannishness does not exhibit the ‘category crisis’ that 
marks the true cross-dresser, but it is sufficient to derail binary concepts of ‘male’ 
and ‘female’.  The spectator is refused the comfortable basis on which to make 
customary evaluations.   
 
Garber draws on Lacanian psychoanalysis to suggest that; ‘the transvestite is the 
equivalent of Lacan’s third term, not ‘having’ or ‘being’ the phallus, but ‘seeming’, or 
‘appearing’’, and that such ‘seeming’ acts both to mask reality and also to protect 
it.45  A Lacanian ‘seeming’ is immediately recognizable in the impulses that produce 
Muñoz’s ‘disidentification’ as a strategy to negotiate hegemonic norms; both 
masking and protecting the subject by destabilizing normative evaluations.  In the 
spectatorial response to Lucas’s refusal of conventional signs of womanliness, and 
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the spectatorial failure to see beyond a normative and naturalised gender binary, is 
there is a tendency to inflect ‘seeming’ with a pejorative  meaning of deception?  Is 
the spectator inclined to accuse Lucas of deception; of meaning something more, 
something else, so that if there was more meaning, we might ‘get it’?   
 
Is Lucas using her salmon as a codpiece?  Is she ‘seeming’ to have something she 
lacks in order to protect herself from a potentially embarrassing evaluation of her 
worth ‘as a woman’?  She displays her salmon as a sign of phallic potency, but it 
smells fishy, suggesting that her fish is a sign of sex and suspicion, and this salmon, 
as Lucas’s codpiece signals not only the psychoanalytic convolution of lack and lack 
of lack, but also the importance of humour in diffusing embarrassment.  Collings 
makes a similar point: ‘The fish is a derogatory comment on femininity as well as a 
classic phallic symbol.   But a woman is making the joke, plus the fish is a whopper, 
and look – she isn’t even horrified!’46 
 
Garber riffs on the multivalent readings of the gender signage of the codpiece.  Its 
meanings include cock and balls, but also; ‘hoax, fool, pretence or mock.47  So the 
codpiece is a sign of overdetermined phallic ostentation, but also a piece of 
tomfoolery, a ruse, a pun, a prosthesis, a joke-shop phallus, a nod and a wink 
towards a theatrical masculinity.  The salmon, like a codpiece, is ‘for show’ and like 
my mother’s tinned salmon, for showing off.  The codpiece, like the salmon, invites 
and complicates (e)valuation.  Each is a mark of Lacanian ‘seeming’ without 
meaning much.  Interestingly, the gender ambivalence of the codpiece is not a 
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source of anguish.  Perhaps due to its theatrical heritage, it is more of a piece with 





FREUD AND THE MASCULINITY COMPLEX 
The salmon, in Got a Salmon On, both dead and oversexed seems to invite a 
Freudian reading.  It is as if this fish has appeared in a dream and requires 
interpretation.48  It is as if it must mean something; as if it has perhaps some 
repressed association that we are ‘too tightly laced’ to bring directly to mind.  
Despite his synonymy with a patriarchal world view, Freud is an important thinker on 
gender difference, even and especially for feminists.   And I would argue that 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory offers a productive approach to Lucas’s work, not 
with the intention of ‘teasing out a hidden neurotic content’ or of applying some cod-
psychoanalysis to decoding either the art or the artist, but as a framework to further 
examine the embarrassment of gender suggested by her work, and also to consider 
embarrassment as a female complaint.49   
 
‘Freud’ is not without its own difficulties.  The failure of psychoanalytic theory to 
demonstrate any sound basis is, according to some, a far-reaching intellectual 
embarrassment.  Accused of phallocentrism, dubious scientific credentials, and 
being no more than specious fair-ground hooey, the long running, extremely wordy 
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and ill-tempered arguments have been dubbed ‘the Freud wars’.  Although the 
principles and techniques of psychoanalysis and its histories have been subject to a 
thoroughgoing dismantling, yet still its hold on us is strong and Freud is not easily 
dismissed.  Psychoanalysis has informed a great deal of twentieth-century thought 
and many prominent thinkers from Althusser to Žižek have been analysts and/or 
analysands making it disconcerting to speculate that much of the intellectual 
structure of the twentieth-century turns out to be a house of cards based on fiction 
and fraud.  We continue to cite Freudian theory out of habit, or intellectual hubris; 
‘masters by association, we are encouraged by a culture of theory to rub our 
intellectual projects against Freud or, even more likely nowadays, against 
‘Freudians’ like Jacques Lacan.’50  So firstly, there is the legacy of intellectual 
investment that we cannot afford to discard, and secondly, a sentimental attachment 
to therapy; we want to be cured.  We cannot seem to shake off the persistent belief 
that there is something about the self, some hidden core that can be revealed, and 
is worth revealing, and that psychoanalysis is the key.  So, an attachment to Freud 
or at least Freudiana survives because both the theory and the therapy satisfy an 
embarrassing narcissism.   
 
In 2000, against a background of the skirmishes of the Freud Wars, the relationship 
between Lucas’s imagery and Freud’s imaginary was cemented with an exhibition at 
the Freud Museum called, after Freud’s text and Lucas’s sculpture; ‘Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle’.  This juxtaposition suggests how Freudian psychoanalysis might 
prove useful in relation to Lucas’s work because of its potential to theorise the 
displacement of gender that is intrinsic to Lucas’s work as a source of displaced 
embarrassment.   
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Freud did not actually cause embarrassment to be female, but the concept of 
woman as excessive and feeble is something he is credited with authoring.  The 
science he invented, or perhaps more emotively, the pseudo-science he fathered 
rationalises the ‘failure’ of woman as a failure that originates in sub-standard genital 
equipment; we are born faulty.  Many of the problems, the discontents, the 
dissatisfactions, the embarrassments of being female, according to Freud, stem 
from being, and being seen to be quite literally without a phallus.  Furthermore, 
Freud’s ‘invention’ of penis envy is, or so he argued, the root cause of women’s 
tendency to be ruled by their emotions.  Character traits attributed to penis envy 
include ‘narcissism, vanity, and shame, as well as jealousy and envy itself.’52  Freud 
almost never used the word embarrassment (save only in relation to parapraxis),  
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dealing instead in the heavier and more moralistic ‘shame’.  But it seems self-
evident that he would, if it were not beneath his notice, have included 
embarrassment in his list of women’s emotional foibles. 
 
In his essay ‘Why Can’t a Woman Be More Like a Man’, Malcolm Macmillan, an 
anti-Freudian and psychoanalytic dissenter, writes: 
No aspect of Freud’s work has aroused more objection than his treatment of 
female psychology.  And understandably so, since the burden of his theory 
was the self-evident superiority of male to female sex organs, once 
perceived by little girls, sends them into a lifetime’s worth of devious and 
dependent behaviour that can only retard the true (masculine) work of 
civilization.  Freud apparently never budged from that position or worried 
about its suspicious congruence with the misogyny of his time.53 
 
Freud was inconvenienced by women; they did not fit his theory.  He had to write 
around them to produce convoluted and unconvincing ‘girlish variants’ of the 
Oedipus complex in an attempt to account for the development of female 
psychosexuality.  Macmillan comments; ‘Not even Freud himself was altogether 
proud of the result, but the embarrassment has long since become general and far 
more extreme.’54  
 
Within a schema that considered women as congenitally inferior in both physical 
and mental capacity, Freud theorised a wishful displacement of (female) gender.  
He observed and recorded a clinical condition amongst some of his female patients 
(including his youngest daughter Anna) that manifested as the adoption of a 
masculine persona, not in real life, but in their imagination.  Through this fantasy of 
being not a man, but man-ish, ‘the girl’ was able to evade the impediment of her  
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own sexuality.  He theorised that this condition, which he termed ‘the masculinity 
complex’, was symptomatic of a restless dissatisfaction with the incompleteness 
and inadequacy of the female gender as a faulty copy of the masculine.   
Freud did not connect the female patients’ assumption of a masculine role in 
fantasies and daydreams with masculinised behaviour or homosexuality.  On 
the contrary, he saw it as an escape from sexuality; ‘the girl escapes from 
the demands of the erotic side of her life altogether.  She turns herself in 
fantasy into a man, without herself becoming active in a masculine way, and 
is no longer anything but a spectator at the event which has the place of the 
sexual act.’55 
 
In Freud’s ‘masculinity complex’, we can identify a prototype for Lacan’s ‘seeming’ 
and even Muñoz’s ‘disidentification’, and might furthermore draw some connection 
with Riviere’s ‘masquerade’ as an act of compensation for the lack of ‘normal’ 
female attributes of incompleteness and inadequacy.  Each strategy, albeit in 
differing ways, addresses the perceived biological and sociocultural shortcomings of 
the female gender and its negative evaluations as a negotiable obstacle, one that 
might be escaped (even if only in fantasy), and I would argue that Lucas’s elusion of 
female gender, or more precisely the image of her own femaleness, characteristic of 
her ‘mannish’ self-portraits, is just such an act of escape. 
 
In Lucas’s self-portraits, mannishness is an escape from gender and by extension 
from sexuality as criteria for evaluation, and thus it is a prophylactic against 
embarrassment, the embarrassment of being female; incomplete and always 
available for evaluation by means of ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’.  In her self-portraits, 
Lucas appropriates ‘mannishness’, not in order to appear as a man, but to overwrite 
the signs of femininity by which a woman is summarily judged, that is, judged ‘by 
her cover’ on the basis of appearance.  Lucas’s gender ambivalence, generally  
                                                 
55
 Young-Bruehl, p107. In her account of this complex Young-Bruehl cites Freud’s 1919 
Essay “A Chid is Being Beaten”. 
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evident in her series of self-portraits and, in particular fronted by her codpiece, (the 
salmon) suggests that we cannot evaluate her in terms of either male achievement 
or female appearance.  She declines to give good face.   
 
Relating to the subject of the ‘masculinity complex’ Anna Freud wrote the following:  
The patient felt that the fact that she was a girl prevented her from achieving 
her ambitions and, at the same time, that she was not even a pretty enough 
girl really to be attractive to men.  In her disappointment with herself she 
displaced her wishes onto objects who she felt were better qualified to fulfil 
them.56 
 
Whilst Anna Freud writes here of a patient she was analysing, there is evidence that 
she was referring also to herself, and her two sessions of analysis with her father, 
Sigmund.  And whilst Anna Freud intends ‘objects’ to refer to other persons (both 
male and female), in Lucas’s work, the ‘objects’ fulfilling displaced wishes are quite 
literally objects, but objects that are saturated with anthropomorphic meaning and 
gender signage. The conflation of femaleness and lack of success that Anna Freud 
writes of reverberates with the comment made by Lucas that her interest in the 
feminine is directly related to her (then) lack of success.  In each statement, the two 
categories; femaleness and failure are tightly knotted, as are exposure and 
evaluation, and hurt and ‘true’.   
 
It is my contention that in her self-portraits, Lucas both draws attention to, and 
perhaps comes to terms with, the particularly female embarrassment of exposure, of 
‘to-be-looked-at-ness’.  Lucas in fact ‘faces up’ to the exposure that is the lot of 
‘woman’ (and also of celebrity) of being taken at ‘face value’.  But her evasion of 
womanliness in self-portraiture is also a strategy that refuses the embarrassment of 
evaluation.  The gender ambivalence denies the spectator the capacity to know and 
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 Freud, A. The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (1936) cited in Young-Bruehl, p129.   
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so to act; to judge.  This ambivalence might be said to function not so much as a 
carapace that protects her exposure, but as a void that suspends evaluation.  The 
embarrassment that Lucas evades becomes displaced; in the case of the self-
portraits, some of the displaced embarrassment may become the embarrassment of 
the spectator.   Elsewhere in her work the embarrassment of being sexed is already 
displaced, that is, displaced onto her objects.  Objects and assemblages such as 
Bitch, the female half of Au Naturel, and the passive, leggy, bunny chairs present 
femaleness as always already compromised by negative evaluations.   
 
 
                     






THE MISSING PIECE  
One comment on Sarah Lucas’s work is made over and over.  There seems to be 
something missing as if there were an ellipsis somewhere in the image .  Lucas’s 
work has furthermore been described as ‘withholding’ and ‘aphoristic’.57  This is not 
a reference to death, or absence.  It involves no sentimental longing for something 
                                                 
57
 ‘Sarah Lucas’s approach to her work is similarly withholding, equally aphoristic:’ Burn, 
p369. 
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to complete it and make it, or her, whole.  It is more a case of ‘it’ being not all there.  
If ‘it’ was not missing, the spectator, or especially the critic, who is conditioned to 
find meaning in art might be more secure in their claim to ‘get it’.  It can be an 
embarrassment to not get it, betraying a lack of ‘cultural capital’ that may manifest 
as naivety, stupidity, poor education, poor taste, social faux pas, or lack of street 
cred; it leaves us feeling foolish.  As Phillips writes: 
 We know when there is something we are not getting even if we don’t   
 always know what it is.  But whatever the ‘it’ is – the joke, the point, the 
 poem – we would rather get it.  And this definite preference is a clue about 
 the ways we want, and the ways we are educated to want.58  
 
What exactly is missing in Lucas’s work is unclear, but there is a feeling that the 
missing piece would have, could have, supplied critical information enabling the 
spectator or the critic to make more sense of the work, enabling them to confirm 
their uncertain reading and to ascribe to the work some intellectual depth.  If the 
work is merely shallow, then spectatorial investment is intellectually embarrassing, 
but if we believe it to have depth, to have meaning and therefore value, the 
spectator may be equally embarrassed by the fragility of her claims to knowledge.   
 
In search of depth, Lucas’s work is frequently discussed in arthistorical frames of 
reference, notably arte povera, minimalism and surrealism, comparisons are also 
routinely made with Warhol and Duchamp.  All of these comparisons furnish 
seemingly valid connections that turn out to be critical dead ends.  Perry suggests 
that Lucas’s work; ‘has been seen by some as gesturing towards postmodern and 
feminist concerns, but ultimately saying nothing and resisting serious analytical 
exploration.’59  And Stallabrass asks; ‘Why does critical theory bounce off this 
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 Adam Phillips, Missing Out: In Praise of the Unlived Life (London: Hamish Hamilton, 
2012). p37. 
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 Gill Perry, ed. Difference and Excess in Contemporary Art: The Visibility of Women's 
Practice (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004). p16.   
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work?’60  As each of these commentators suspect, it is certainly not because of a 
lack of critical input.  Lucas’s make-do, low-rent materials, tabloid-style vernacular, 
and philistine attitude are balanced by a thorough, but thoroughly invisible 
theoretical backbone. 
 
There ‘seems’ to be, in the Lacanian sense, with that ‘seeming’ suspended 
somewhere between ‘being’ and ‘having’, a great deal of theory at play in Lucas’s 
work.  A string of isms; feminism, post-modernism, deconstructionism, and 
symbolism are invisibly present.  Stallabrass concedes that; ‘Despite appearances, 
then, theory is certainly not absent from Lucas’s work: indeed, her entire oeuvre 
would be impossible without its insights.’61  But the spectator is frustrated; the 
capacity to know is restricted, the spectator is ‘without’ knowledge.  Knowing, really 
knowing, is withheld, and to not know is experienced almost as a sexual frustration, 
or a state of incapacity and inferiority, like a child, or a woman.   ‘ . . . and not getting 
it here means being confounded, being undone, being diminished . . . he is left 
feeling that his agency, or rather his desire, is confused or compromised, or even 
stolen from him . . .’62  To not know, to not be ‘in the know’ is to be unmanned; 
embarrassed. 
 
The evasion of meaning in Lucas’s work reads as symptomatic of the degree of 
embarrassment that she feels about being exposed and evaluated through the 
critique of her work.  This is a problem that is compounded in the customary 
confixing of art and artist; both are exposed, both are evaluated.  The something-
missing-ness of Lucas’s work in general, operates in the same way as the 
genderlessness of her self-portraits; it rebuffs evaluation, transferring the 
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 Julian Stallabrass, High Art Lite (London: Verso, 1999). p95.  
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 Stallabrass, p94 
62
 Phillips, Missing Out, p52. 
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embarrassment of being seen/judged back onto the disadvantaged spectator whose 
capacity to know is restricted.  And Lucas is giving nothing away.   
I’m not trying to put forward something.  I’m trying to avoid a lot of things.  I 
try to be fairly neutral, in the same way that I try to find a neutral table for a 
piece of work.63   
And yet another comment from Lucas; 
In the end an important part of making those pieces for me was deciding not 
to be judged.  That decision actually freed me.  I’m not judged and I don’t 
have to be limited even by my own judgements.64 
 
In looking for the missing piece, the spectator and the critic scan the iconography in 
a game of hide and seek that is schooled in Freudiana if not actually in Freud.  
There is a spectatorial inclination to ‘see’ something missing as a hole or gap that 
has meaning.  The spectator is inclined to ‘see’ what isn’t there, to read something 
into the gap, to uncover ‘hidden’ meaning.  The spectator sees the gap, the ellipsis 
as somehow concrete assigning to it a greater intentionality and significance than 
that of mere nothingness.  In this attribution of import, the spectator must take some 
responsibility for the gap, for what they don’t see; it is their gap and their missing 
piece that they imagine filling it and thus it is their exposure that is now vulnerable to 
evaluation.65  
 
Lucas’s tactics of ambivalence, and neutrality, and withholding, her habitual 
economy of gesture, effectively turn the tables on the spectator, who must, in the 
final account, take responsibility for interpretation and meaning, and perhaps, for  
feeling something.  If exposure and evaluation are the twin peaks of 
embarrassment, they become our problem not hers.  If Lucas’s objects, the fish, the 
light bulbs, false teeth, fag ends, and fruit make us think we see sex everywhere,  
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 From an interview with Marco Spinelli, Walker Art Centre, Minneapolis, Brilliant! New Art 
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Lucas-as-object in her self-portraits cautions that maybe we don’t actually see sex  
or sexuality; it’s all in the head.  The last word on finding (any) meaning in her work 
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Chapter Seven (Conclusion):    
Outcome:  Towards a critical epistemology  




Whenever I attempt to ‘analyse’ a text that has given me pleasure, it is not my 
‘subjectivity’ I encounter but my ‘individuality’, the given which makes my body 
separate from other bodies and appropriates its suffering or its pleasure.               




Through the analysis of a series of loosely connected encounters with contemporary 
art, this thesis cumulatively builds a critical epistemology of embarrassment.  Piece 
by piece it accrues a particular and contextual knowledge gained through attention 
to the marginalia of spectatorship and a sometimes imaginary rapport with the 
subject matter.  The encounters have for the most part been personal and based on 
my own experience; in fact, the very personal and indeed subjective nature of 
embarrassment has been acknowledged as a productive limitation, and adopted 
throughout as a praxis.  My encounters with art, which I offered from the outset as a 
romance, leave me bruised.  Each in its own way is a one-off; each encounter is like 
a one-night stand, and as Ridout remarks; ‘Is not the pleasure of a one-night stand 
always bought at the cost of a certain embarrassment?’2  
 
The episodic nature of the various encounters has formed the framework of 
chapters; each an exploration of the feelings aroused, and an engagement with the 
various theoretical and critical discourses that underlie such feelings.  The romance 
                                                 
1
 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans., Richard Miller (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 1975). p62.   
2
 Ridout, p79. 
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of the episodes, suggested as a romance by Tomkins, has been an ill-matched 
affair between the slight and imprecise feeling-ness of embarrassment and the 
abstract power of theory, supposed as having more strength and authority than 
feeling.   
 
Because embarrassment hurts, all our natural impulses are to avoid it, so when 
Gilbert and George claim this to be a ‘good feeling’ there is a suggestion of 
perversity that this research project has sought to understand.  A further aim has 
been to validate, not embarrassment itself, which must remain disprised, but the 
subjective ‘truth’ of the knowledge, and indeed self-knowledge that embarrassment 
imparts.  The embarrassment of the text has proved to be elusive and 
unpredictable, but this series of studies has shown that it might be found in the 
peripheral, the overlooked, the disavowed, in attending to the unintentional.  
Embarrassment has been found not to reside exactly in the text, nor in its spectator 
(though either may be predisposed towards embarrassment or embarrassability), 
but to be found in and around the moment of the encounter; perhaps in a moment of 
stickiness, unscheduled and inappropriate.  And at first glance, this moment is 
seemingly unproductive because it interrupts and displaces the conventional 
spectator-text response.  But its value lies precisely in its disruptiveness, a quality 
that is neither easily anticipated, nor amenable to theorisation.  It is in the nature of 
embarrassment to be personal, to be marginal, and to be singular.  These qualities 
make embarrassment resistant to an orthodox project of generalisation, but 
contribute to a remarkable form of embodied criticality. 
 
Embarrassment is personal.  And the critical epistemology of embarrassment 
returns always to instances of the singular.  It is a form of knowledge that resides in 
the empirical and is resistant to the broad sweep of theorization; it is non-
transferable, and unsuited to the collectivity of politics.  It is about an inimitable 
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moment of aversive self-consciousness, when the self is singled out; exposed and 
evaluated.  In its singularity embarrassment is positioned as being in opposition to 
inclusiveness.  The feeling of embarrassment is experienced as a sense of 
exclusion from communities of competence and composure.  It is a feeling that 
manifests as being ‘without’; and I have adopted ‘without’ as a Barthesian 
amphibology; a word that means two things and insists on meaning both at once, 
‘as if one were winking at the other and as if the word’s meaning were in that wink’.3  
And so, embarrassment, as a feeling of a ‘withoutness’, of both ‘outside’ and ‘lack’ is 
a feeling of an inadequate singularity.   
 
This final chapter draws together the strands of knowledge generated in the 
preceding episodes; knowledge of a weak theory, a weak method, and an 
uncomfortable embodied truth and how each underpins the singularity of 
embarrassment.  The conclusion offered by this thesis is that embarrassment, as an 
embodied criticality, is critical of coercive ideologies at work in the construction and 
constructedness of situations of ‘withoutness’; such as without competence or 
without composure.  I am embarrassed by my exclusion from institutions of intimacy, 
from coteries of cultural competence, from spaces of gay male pleasure.  I am 
embarrassed by my lack of clear understanding; I am not ‘in the know’.  Such 
situations may be experienced quite literally as exclusion from some form of 
collectivity, but embarrassment may also be perversely present in uncomfortable 
situations of inclusion, and this in no way eradicates the feeling of singularity; of 
being singled out.  Embarrassments of being and belonging, and of not being, and 
not belonging, though seemingly contradictory, are actually of a piece.  Sometimes 
belonging is only provisional, or it is restrictive, or too costly to maintain.  Sometimes 
it is embarrassing to belong.  I am embarrassed to be counted in, amongst the 
sentimental, although I am sentimental (and Bersani is embarrassed to be counted 
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 Barthes, Roland Barthes, p72. 
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as sentimental because he is not).  The feeling is sometimes about being on the 
wrong side of some seemingly arbitrary fence or boundary as if there were a lack of 




A BODY OF KNOWLEDGE 
A critical epistemology of embarrassment is in a sense, not a theory of knowledge, 
but a ‘body of knowledge’.  The body (in a non-Cartesian sense)4 is the scope and 
subject of embarrassment.  What can be known is generated here, and grounded 
here.  The body enfolds our inner self of le privé and frames the public face of our 
image, but the outer limit of this body extends beyond the skin that can blush to 
encompass what might be termed the ‘social skin’, an interface between the self 
and all that it encounters.5  ‘Social skin’ is sometimes too tight, or itchy, or out of 
fashion, mine has no pockets.  The encounters with art detailed in the previous 
chapters have attended to the thinking and feeling body and provided a microcosm 
of the experience of ‘social skin’.  Art has the capacity to get right to the nub of the 
matter; it has the capacity to matter to us, to get right under our skin.   
 
In Thinking Through the Body, Gallop posits that the splitting of mind and body is a 
‘cruel disorganisation’ and tries repair this division and also to reconfigure ‘the split 
between public and private which keeps our lives out of our knowledge’.6  Within a 
                                                 
4
 I understand ‘body’ in this context to be whole rather than split into the thinking mind and 
its carcass of the unthinking life support system. 
5
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others.’ Ahmed, Cultural Politics, p148. 
6
 Gallop here cites and builds on the work of Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born; motherhood 
as experience and institution (1976) Jane Gallop, Thinking through the Body (New York: 
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project of predicating knowledge on bodily experience, she considers a 
psychologically inflected art criticism that my approach has approximated.   
 To face a work of art, or any other sort of object, with the identity of a 
 psychoanalytic critic, is to offset one’s sense of uncertainty, ignorance and 
 insufficient understanding with the authority of a body of knowledge, a 
 history  of connoisseurship that traces back to Freud’s knowledge.7  
 
And whilst Gallop seems initially to invoke the ‘body of knowledge’ of all of Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theory and its continuation in the work of Freudians, suggesting that 
we might offset feelings of ignorance or uncertainty by relying on the authority of a 
‘body of knowledge’ as a corpus of theory, in another sense, to trace back to 
‘Freud’s knowledge’ is to acknowledge its origination in the body of Sigmund, so 
that the ‘body of knowledge’ might be considered to be subject to the limitations of 
embodiment, and how and what ‘Freud’ knew was limited to what Sigmund felt and 
what Sigmund thought.   
 
In fact, Gallop goes on to propose that we might ‘read Freud not so much for his 
knowledge of subjectivity as for the imprint of his own subjectivity upon his pursuit of 
knowledge.’8  So perhaps ‘Freud’s knowledge’ should call to mind an empirical 
knowledge, an experiential knowledge that, takes into account the linked 
seeing/knowing (voir/savoir) that is personal, subjective and embodied.  This of 
course, suggests a limited knowledge, but one that we can count on to be, within its 
limited context, ‘true’.  That limitation of what can be known, of a ‘body of 
knowledge’ and indeed the limitedness of embarrassment as something brief in 
duration and minor in register have been considered here as a form of marginalism 
envisaged as a productive limitation that confines attention to the empiricism of 
thinking-feeling. 
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But what of the body that can’t be known, or the body that denies all knowledge?  
The ambiguity of gender of Sarah Lucas’s self-portraits has been considered as a 
cause of some embarrassment.  Not an embarrassment of ambiguous gender per 
se, but specifically, it is the not-knowing that is spectatorially problematical.  The 
spectator is not ‘in the know’.  The hyper-gendered/ultra-neuter nature of her work 
leaves the spectator feeling the necessity to read something into a perceived 
ellipsis; to fill in the gaps.  But in doing this, I stumble over a moment of 
knowing/not-knowing, and leap to conclusions that I can’t quite make.  Rather than 
enjoying what Sedgwick terms the ‘privilege of unknowing’, I suffer the privation of 
(not)knowing too much. I am embarrassed by the fragility or even fraudulence of my 
claims to knowledge.  
 
 
BODY OF KNOWLEDGE:   (i) WEAK THEORY 
This thesis has proposed that although embarrassment is broadly resistant to 
theorisation, a ‘theory of embarrassment’ can be envisaged in so far as it meets the 
criteria established by Silvan Tomkins for a ‘weak theory’ of negative affect.  In 
Chapter Two attempts to theorise the embarrassment of Jemima Stehli’s Strip using 
existentialism and anecdote both failed on their own terms due to their blind-spots, 
but both managed to account for some of the embarrassment of Strip precisely 
though their limitations.  The idea of a limit that curtails generalisation is central to 
‘weak theory’ which is restricted in its application and not extensively transferrable.  
What a weak theory of affect achieves is a narrative of event that accounts 
effectively for the feeling it causes, its circumstances and implications, and what 
truth it tells.  The theory is weak only in its extent.  As a weak theory, it does not 
account well for other, different events, which each have their own tale and their own 
truth.  The connection we can draw between separate incidents is tentative.  There 
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may be a likeness that Sedgwick refers to as ‘textured analogy’ but the threads of 
similitude are fragile and not able to sustain the generalising tendencies of a 
stronger, more abstract theory.   
 
A weak theory of embarrassment can be seen to have been effective throughout the 
chapters; it both connects them and holds them apart.  Each event requires its own 
detailed description and evaluation; threads of similitude can be drawn, but the 
knowledge gained is limited in its transferability.  Adam Phillips argues that from a 
psychological perspective, all emotional experience is limited in this way; 
The contingent self is a weak epistemologist because it knows only one 
thing, and it is a paradoxical kind of knowledge.  It knows that all emotional 
experience is new at every moment, and since all our equipment to prepare  
ourselves for the future comes from the past, it is redundant and ironic.9 
  
Each separate encounter demonstrated that I was unable to anticipate 
embarrassment (and so avoid it) using previous knowledge.   
 
I approached Howells’ 14 Stations expecting to be embarrassed by issues of risk 
and intimacy foregrounded by the performance, but I was not embarrassed.  And 
then unexpectedly, awkwardly I experienced a quite different embarrassment that 
was located in another dimension altogether.  I was unmoved by the nudity, 
confession, pain and participation, but the sentimentality of the work caught me with 
my pants down, causing me to confront my own narrative history and a younger self 
that haunts it.  The embarrassment was slight and slippery.  It was not at all what I 
had expected and not where I expected it to be.   
 
                                                 
9
 Phillips, On Flirtation, p21.  The claim made by Phillips is however, not necessarily true.  
Tomkins considers that some emotions actually build strong theory; he gives the example of 
humiliation which produces a strong negative affect theory which marshals the experience of 
humiliation in extensive anticipation of further humiliations.  See. 
Tomkins cited in Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, p134. 
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To be effective then, a theory of embarrassment must be weak.  It needs to be 
loose, porous to event, and above all tentative.  To capture the singularity of the 
feeling, it must be rooted in individualism and empirical particularity.  Weak theory 
may be absolutely effective, but only in singular instances.  The truth it offers to tell 
is not one of typicality or generality, but is nevertheless ‘true’.   
 
 
BODY OF KNOWLEDGE:   (ii) WEAK TRUTH CLAIMS 
One of the values that might be ascribed to embarrassment is that of telling, or 
perhaps exposing something that is true.  In Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Hotspur 
invokes an old maxim that links truth to shame; 
 And I can teach thee, coz, to shame the devil 
 By telling truth: tell truth and shame the devil.10 
 
If embarrassment is a minor shame, then its truth is a minor truth; not less true, but 
true in a minor context.  It is a subjective truth, singularly true, and experienced 
bodily.  Gilbert & George have stated; ‘We are very embarrassed sometimes at what 
we are doing, and that’s a good feeling.  When it hurts then its true for us.’11  In the 
embarrassment they feel, the conditions of ‘hurt’ and ‘truth’ each stand as guarantor 
for the other.  If it wasn’t true then it wouldn’t hurt, and if it didn’t hurt it wouldn’t be 
true.  And so, through this equation, embarrassment and its epistemology might be 
presumed to have a contiguous relationship to truth.  Sometimes the disclosure of 
truth is inadvertent; embarrassment is forced upon us and we give ourselves away 
by blushing.  Other times, the equation of embarrassment with truth relates as much 
or more to its narrative as it does to the event.  The truth of embarrassment is a 
disclosure, an admission, a confession, and this has been explored here through the 
use of anecdote.  And furthermore, the relation of embarrassment to truth has been 
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 William Shakespeare, The Complete Works (the Alexander Text) (London: Collins, 1978). 
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 The Words of Gilbert & George, p136.   
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considered here through concepts of ‘objectivity’; a presumed general truthfulness, 
and ‘subjectivity’ which though partisan, comes closer to the embodiedness of 
embarrassment’s truth as something ‘real’ and something that can hurt.   
 
Taking part in Howells’ 14 Stations caused me to consider sentimentality as a 
feeling that is more embarrassing to some than to others.  For Berlant’s intimate 
public, the sweeter feelings may be embraced and accepted.  For Leo Bersani, in 
contrast, the assumption that he might value the sentimental ‘romances of memory’ 
was declared to be ‘somewhat embarrassing’.  My embarrassment was 
unexpectedly about the sentimental attachment I feel for an unlovely younger self 
and her ‘narratives and things’.  I was, in truth, moved not by the political agency of 
the work, but by the romances of memory.  Irony would have spared my 
embarrassment, but in order to remain ‘true’ to myself, I needed to fully own my 
sentimentality.  Rather than a case of being ‘without’, my embarrassment was 
experienced from within.  I find that I am to be counted in as one of Berlant’s 
‘intimate public’, and not quite the hard-boiled, left-facing intellectual of the ‘social 
skin’ I affect to inhabit.   
 
The truth of embarrassment is visceral; like Barthes’ punctum it pricks, it bruises.  It 
is not only a corporeal truth but also personal, in the sense of a private truth and 
limited to the person.  Embarrassment is not concerned with general truths or 
truisms, but only with a truth that is pin-point accurate.  Lee Edelman captures the 
particularity of truth that I have argued can be ascribed to embarrassment and its 
resistance to the broad sweep of generality.   
Truth [ . . . ] irreducibly linked to the ‘aberrant or atypical’, to what chafes against 
‘normalization’, finds its value not in a good susceptible to generalization, but 
only in the stubborn particularity that voids every notion of the general good.12  
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 Edelman. No Future, p6. 
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This thesis, although not conceived as a project of revalorisation, has proposed that 
the stubborn, particular, hurtful truth of embarrassment could be considered to be of 
‘value’, albeit a perverse value, and furthermore, that the value of embarrassment as 
truth-telling should be accepted as singular, as belonging to a singular self without 
the need to ascribe its value to some wider project, such as ‘the general good’.  It is 




BODY OF KNOWLEDGE:   (iii) WEAK POLITICS 
Although embarrassment can be a present moment of inaction, a blockage when 
the self is out of play, a freeze-frame, a moment between moments when time 
seems to stand still, it is also always marked by its futurity.  This indicates a ‘weak 
politics’ of embarrassment that originates in the temporary blockage of embaras, 
and is a promise of other potential outcomes and so, in effect, a mandate for 
change.  The appalling present moment of embarrassment is mitigated by the 
potential to remedy the fault next time.  It is an overdetermined experience of the 
lived present moment, but yet it desires the sliding doors of other outcomes; ‘if only 
we could pull ourselves together’.  Embarrassment is in fact a feeling of ‘if only . . .’.  
As Sedgwick puts it: 
Because the reader has room to realize that the future may be different from 
the present, it is also possible for her to entertain such profoundly painful, 
profoundly relieving, ethically crucial possibilities as that the past, in turn, 
could have happened differently from the way it did.13  
 
So as a feeling of ‘if only . . .’, embarrassment assumes a promise of different 
potential outcomes, of being better than this, of competence, composure, okayness, 
of possibilities.  And the critical potential of embarrassment, and its pause lies, at 
                                                 
13
 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, p146. 
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least in part, in entertaining such possibilities, and entertaining them in a bodily way 
as hurtful and true. 
 
However, embarrassment is weak in a political sense because the possibilities of 
‘next time’ notwithstanding, the urgent project of the embarrassed self is the 
reinstatement of composure.  Nothing beyond this matters, or matters enough, or 
matters now.  As an emotion, embarrassment is only weakly political (anger for 
example is stronger) and in this weakness there is a likeness to the politicality of 
Berlant’s ‘intimate public’ which she terms ‘juxtapolitical’, inhabiting a political 
environment, acted on by political factors, and politically aware, but not engaged.  
Berlant comments; ‘Politics requires active antagonism, which threatens the sense in 
consensus; this is why, in an intimate public, the political sphere is more often seen 
as a field of threat, chaos, degradation, or retraumatization than a condition of 
possibility.’14  Embarrassment is averse to antagonism.  Embarrassment wants 
mostly to put its own house in order, it is consumed with the need to restore 
equanimity to its own internal chaos.  Embarrassment is not quite inert, but tends 
towards inactivity, it looks away, thinks inwardly and waits for the moment to pass, 
the predicament to ease.   
 
The cathartic potential for change that emotion augers is also noted by Probyn in 
relation to shame.  She declines to claim that the experience of shame makes us 
better people, that, she says, would be hubris.  She writes:  
I won’t go that far, but shame undoubtedly makes us feel temporarily more 
fragile in ourselves.  And that acknowledgement of fragility may serve as a 
basis from which to re-evaluate one’s existence.  . . .  the rupture and loss of 
assurance, or cultural capital, when one is thrust into another field may begin 
the process of change.15  
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In its imagining of other outcomes however, embarrassment is wishful rather than 
dynamic (perhaps less dynamic than shame).  Commenting on the minor, dysphoric 
emotions, Ngai describes the political aspect of her ‘ugly feelings’ as a ‘restricted 
agency’, a form of passivity or suspended action; action that is blocked by 
ambivalence.  She characterises minor negative affect as generally noncathartic in 
that it foregrounds ‘a failure of emotional release’ but also these nasty little feelings 
are circuitous, it is irritating to feel irritable, anxiety makes us anxious, being 
embarrassed is embarrassing, so not only is there no emotional release, there is no 
release; we are trapped.16  Embarrassment as a political force is then weak, and it is 
isolating; it avoids contact, even eye contact; and so acts against collectivism.  It 
lacks motivation and is characterised by the modesty of its ambition.  
Embarrassment is typically a ‘restricted agency’ and though it aspires to be ‘good’ it 
is risk averse and will gladly settle for being good-enough. 
 
Walking round Tate Modern at the Major Exhibition of the work of Gilbert & George, 
I felt a peculiar sense of being in the wrong place; of not belonging.  ‘Art for All’ 
proclaim Gilbert and George, declaring me welcome, a welcome that might declare 
classlessness.   But despite this, I was overwhelmed by self-consciousness, on the 
brink of embarrassment.  I suffered a feeling of a lack of competence; a failure to 
master the cultural competence of ‘the gaze’, and a feeling of restricted agency of 
the spectatorial position; ‘without’ the capacities to know and to act.  Furthermore, 
their work made me feel hyper-gendered in a place where my gender has no value.  
I have no place in their world, my sex and my sexuality are not ‘liked’; neither 
admired nor represented.  I was a ghost, a shadow, a snoop.  I felt excluded from 
imagined spaces of gay male pleasure, relegated to outside the frame; I was 
marginalised, isolated, and disenfranchised.   
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BODY OF KNOWLEDGE:   (iv) WEAK METHOD 
In these encounters with art, single two-dimensional works, exhibitions, and 
performance art there is in the nature of the reading of these texts, something 
relational, perhaps overly invested in subject matter, perhaps perverse in its fixation 
on the spectating self.  In the attention to the smallest of affects, the drawing out of 
The spectatorial response to the minutiae of the image, the situation, you could say 
to the syntax of the moment, there is a correlation with a somewhat outdated branch 
of literary criticism that deals with ‘reader response’.  Like anecdotal theory it seems 
to invite the mild embarrassment of being unfashionable.  Reader-response criticism 
attends to the singularity of the relation between a text and its reader in a level of 
critical detail that may indeed (still) be missing in the analysis of the spectatorship of 
art, even the one-to-one performance.  Reader-response criticism sees meaning as 
something that happens between the text and its reader:  
Meaning . . . is not something one extracts . . . like a nut from a shell, but an 
experience one has in the course of reading.  Literature, as a consequence, 
is not regarded as a fixed object of attention but as a sequence of events 
that unfold within the reader’s mind.  Correspondingly, the goal of literary 
criticism becomes the faithful description of the activity of reading, an activity 
that is minute, complicated, strenuous, and never the same from one 
reading to the next.17  
 
In its privileging of the description of experience that unfolds at its own pace, and 
the focus on the smallest of signs, and the acceptance that this is an inimitable 
event, but one that might be alike to some others, reader-response criticism 
correlates with weak theory and is an effective method to analyse an embarrassed 
spectatorial response to art.  Stanley Fish disputes the idea that reader-response 
criticism can actually be considered to be a ‘method’, and his reasons reinforce the 
likeness to a weak theory, dissolving any lingering equivalence between extent and 
                                                 
17
 Tompkins, pp xvi,xvii. 
 306 
effectiveness. ‘Strictly speaking,’ he writes, ‘it is not a method at all, because neither 
its results, nor its skills are transferable.’18  
 
Fish advocates that the effectiveness of this ‘weak method’ hinges on a change in 
pace in the spectator-text encounter; ‘Essentially what the method does is slow 
down the reading experience, so that ‘events’ one does not notice in normal time, 
but which do occur, are brought before our analytical attentions.’19  When an 
embarrassed response is a factor in the spectator-text relationship, the change in 
pace is effected by embarrassment as a blockage; the embaras.  Like twigs and 
debris accumulating, damming the flow of water, the blockage is a temporary 
intensity of feeling, a pause, a moment of inertia, a building of cathectic force; a 
change of pace that will change.  And the experience is restrictive, self-reflexive, 
analytical, wishful, and above all, critical.  The critical potential of embarrassment 
rests in harnessing the pause, intensity, and flow of the blockage; noticing the 
marginal, unrepeatable ‘event’ and being able to bear its feeling of ‘truth’. 
 
When I looked at Sodom, I thought this work is not about me, and I was about to 
move on.  But compositionally, it is reminiscent of a deposition, and I looked again.  
One figure supporting the other’s dead weight.  Naked.  Two men, naked.  But not 
quite; the wristwatches undo the biblical association.  The work is secular.  And I 
looked again, unsettled by the consistency of the colour of flesh, itching with 
curiosity to read the text that the bodies separate.  Reading the partially obscured 
text is an investment in time; the words delay my progress.  And always with my eye 
returning to the points of contact between the bodies; flesh touching flesh, generous 
and effective in its touch; in its embrace, in its intimacy.  An intimacy that I am 
‘without’.  I am outside the institutional intimacy of normative loops of property and 
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reproduction, ‘one of the most despised sexual minority positions’.20  And I know 
that actually this work is very much about me. 
 
In adopting the weak method of reader-response criticism, the whole envelope of 
the encounter should be considered relevant.  This has proved to be a productive 
strategy, for example when I described my visit to the Gilbert & George ‘Major 
Exhibition’ at Tate Modern.  Not only the works themselves, but the building, 
ideologies of cultural consumption, curatorial practices, the genderedness of 
looking, the encumbrance of ‘the gaze’; all these things contributed to the 
experience of self-consciousness that ruled my spectatorial response.  Gallop 
proposes that in order to access the meaning, truth, or value of art, the spectator 
should attend to what is marginal; ‘to peripheral, insignificant trivia where it might 
appear in a way that surprises, embarrasses, and overwhelms the observer.’21  And 
I would add that besides giving attention to the marginalia of the art work, we should 
allow the feeling of what Barthes terms ‘the perverse body’; ‘ . . . ready to fetishize 
not the image but precisely what exceeds it’.22  It is in the disruptive and distracting 
marginalia that the origins of the embodied truths of embarrassment are to be 
found.  These things slow the experience down and allow critical focus on the 




In my encounter with Gilbert & George’s Sodom, I compared the initial moment of 
embarrassment to an experience of being singled out and knowing that I don’t quite 
‘fit’; that in some way I cannot fully identify with the self being interpellated.  That 
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experience, on the brink of embarrassment is an experience of being exposed and 
differenced, revelling, momentarily, in difference but with the dawning realisation 
that my difference will be pejoratively evaluated.  That is a feeling of singularity.  
And singularity as a mode of feeling resonates with the personal praxis of my 
methodology, and singularity is also integral to the outcome of embarrassment.  It is 
integral to the true-ness that I ascribe to embarrassment, to the restricted agency of 
a weak politics, to the weak method by which we might examine the spectator-text 
relationship, and to its theoretical limitations; that is, a resistance to the 
generalisation of ‘theory-proper’. 
 
Singularity as a word is uncomfortable.  It has a burden of other applications that 
might say something I don’t want to mean.  For Deleuze singularity is an event, a 
point, a density; ‘Singularities are turning points and points of inflection; bottlenecks, 
knots, foyers, and centres; of fusion, condensation, and boiling;’23  But these points 
do not sustain the investment of the fragile self, the self that feels itself to be 
everything.  For Deleuze, a singularity is pure, mobile, and untouching.  When I feel 
singularity as the brink of embarrassment, it is sticky with touch, compromised by a 
self that is never as whole or as wholesome as I imagined.  Deleuze says, in 
complete antithesis to my understanding, that singularity should never be confused 
with ‘the personality of the one expressing herself in discourse’ because ‘It is 
essentially pre-individual, non-personal and a-conceptual. [ . . . ] Singularity is 
neutral.’24  And to my embarrassment I cannot reconcile this disinterest with the 
disorder of self that brims in me any more than I can gaze on an artwork without 
bringing with me the affairs of life.  For me, singularity is exactly the self 
(inadvertently) expressing herself.  My singularity is never neutral. 
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Singularity and the experience of finding oneself unexpectedly ensingled by 
embarrassment are full of possibilities, but come at a cost; embarrassment can be 
diminishing, undignified, discomfortable.  Sartre captures this: 
 There is no one who has not at some time been surprised by an attitude  
 which was guilty or simply ridiculous.  The sudden modification then 
 experienced was in no way provoked by the irruption of knowledge.  It is 
 rather in itself a solidification and an  abrupt stratification of myself which 
 leaves intact my possibilities and my structures ‘for–myself’, but which 
 suddenly pushes me into a new dimension of existence25 
  
The self, he says, ‘solidifies’, which I take to mean an intensity of self-ness, an 
embracing of what is definitively self, the differences, and the possibilities of that 
self.26  
 
Singularity as a particular mode of feeling that must be accountable to and for itself 
is characteristic of the later work of Barthes.  If Roland Barthes had not been run 
over by a laundry truck he might have made good on the promise of individualism 
made in ‘The Crisis of Desire’, an interview for Le Nouvel Observateur in 1980.  In 
the context of a series of questions about intellectualism and militancy, Barthes 
expressed his belief that at that time, there was a lack of desire; ‘A man without 
desire atrophies’ and that in place of an earlier radicalism there was then a trend 
towards conformity, towards becoming part of a herd, that he believes should be 
countered. 
People on the margins of society flock together, become herds, small, it’s 
true, but herds just the same.  At that point I lose interest, because 
conformity reigns in every herd. [ . . . ] I believe that the only truly consistent 
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marginalism is individualism.  But this idea should be taken up again in a 
new way.27 
 
The interviewer then asked; ‘Are you optimistic about individualism?’ And Barthes 
replied: 
No, not really.  Because anyone who lived his individualism in a radical 
fashion would have a tough life. . . . Even if it’s just ‘thinking’ my body until I 
realize that I can think nothing but my own body – this is an attitude that runs 
up against science, fashion, morality, and so on.28  
 
Individualism is evidently not envisaged by Barthes as a comfortable thing to 
inhabit.  But yet he prefers it to being part of ‘the herd’, which is mildly disparaged 
as conformist and uninteresting.   
 
The accidental glimpse of a remarkable intimacy in Gilbert & George’s Sodom 
called on me to account not only for my singularity but more prosaically for my 
singledom, which Berlant terms as a state of being unhinged and unhitched.  My 
family, like swans tend to mate for life, and it was expected that I would too, but I 
continue to disappoint. For me, a pair of swans is a small herd, grazing 
complacently alongside other small herds, and I prefer to retain the uncomfortable 
individualism of my singular singledom. My rejection of the herding instinct, of the 
swan-like pairing has a cost; I suffer an embarrassing exposure of ‘withoutness’.  As 
a singleton, and thus outside the institutions of intimacy, I fail to qualify for the 
institutional privacy accorded to coupledom; the privacy to be in public.   
 
Embarrassment is one of the minor discomforts encountered by individualism and 
the work of Erving Goffman typifies it as personally uncomfortable but socially 
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beneficial.  Goffman presents embarrassment as a hygienic impulse to conform and 
to be ‘good’.  He argues that it acts as a mechanism to preserve principles of social 
organization and is a deterrent to disorder.  Embarrassment, he writes; ‘ . . . is not an 
irrational impulse breaking through socially prescribed behaviour but part of this 
orderly behaviour itself.’29  Embarrassment occurs in a moment of exposed non-
competence when the self fails to fit, fails to ‘fit in’ in a particular context, or when the 
self fails to be ‘good’.  What we crave most at that point is for our failing to pass 
unnoticed, that we might slip back into the protective mass-intimacy of okayness (for 
the ground to swallow us).  As a social regulator that exposes and discourages 
difference, embarrassment can be understood to expose the inadequacies of 
singularity and endorse the conformity of the herd.  Even on ‘the margins of society’, 
even where difference is prized, the herding instinct prevails and embarrassment is 
one of the mechanisms that underpins it.  Because embarrassment is unpleasant, 
and also disprised as weak, incompetent, and risible, we do what we can to avoid it, 
so the discomfort of feeling embarrassed and the stigma of being embarrassed work 
to extend and maintain standards of ‘goodness’, standards of conformity, 
competence and composure.  In this sense, embarrassment can be understood to 
be very conservative.  
 
Besides being conservative, embarrassment, as a feeling of inadequate singularity 
is insistently and overwhelmingly embodied.  In the process of thinking, thinking 
through the blockage of the embarrassment, the self is quite literally overwhelmed 
by its body, too warm, too indifferent, everything but nothing.  And possibilities; 
other manifestations of self that might be possible, (if only . . . ) but not limitlessly 
possible.  Miller suggests that such embodiment is a useful antidote to abstraction; 
One’s own body can constitute an internal limit on discursive irresponsibility, 
. . . The autobiographical act – however self-fictional, can like the detail of 
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one’s (aging) body, produce this sense of limit as well: the resistance 
particularity offers to the grandiosity of abstraction.30  
 
This confirms that the singularity of embarrassment, when harnessed as a mode of 
critical thinking (‘thinking’ my body), insists on staying true to the lived experience.  
Like weak theory, it is curtailed by a productive limitation and is effective only within 





Singularity then, as obstinately not neutral, but as possibility, and as an 
uncomfortable mode of feeling is the cathectic intensity that fires embarrassment as 
criticality.  Embarrassment feels like criticality.  This derives directly from the two 
parts of embarrassment; firstly, of exposure, that is, an exposure to inspection and 
review, and secondly, evaluation; a judgement that is empirical in the sense of being 
experiential rather than speculative or derived from theory.  The evaluation offered 
by embarrassment is always at heart subjective but with an eye to objectivity as (a 
version of) what is ‘true’.  And the evaluation offered by embarrassment is always  
immediately negative; its business is with the not good-enough.  But it is never 
wholly negative; its seed is interest, perhaps even desire.   
 
Looking at Franko B, I was obliged to account for my desire to look at the monster.  
When I looked, my embarrassment was hardly visible, but I confess, I was 
embarrassed to want to look at him, embarrassed by my curiosity, my desire, and I 
was embarrassed that my desire was not reciprocated.  Most hurtfully, I was 
embarrassed that he didn’t acknowledge me; ‘what was I for him?’  I felt I was 
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nothing. Other spectators have felt intimacy and even love inspired by Franko B’s 
performance work.  Doyle openly cried when she saw ‘I Miss You’.  She was moved 
to tears by the intimacy of the piece.  She felt that she was the ‘you’ that Franko’s ‘I’ 
was missing.  Abramovic speaks of the ‘unconditional love’ of his work, and Miglietti 
of ‘an intimate relationship of the unexpressed’.31  I, on the other hand felt much 
less; I felt disregarded and discredited.  I felt diminished. 
 
The criticality of embarrassment mediates between ‘not good-enough-ness’ and ‘if 
only . . .’ so that it has an inherent cathexis that is both, but not equally, critical and 
desiring. This is activated in response to the object of its look, the contingency of 
event, the predicament, and especially to the self that is compromised by these 
things.  Embarrassment is perhaps intrinsically critical because it stems from self-
criticism.  Its primary concern is always with the ‘not good-enough-ness’ of the self.  
But whilst the starting point may be self-criticism, the criticality will not stop at our 
skin. 
 
If we are able to persevere with the discomfort of embarrassment, to examine its 
causes and outcomes, what it draws attention to is our ‘social skin’; something we 
are not always comfortable in that mediates between the interior self and the 
exterior world.  Whilst embarrassment, as an aversive self-consciousness disrupts a 
sense of self, importantly it is also indicative of a friction between the self and its 
‘social skin’ which as Ahmed observes ‘is shaped by some bodies and not others.’32  
Embarrassment points out that however much we might revel in our singularity, we 
also and often crave a sense of belonging as a site or structure of ease, a comfort 
zone, a place where we are ‘good’.  And as Tomkins says, we mostly aim to be 
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‘good’ in the sense of competent rather than morally ‘good’.33  And importantly, we 
crave a place where we are seen to be competent, where we are seen to be ‘good’; 
where our competence and goodness are acknowledged and endorsed.   
 
In our desire to be at ease, and to belong we are willing to moderate and modify 
ourselves, we will, as Berlant says, ‘amputate’ those parts of self that do not fit.  As 
a conservative mechanism of social regulation what embarrassment generally  
inclines us towards, is to fit in, and in order to fit, to avoid being hurt, we manage our 
differences.  We negotiate the terms of belonging, and the structures to which we do 
and don’t belong are fabrications of cultural and counter-cultural ideologies; they 
give consistency and okayness to matters of facticity, to taste and perversion, to 
allegiance or non-alignment, and as structures, they are more and less habitable.  
Barthes writes: 
 I can perfectly well inhabit what doesn’t make me happy; I can 
 simultaneously complain and endure; I can reject the meaning of the 
 structure I subject to and traverse without displeasure certain of its everyday 
 portions (habits, minor satisfactions, little securities, endurable things, 
 temporary tensions)34  
 
Habitation of structures of being and belonging is negotiated in skirmishes along the 
borderlands that mark the outer limits of self; the points at which we encounter our 
limitations and our embarrassability.  But belonging is rarely fully resolved, in part 
because it is a fugitive state, elusive in its orientation, differently mobilised, 
contingent, and our belonging is repeatedly traded against our singularity.   
 
Terms of belonging are socially and culturally prescribed; they are embedded in 
cultural conditions of normativity and what Félix Guattari calls ‘systems of 
submission’.  ‘Mass culture produces individuals: standardized individuals, linked to 
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one another in accordance with hierarchical systems, value systems, systems of 
submission’35  And for Guattari, the subjectivity we experience as standardized 
individuals is hegemonically authored even when we dream, or daydream, or fall in 
love.  In a similar vein, Warner argues that all publics, and all communities of 
persons populate an axis of normativity.  At one extreme is absolute conformity, at 
the other, absolute non-conformity.  He borrows from Goffman the terms 
‘stigmaphobe’ and ‘stigmaphile’ to denote the extremities.  The stigmaphobe is the 
model of the standardized individual who endorses normative values and inhabits 
what Warner terms the ‘world of normals’.  ‘The stigmaphobe world is the dominant 
culture, where conformity is ensured through fear of stigma.’36  The opposite 
position is that of the stigmaphile who learns to value what is different, queer or 
disprised.  And the point Warner makes is that these two poles are far from equal.  
They are hierarchically organised in favour of the conformity of ‘normal’.  Normal is 
a powerful force that is posited as indivisible from ‘good’ (it is normal to be ‘good’; 
being ‘good’ is normal) and the stigma of embarrassment is conscripted as one of 
its control mechanisms.  Even the queerest of counter-cultures, outsider cults, and 
the smallest of herds discipline those who belong, or aspire to belong by endorsing 
‘normal’ (whatever that might be) and stigmatising not-normal as ‘withoutness’.   
 
And yet . . .  and as I have already remarked, there is always an ‘and yet’ with 
embarrassment, a supplementary cause or outcome, something deeper, or 
disavowed, camouflaged by the blush.  And yet, as embarrassment insists on 
returning the embarrassed self to itself, and its difference from the prescribed 
standard of normal, it is potentially quite subversive.  The ‘good feeling’ of 
embarrassment that Gilbert & George claim to value is produced not by being at 
ease, but through discomfort; by being ‘true’ even if that means being not ‘good’, not 
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okay, not good-enough; yet, it is true.  So the perverse value of embarrassment, lies 
in its singularity as something ‘true’, even when it is not good-enough, and perhaps 
especially when it is not good-enough; it lies in resisting the desire for conformity, 
the desire to be okay enough for the herd.   
 
If we are able to suspend the inclination to be absorbed into the ease of belonging, 
and the comfort of the comfort zone, embarrassment might be redefined, not as 
Goffman’s conservative impulse to be ‘good’ that belongs to our ‘systems of 
submission’, but instead, as a vibrant state of (self-)doubt, which is to say, an 
embodied criticality.  In parallel with its hygienic, conservative function the 
supplementary (and subversive) role of embarrassment is to draw attention, not only 
to the individual and her flaws, but to the submission that is expected of her.   
Embarrassment might be understood to be a radical and individuating pulse of 
feeling that is critical of institutional okayness and the coercive structures of normal 
that we are supposed to belong to, or at the very least, aspire to belong to.  If we can 
bear the feeling, embarrassment might free us from the tyranny of normal, because 
embarrassment is in fact, the emergent and uncomfortable consciousness of a 
flawed individualism.   
 
 
‘SOMEWHAT’  EMBARRASSING 
But the cathexis of critical-desiring turns out to be an accommodation rather than a 
will to act.  Embarrassment is theoretically weak, politically weak, cathectically lazy.  
Even though in the moment of embarrassment, in the heat of the moment when the 
self is everything, and we are privately consumed by it, it is publicly marginalised; 
disprised, unvalued, a minor discomfort.  The feeling is side-lined, covered up, and 
not valued. 
 317 
I have argued that embarrassment is an experience of singularity that is inconsistent 
with normative terms of inclusion, and that it is a form of embodied criticality, critical 
of the sometimes coercive terms of being and belonging, but perhaps it is only 
somewhat critical.  Like Bersani demoting the embarrassment he felt about being 
included in Foucault’s sweeping homo-sentimentality, claiming to be only somewhat 
embarrassed, I too feel compelled to mitigate the strength of the claim I make for 
embarrassment.  This mitigation is in no way meant to diminish critical authority, but 
does reflect the fact that embarrassment and its critical epistemology is limited 
(productively limited) to a minor register.  I find that I too am emasculating it through 
language to say that embarrassment is ‘somewhat critical’ of the coercive terms of 
institutional okayness.  Embarrassment is marginal and always marginalised and 
also tautological; it is embarrassing to be embarrassed, and in accord with this, the 
criticality offered by embarrassment has its own embarrassments.  Embarrassment 
as criticality is embarrassed by its complicity in the very coercive ideologies it is 
critical of; the embarrassing truth is that embarrassment has always already been 
conscripted to endorse what it critiques.   
 
The ‘good feeling’ of embarrassment arguably comes from defining it not as a 
conservative impulse, but instead, as radical and individuating, but because 
embarrassment is implicated in the coerciveness of social and ideological 
structures, it cannot be a thoroughly radical impulse, nor can its effects be 
thoroughly individuating in a radical way.  It is in fact, embarrassing to claim the 
insistent singularity of embarrassment as a radical individuation when the claim is 
so vulnerable to accusations that singularity is no more than a petit-bourgeois 
liberalism.  Embarrassment, fickle and Janus-faced is thus undermined by 
ambivalence, and perhaps by what Barthes might identify as ‘traces of bourgeois 
ideology’ that present such a risk of ‘scandal’.  Embarrassment, like an 
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amphibology, persists in meaning in both directions.  To redefine embarrassment as 
a radical and individuating thinking-feeling will spare no blushes; it will still hurt.  
 
When we look at art we look within a framework that places normative value on 
critical distance.  But if we are willing to get right up close, exposing what we are, 
and risking feeling, and indeed, looking foolish, the spectator may find that she is 
open to other possibilities besides.  Among the range of possible emotional and 
cognitive responses that the spectator might experience, embarrassment is slight, 
never flashy or outspoken.  It is quite subdued, quite muted, and almost mute.  It is 
more than indifference, but considerably less than the exaltation of Bell’s ‘aesthetic 
emotion’.  To be embarrassed by looking, by being caught looking, is likely to be 
only to be somewhat embarrassed.  It is a condition of minor dissatisfactions, with 
the self, with the encounter, with the conditions of social skin that frame the 
experience.  It will entertain tentative connections; between the work and its viewer, 
between the symbolic world of art and the real world, between thinking and feeling, 
between the present moment and other time frames, between cultural aspirations 
and more prosaic lived experience of the individual person.   
 
When we look at art, we are conditioned to have certain expectations of the 
encounter, preconceived ideas of spectatorial response predicated on tropes of 
value; of knowledge and taste.  Spectatorial response is freighted with expectation.  
Not least, there is an anticipation of the encounter being potentially transformative; if 
the art is good-enough, if the spectator is good-enough.  When we look at art, we 
accept the role of ‘spectator’ and enter into a relation with the art object, an object 
that as ‘art’ is already ascribed certain credentials accrued within the value system 
of the artworld; a system of exhibition, curation, critique and review and collection.  
Embarrassment as a conservative mechanism will reinforce exactly those values, 
persuading the spectator to take on those values as her values, so that she can be 
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as Berlant says, in proximity to ‘okayness’.  She will play by the rules of the gallery, 
she will gaze in the prescribed manner, and aspire to show if not knowledge, then at 
least taste.  She might aim to appreciate art. 
 
Within the context of art spectatorship, to alternatively accept the possibilities of 
embarrassment as radical and individuating might be to stand apart from the 
normative values of the art world, to stand ‘without’ the system that ascribes them: 
not to contradict or oppose, but to be apart from the system rather than a part of the 
system.  Barthes writes of the pleasure of the text being a matter of ‘individuality’ 
rather than ‘subjectivity’; an embodied sensation quite unlike, that is to say, quite 
separate from other individual bodies.  And embarrassment, as a good feeling, or at 
least as a not entirely un-pleasurable feeling, makes us acutely aware of that 
separation and the cultural specificity of our individuality.  Embarrassed, we feel our 
singularity.  By exposing ourselves to art, we may find ourselves seeing (and seeing 
ourselves seeing) from a viewpoint that is critical, self-centric, trivial, but also true.  
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